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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most vexing historical debates in corporate law concerns
whether regulations or markets are better equipped to address managerial
agency costs within public corporations.' Although corporate law scholars
have traditionally favored immutable legal imperatives as an elixir for
misaligned incentives, 2 an increasing number of commentators place
I. This debate is most salient when applied to public corporations for two reasons. First,
because the shareholdings of public corporations are often widely dispersed, managers may enjoy
greater leeway to operate the corporation to maximize their own welfare selfishly without fear of
significant shareholder dissent. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 6 (1933). Second, when shares are dispersed and publicly
traded, it becomes possible for a single entity or unified group to purchase a control block of shares,
threatening to wrest control from renegade managers. See, e.g., ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE
LAW § 9.5.1, at 390-92 (1986); Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J.
POL. ECON. 288, 288-89 (1980); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and
Control, 26 J.L. & EcON. 301 (1983); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305, 308-10; 337-38
(1976).
2. Jack Coffee, for example, has assessed the value of takeovers as a mechanism to align the
incentives of managers and shareholders against other mechanisms, including "independent boards,
shareholder voting, derivative litigation, or mandatory disclosure statutes." John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in
Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1199 (1984). He contends that takeovers are "at best
a partial remedy and cannot be seen as a substitute for other modes of accountability." Id. at 1200.
Coffee argues that a hostile takeover may not further social welfare for at least two reasons. First,
Coffee notes that other mechanisms are more effective at aligning the interests of managers and
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greater faith in market mechanisms to accomplish the same task. 3 While
many such mechanisms operate simultaneously (including markets for
output, 4 labor, 5 and capital6 ), perhaps none has received more attention
than the oft-celebrated "market for corporate control" as a means for
shareholders for all but "massive managerial failures". Id. at 1153. Second, Coffee contends that
hostile takeovers may result in "serious diseconomies." Id. Hostile takeovers may occur not because of
efficiency reasons but rather because the acquirer's management seeks to maximize the size of their
firm. Additionally, the prospect of a hostile takeover may cause target managers to engage in more
risky behavior to boost the value of their firm. Coffee also argues that an active hostile takeover market
may reduce the security of managers in their jobs and thereby make the labor market less liquid as
managers require a higher amount of salary to compensate for their reduced job security. See id. at
1158-60, 1221-50. See also ROBERT B. REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER 140-72 (1983)
(advancing the argument that takeovers force managers to pay excessive attention to short-term gains at
the expense of long-term planning); Leo Herzel, John R. Schmidt, & Scott J. Davis, Why Corporate
Directors Have a Right to Resist Tender Offers, 3 CORP. L. REV. 107 (1980) (contending that broad
authority for the board of directors to stop hostile tender offers forces the bidder to negotiate with the
board and thereby may lead to a higher premium for the target company's shareholders); Martin Lipton,
Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 20-25 (1987)
(arguing that the takeovers have resulted in overly leveraged firms, harm to nonshareholder
constituencies of a corporation, and an excessive focus on the part of managers on short-term profits);
Louis Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 249, 268-309 (1983) (questioning the efficient market hypothesis and arguing that a hostile
takeover based solely on a low stock price is unlikely to be correlated with poor management at the
target firm).
3. John Pound, on the other hand, argues for a more "political" means of corporate oversight "in
which active investors seek to change corporate policy by developing voting support from dispersed
shareholders, rather than by simply purchasing voting power or control" including, for example, proxy
contests and more informal consultations between management and investors. John Pound, The Rise of
the Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003,
1004-10 (1993). Political means of oversight avoid the large transaction costs and disruption
accompanying a change in control and are more politically sustainable compared with takeovers where
active investors seek to change corporate policy by developing voting support from dispersed
shareholders, rather than by simply purchasing voting power. Id. at 1009.
4. Competition in the market for a corporation's output products reduces profits within the firm
and thereby the rents available for managers to expropriate privately. Managers who shirk also run the
risk of unemployment as competition drives their firms from the industry. See, e.g., Frank H.
Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L.
540, 557 (1984) (contending that competition in a firm's market for output products forces the firm's
managers to maximize firm value).
5. An active, competitive labor market gives managers an incentive to avoid developing a
reputation for self-dealing, which would cause difficulties when they seek to obtain managerial
positions in the future. See Armen A. Alchian, Corporate Management and Property Rights, in
ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 337, 338-49 (Henry G. Manne
ed., 1969). Cf Shuichi Senbongi & Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Managerial Reputation and the
Competitiveness of an Industry, 13 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 95 (1995) (predicting that managers produce
more quantity than necessary to maximize profits in imperfectly competitive industries as a means of
increasing their reputation in the managerial labor market).
6. The need on the part of some firms to return periodically to the capital market for new
sources of funds may also constrain the ability of managers to appropriate private benefits of control.
See Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 650
(1984).
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achieving deterrence. 7 By providing a constant and credible risk of hostile
acquisitions, the takeover market creates a powerful incentive for managers
8
to constrain their own rapacity in the interests of self-preservation.
Consequently, the argument goes, a principal normative aim of corporate
law should be to ensure that the market for corporate control remains
active, robust, and competitive.
It is therefore unsurprising that even champions of market incentives
tend to cast lots with their proregulation counterparts in scrutinizing
defensive practices that foreclose the possibility of a takeover. 9 Consider,
7. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions,91
YALE L.J. 698, 705 (1982) ("Corporate control transactions can reduce agency costs if better managers
obtain control of the firm's assets or if they alter the incentive structure facing existing managers.
Corporate takeovers, and subsequent changes in management, increase the wealth of investors."); Frank
H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1169-74 (1981) Ihereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper
Role] (arguing that hostile tender offers are one way for an outside investor to collectivize the interests
of dispersed shareholders in monitoring management for agency problems); Ronald J. Gilson, A
Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN.
L. REV. 819, 841-45 (1981) (arguing that takeovers are superior to mergers, asset sales, or proxy
contests in displacing poorly performing managers); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for
Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 113 (1965) (contending that "[olnly the takeover scheme
provides some assurance of competitive efficiency among corporate managers and thereby affords
strong protection to the interests of vast numbers of small, non-controlling shareholders"). See also
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1981) (contending that "[tfhe effects of [inhibiting takeovers]
are substantial .... The reallocation of economic resources to their highest valued use, a process which
can improve efficiency and competition, is hindered. The incentive the tender offer mechanism provides
incumbent management to perform well so that stock prices remain high is reduced.").
8. Some takeover-market proponents have also criticized the effectiveness of more traditional
means of aligning managers' incentives, such as fiduciary duties. For example, in an influential paper,
Fischel and Bradley write:
Many analyses of corporate law assume that liability rules enforced by derivative suits play a
fundamental role in aligning the interests of managers and investors. We have shown that this
widespread assumption is not supported by either the theory of liability rules, the available
empirical evidence, or the structure of corporate law.
Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate
Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 292 (1986).
9. For a taxonomy of different antitakeover devices, see Clark, supra note 1, at 571-77 (1986).
We should note that antitakeover devices need not always work to reduce shareholder welfare. Some
such devices may enable managers to protect shareholders from coercive as well as inadequate tender
offers. Defensive tactics may also help to foment a competitive auction for control, resulting in a higher
price for target company shareholders. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing
Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1046-56 (1982) (arguing that "acquirers may vary substantially
in the amount of synergistic or managerial gains they can produce, and a rule of auctioneering increases
the likelihood that the target will be acquired by the firm to which its assets are most valuable"). But
see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L.
REV. I, 2 (1982) (arguing that auctions for corporate control "do not benefit investors as a group even
though they may raise the price realized in particular cases. By raising the price, auctions reduce the
number of acquisitions and thus the amount of monitoring."); Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role,
supra note 7, at 1175-77 (contending that managers should remain passive even where defensive tactics
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for example, the practice of paying "greenmail," i.e., causing the
corporation to repurchase the stock held by an impending acquirer at a
substantial market premium.10 With few exceptions," I supporters of the
takeover market view the possibility of greenmail (and other forms of
standstill agreements) as an unwarranted impediment to market

may result in a higher bid price for the target firm). For an empirical study of the wealth effects of
defensive tactics, see Robert Comment & G. William Schwert, Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the
Deterrence and Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures, 39 J. FIN. EcON. 3, 6 (1995)
(providing evidence that defensive tactics increase the target company's bargaining power and thereby
the premium that target shareholders receive in a tender offer).
Notwithstanding the potential salubrious effects of defensive tactics, when an antitakeover device
simply precludes the possibility of any takeover, commentators are more unanimous in their criticism:
If the company adopts a policy of intransigent resistance and succeeds in maintaining its
independence, the shareholders lose whatever premium over market value the bidder offered
or would have offered but for the resistance or the prospect of resistance. This lost premium
reflects a foregone social gain from the superior employment of the firm's assets.
Easterbrook & Fischel, ProperRole, supra note 7, at 1174-75.
Whether or not bidding contests are desirable, there are strong reasons for opposing defensive
tactics, such as creation of antitrust obstacles, that obstruct the resisted offer. These tactics
can be abused, as Easterbrook and Fischel observe, by a management seeking to perpetuate its
control. Obstructing tactics also preclude shareholders from making their own decision
whether to accept the offer. These concerns justify the prohibition of such tactics, even if
Easterbrook's and Fischel's thesis on bidding contests is rejected.
Bebchuk, supra note 9, at 1029. See also Ronald J. Gilson, supra note 7, at 875.
10. A close cousin of greenmail, the standstill agreement, has also received attention. Through a
standstill agreement, the target corporation pays money to a large block shareholder in return for the
promise on the part of the block shareholder not to acquire additional shares. Standstill agreements
frequently include a provision giving the block shareholder a seat on the company's board of directors.
See Larry Y. Dann & Harry DeAngelo, Standstill Agreements, Privately Negotiated Stock Repurchases,
and the Market for Corporate Control, II J. FIN. EcON. 275, 279 (1983).
11. Jonathan Macey and Fred McChesney have attempted to provide one such exception, arguing
that greenmail provides the target company's management the ability to cull out lower value bidders
and thereby encourage higher value bidders into an auction for corporate control. See Jonathan R.
Macey & Fred S. McChesney, A TheoreticalAnalysis of CorporateGreenmail, 95 YALE L.J. 13 (1985).
Under this account, greenmail provides compensation to an initial bidder in a takeover contest, inducing
the bidder to invest in research to determine whether a company is a worthwhile takeover target. Id. at
28-32. Macey and McChesney also note the superiority of greenmail in relation to other defensive
tactics from a shareholder welfare perspective. See id. at 29-30 (countering that "greenmail is unlike
other defensive tactics, in that greenmail actually solves the free-rider problem that lowers the
probability of an ultimate takeover"). Macey and McChesney also argue that standstill agreements
serve to induce outside investors to reveal credibly their information to the target firm on the value of a
potential merger. See id. at 34-37 (contending that "standstill agreements can also work as a bonding
mechanism permitting the transfer of information"). See also Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny,
Greenmail, White Knights, and Shareholders' Interest, 17 RAND J. ECON. 293 (1986) (arguing that
greenmail provides a signal to the market of a potentially profitable bidding opportunity and that
greenmail also allows the target company to initiate a competitive auction by removing the initial bidder
whose preexisting low-cost stake in the firm gives it an otherwise large advantage in the auction). But
see Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Komhauser, Takeover Defensive Tactics: A Comment on Two
Models, 96 YALE L. J. 295, 315-17 (1986) (questioning whether management really has any
informational advantage in determining the presence of other, higher value third party bids).
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discipline. 12 Greenmail, however, is but a focal point within a larger
universe of takeover-retarding practices where managers bestow
"favoritism" on certain block shareholders using corporate resources. Even
outside of the context of an impending takeover, favoritism can (and does)
exist in any number of forms: Managers may, for instance, sell discounted
shares to select shareholders, thereby giving the shareholders preferential
rights to the corporation's profits. They might alternatively seek to divert
corporate opportunities and other favorable business prospects toward
favored shareholders. Management may also seek to procure block
shareholders' quiescence more directly, through express payments of cash
or property in exchange for a portion of the block of shares. But
notwithstanding its form, the various types of favoritism share a common
feature: They all have the design (and frequently the effect) of co-opting
the most plausible acquirers of the firm-block shareholders-converting
them from market monitors into conspiratorial confederates of
management. As such, the argument goes, shareholder favoritism retards
the disciplining threat of a takeover, and is therefore likely to reduce
aggregate firm value.
Critics of shareholder favoritism go further still, arguing that
patronage not only reduces the effectiveness of monitoring, but in addition
it permits managers to appropriate for themselves even greater levels of
firm value, all to the detriment of shareholders as a group (and potentially
that of other corporate stakeholders). Hence, conventional wisdom has
largely held fast to its view that the law should proscribe (or at least
discourage) the practice of favoritism toward block shareholders. 3 The
political durability of this position may also help explain the existing array
of prohibitions against favoritism, ranging from bans on non-pro rata
12.

See Ronald J. Gilson, Drafting an Effective Greenmail Prohibition,88 COLUM. L. REV. 329,

330 (1988) ("From the perspective of the protakeover forces, greenmail is just another, albeit more
blatant, technique by which target management entrenches itself at the expense of target
shareholders."). See also David Cowan Bayne, S.J., Traffic in Corporate Control-Greennail:The
Intrinsic Illegitimacy, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 511, 513 (1995) (contending that "[g]reenmail is

nothing other than a recondite species of the broader genus Corporate Bribery, and as such is
intrinsically illegitimate"); Note, Greenmail: Targeted Stock Repurchases and the ManagementEntrenchment Hypothesis, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1048-49 (1985) (relating the argument that
managers may use greenmail payments to entrench themselves in control).
13. See infra Part H1(discussing the legal prohibitions against the various forms of shareholder
favoritism). On the other hand, certain forms of favoritism may also generate ancillary benefits to the
firm. When a firm hires a shareholder as an employee, the shareholder may represent the best potential
hire despite the danger that the firm is using the employment as a pretext to shift resources to a
particular shareholder. Similarly, shareholders with good information on the company may offer the
lowest cost source of additional capital for firms. Although these possible virtues are not central to our
analysis, we briefly revisit them in Part II.
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shareholder dividends, to fiduciary duties of loyalty imposed on dominant
shareholders, to federal tax policies and securities laws that work to inhibit
4
various types of shareholder favoritism.1
In this Article, we question whether the general case for prohibiting
favoritism is as strong as conventional wisdom suggests. Our analysis
contains both practical and theoretical components. From a pragmatic
perspective, we argue that the multi-dimensional nature of shareholder
favoritism creates an immense regulatory obstacle for courts and
legislatures. Indeed, while some acts of patronage are relatively simple to
verify (such as outright cash payments to block shareholders), prohibiting
such acts would be unlikely to eradicate the overall practice of bestowing
favoritism. Rather, managers intent on playing favorites would simply
relocate their activities, choosing less verifiable actions (such as the in-kind
allocation of business opportunities). While regulators might attempt to
compensate through ad hoc prohibitions on those less direct forms of
patronage, so doing would not only add significant administrative costs, but
it might simply induce managers to readjust their strategies yet again. All
the while, in an effort to outwit prospective proscriptions, managers would
adopt increasingly indirect and inefficient contrivances for transferring
value, compounding burgeoning administrative costs with additional
deadweight losses that often attend in-kind transfers. This inefficient
dynamic may ultimately render the regulatory game unworthy of the
candle.
Nevertheless, even if prohibiting favoritism at zero cost were a
practical regulatory option, we contend that the theoretical case for doing
so is far from clear; rather, we shall argue, explicitly permitting favoritism
might better serve the interests of shareholders as a group ex ante, even if it
might appear undesirable from an ex post perspective. Our theoretical
argument stems from a simple observation: Takeovers require substantial
investment on the part of an butside acquirer to execute successfully.
Nearly all acquirers, for example, must pay a hefty premium above the
current secondary market price to execute a hostile acquisition
successfully.15 Consequently, a number of potential acquirers may remain

14. Most recently, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") promulgated regulations
limiting the ability of corporations to favor particular shareholders, among others, with selective
disclosures of nonpublic material information. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange
Act Release. No. 34-43154, 73 SEC Docket 3 (Aug. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Promulgating Release]..
15. See Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597, 598-601
(1989) (stating that the takeover premiums averaged 50% in the 1980s); Reinier Kraakman, Taking
Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Discounted" Share Prices As an Acquisition Motive, 88
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docile in the face of outright waste or self-dealing by managers, fearing that
the payoff from a takeover does not justify its significant cost. And herein
lies the rub-for a legal regime that permitted favoritism would provide
investors with an enhanced incentive to assemble a significant but
noncontrolling block of shares in the first place. Indeed, assembling such a
"toehold" block would now confer two valuable benefits on its owner: first,
it would give the block shareholder more credibility in threatening to
engage in an outright acquisition (since the cost of the premium for
assembling the block will subsequently be viewed as sunk); 16 and second, it
would afford the block shareholder an opportunity to lay claim to a share
of the manager's private control benefits, threatening (credibly) a takeover
if the manager refuses to render patronage. Furthermore, this second
option does not even require that the investor ever build a control stake in
the firm, a cost savings that proves to be important when (as is often the
case) the premium required for assembling a block of shares increases with
17
the size of a block.
This enhanced attraction for forming a toehold, however, is but half
the story. Anticipating the incentives of prospective toehold investors,
corporate management must choose between two responses. One choice is
simply to accommodate whatever block shareholders emerge, securing
their quiescence through subsequent patronage and favoritism. 8 While
such a strategy might insulate the management somewhat from a takeover
(and even increase the amount of private benefits that safely may be

COLUM. L. REV. 891, 892 (1988) (noting that takeover premiums "now average over 50% of prebid
share prices"). See also Michael C. Jensen, Corporate Control and the Politics of Finance, J. APPLIED
CORP. FIN. 13-15 (1991) (estimating that shareholders of target companies received approximately

$650 billion in premiums between 1976-90). Potential acquirers may also need to expend resources
investigating a potential takeover target.
16.
This first benefit, of course, would be present even if side payments were not possible.
17.
Indeed, investors tend to pay a significantly larger per share premium as the size of the block
they are purchasing increases. See infra Part Il.

18. Note that Macey and McChesney question the rationality of using greenmail to deter a hostile
takeover when managers act opportunistically. Macey & McChesney, supra note 11, at 41. "The
greenmail game.., is one that any number can play. If management pays greenmail once in order to
protect its jobs, it must be prepared to pay it again and again." Id. Other forms of shareholder
favoritism, nevertheless, do not result in the repurchase of all of the favored shareholder's shares. For

example, allowing the favored shareholder to exploit a corporate opportunity provides the shareholder a
benefit without reducing the shareholder's ownership percentage in the firm. Once co-opted, the
presence of a management-friendly block of shares then will raise the cost to other potential acquirers.
The acquirer at the very least must assemble a control block larger than the preexisting pro-management
block. As this Article discusses below, the presence of the preexisting block may also raise the cost to
the acquirer of purchasing shares from among the remaining dispersed shareholders. See infra Part 111.
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appropriated from the firm'l 9), it also requires sharing any private benefits
of control with others. On the other hand, management could choose an

alternative response of deterrence, so constraining its own ability to reap
private benefits as to render the formation of any block unprofitable. We
argue that under many plausible circumstances, managers would prefer

deterrence to accommodation, opting (much like Bedlzebub 20 ) to consume
all of a small pie than a meager portion of a large one. In so doing,
managers would voluntarily commit themselves to appropriating even less

firm value than they would in a world where favoritism was effectively
prohibited (and outside investors had to make a binary choice between
inaction and outright acquisition). Furthermore, in conventional market
settings where multiple outside blocks could potentially form (each
demanding patronage from managers) this incentive to deter entry by block
shareholders grows even stronger. As such, playing favorites with block
shareholders may, ironically, be in all shareholders' interests.
The implications of our argument hold particular salience for those
who would champion the market for corporate control as a remedy for

managerial incentive problems.

Indeed, our analysis suggests that a

prohibition on favoritism-far from ensuring competition in the market for

corporate control-may instead be an unintended incubator of managerial
mischief. Consequently, we conclude that efficiency-minded courts and
policymakers would do well to consider abrogating such prohibitions (at
least in certain situations 2 1). Doing so would force managers to reckon
with the possibility that outside investors could form blocks solely to

extract patronage, thereby inducing greater managerial discipline. This
inducement, moreover, exploits managers' own expertise and knowledge in
designing effective corporate governance devices to achieve deterrence.
And, because the threat of block shareholder entry is ongoing and

19. As our model below demonstrates, even this proposition is questionable. Indeed, if
management significantly increases the amount it expropriates from the firm, it might inadvertently
make it into such a strong takeover target that it is impossible to deter the outside investor, even with
patronage. See infra Part M.
20. In Milton's PARADISE LOST, Beelzebub rationalized his exile into Hell in a manner similar to
our hypothetical manager (albeit with graver consequences), stating:
Here at least
We shall be free; the Almighty hath not built
Here for his envy, will not drive us hehce:
Here we may reign secure, and in my choice
To reign is worth ambition; though in Hell:
Better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven.
JOHN MILTON, PARADISE LOST 1:258-63 (Christopher Ricks ed., Penguin English Poets 2000) (1667).
21.
See infra Part IV (detailing the contexts in which a permissive judicial posture is likely to be
optimal).
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persistent, the incentive to engage in self-restraint would similarly be
ongoing, long after the initial sale of securities to the public.
Significantly, because the benefits from allowing selective payments
to shareholders derive from the ex ante incentive effects that are placed on
managers, our argument extends even to (and indeed, particularly to)
situations where the corporation is not an active target. 22 Consequently,
our argument provides a more general defense of shareholder favoritism
based not on those instances where it occurs, but rather on those in which it
does not.
Even for advocates of regulatory discipline over markets, however,
our analysis may prove useful, in that it spotlights a significant danger of
piecemeal prohibitions against shareholder favoritism. For pragmatic
purposes, regulators are initially most likely to scrutinize the most overt
forms of favoritism, such as outright cash payments to select shareholders.
Indeed, these acts are the easiest for regulators to detect, to evaluate, and
ultimately to punish. The problem with a piecemeal approach, however, is
that managers may respond by simply masquerading their acts of
patronage, embedding them within a different, otherwise value-enhancing
type of transaction (such as supply contracts). Furthermore, once such an
adjustment occurs, it may be quickly perceived by policymakers to
constitute, on the whole, little more than veiled patronage-thereby
justifying a categorical extension of regulatory scrutiny. This serial process
can lead to a regulatory structure that is dangerously over-broad and
ultimately self-defeating, inducing the true regulatory targets to substitute
into another, more opaque and yet-unregulated sphere, while leaving more
legitimate actors caught in the regulatory crossfire. Moreover, such
complex contrivances can themselves introduce costs and inefficiencies
that would not be present if devices of overt favoritism were allowed.
Hence, even if one were convinced that shareholder favoritism is
undesirable, 23 it is far from evident that attempting to prohibit it with
conventional regulatory machinery is a realistic (or prudent) policy choice.
Finally, our analysis exposes an important lesson for corporate
scholars of all stripes who wish to assess the effects of shareholder
22. A different possible argument exists in support of managerial actions that reduce the threat of
a takeover. Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence Summers contend that entrepreneurs may wish to implement
antitakeover devices to protect the interests of managers in the firm-specific human capital they develop
within the corporation. Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile
Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS 33, 42 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988). Such protection, in turn,
induces managers to invest in their firm-specific human capital. Id.
23. As noted above, we question the validity of even this logical predicate.
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favoritism as an empirical matter. Indeed, under our approach, it is the
threat of having to share benefits that induces managers to exercise
restraint, deterring the emergence of a block shareholder in the first
instance. This deterrence benefit would simply not be apparent if
researchers limited their empirical inquiries only to those cases where a
block shareholder emerges and receives preferential treatment-in such
instances a side payment need not make others better off.2 4 Our principal
argument, however, is that the "off-equilibrium" benefits of deterrence
(corresponding to those bribes which are never actually paid) may well
swamp the costs detected in observed incidents of patronage. Thus, in
order to conduct a more balanced and coherent analysis of such practices,
legal scholars would do well to accord the dogs who didn't bark as much
attention as those who did.25
Four caveats to our analysis deserve explicit mention before
proceeding. First, our principal focus in this Article is the impact of
shareholder favoritism on the threat of a possible takeover to align the
incentives of managers with shareholders. There are, of course, countless
other mechanisms that provide incentives in a parallel fashion that do not
work through a block of shares (including executive compensation
schemes, fiduciary duties, and so forth). Although we will touch briefly on
many of these alternative devices, they are ultimately somewhat tangential
to our enterprise. To be sure, responsible policymakers ultimately must
evaluate an entire "portfolio" of incentive devices, of which markets for
corporate control are only a part. But to the extent that such markets can be
also can occupy a more prominent
made to operate more effectively, they
26
portfolio.
regulatory
this
space within
A second (and related) caveat concerns our assumption that managers
are in a position to manipulate their firms' governance structures in order to
appropriate value inefficiently. One might justifiably wonder, then, why
organizational structures preventing them from doing so are not in place

24. But see supra note II (citing arguments that selective payments even in situations where they
actually are made may increase overall corporate welfare).
25. For example, in their rebuke of Macey and McChesney's pro-greenmail arguments, Jeffrey
Gordon and Lewis Komhauser focus only on greenmail transactions that actually occur, arguing that the
predominance of shareholder value-decreasing greenmail transactions over value-increased greenmail
transactions argues possibly for a complete ban of greenmail. Gordon & Komhauser, supra note 11, at
320. Our analysis, however, points out that in assessing greenmail among other forms of shareholder
favoritism, commentators must focus also on the incentive effect placed on managers even where the
payment is never made.
26. Indeed, all we must argue is that the reforms we advocate do not systematically undercut the
ability of firms to utilize these other incentive devices as well.
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from the very beginning. Indeed, a well-known argument in corporate
finance maintains that entrepreneurs have strong ex ante incentives to
select the best corporate governance structure possible in order to
maximize the price investors will pay for shares at an initial public
offering. 27 Thus, if managerial value diversion were inefficient, this
reasoning asserts, the initial charter would prohibit it. While this argument
is well taken, we find it to be of limited usefulness in a world of
uncertainty. Indeed, the needs of most corporations vary over time, and
most entrepreneurs lack the ability to predict with precision the firm's
prospective needs. As such, it is virtually impossible to design complete
governance structures that come close to maximizing firm value far into the
future without also allowing for some managerial flexibility over
governance. 28 Of course, this flexibility may also allow managers to
exploit governance "gaps" by self-dealing. But at the same time, it is
precisely in such circumstances where the market for corporate control
becomes an important deterrent. As noted above, our analysis offers
insights about how such a market can be made to operate more effectively,
providing durable and continuous benefits well after a firm's initial public
offering.
Third, it is important to underscore that our deterrence arguments
focus on how permitting patronage affects firms whose shares are already
widely dispersed. While this class of corporations is an important one from
a corporate governance perspective, 29 not all corporations have such
widely-held ownership structures.3' For such firms, it is simply not possible
to "deter" investors from forming an influential block-for one already
exists. There, introducing a permissive regulatory regime may offer few
benefits for nonblock shareholders, and may even come at the cost of
inducing managers to co-opt existing block shareholders, who might
otherwise be good monitors.
27. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 305-07.
28. For example, in order to maximize shareholder value, a firm's entrepreneurs might have
contemplated requiring that a certain fraction of its board consist of outside directors. The value of
particular outside directors, however, will depend on their individual expertise and reputation for
independence. Without good knowledge of the available pool of outside directors down the road,
entrepreneurs would have difficulty determining the optimal mix of inside to outside directors. See
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1573 (1989)
(arguing that "[o]pportunistic amendment is possible because the corporate contract is inevitably
incomplete. The parties cannot specify terms to cover even plausible contingencies ... .
29. See supra note I and accompanying text.
30. Many firms outside the United States and the United Kingdom, in fact, are characterized by a
controlling block shareholder comprised of either a controlling family or the state. See, e.g., Rafael La
Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J.
FIN. 471,471 (1999). Our analysis therefore applies primarily to U.S. and U.K. corporations.
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And fourth, although we believe our arguments to be relatively
general in nature, they depend crucially on a key assumption pertaining to
managerial commitment. Explicitly, we assume that even if a manager's
choice of precisely how much firm value to divert ex post is hard to detect,
the manager must possess the corporate governance tools ex ante to
constrain credibly subsequent personal diversions of value at some
maximal level, and in a manner that is at least partially observable to
outsiders. Indeed, it is precisely this act of commitment that enables
shareholder favoritism to provoke the deterrent effect that we envision. In
the absence of such tools, a manager's mere assertion of self-abnegation
would be little more than cheap talk, incapable of deterring the formation
of blocks. 3 Notwithstanding the centrality of this assumption, however,
we maintain that numerous actions falling within the domain of managerial
power have exactly the effect we envision, including, inter alia, incurring
installing
highly monitored bank debt, executing long-term contracts,
32
bonding.
reputational
in
outside directors, and engaging
Our analysis proceeds as follows. Part II provides the pragmatic
portion of our argument, presuming (provisionally) that shareholder
favoritism is undesirable and questioning whether effective regulation is
practically feasible. This section offers a taxonomy of methods through
which a corporation may favor its shareholders selectively and describes
the regulatory system that governs them. We argue that the patchwork
nature of this legal landscape is both inevitable and hazardous, raising
serious doubts about whether effective regulation in this area is attainable.
Part III then turns to the conceptual portion of our thesis, reversing our
inquiry by presuming (provisionally) that effective regulation is feasible
and questioning whether the goal of eliminating favoritism is itself
justified. Here, we formally develop the argument that shareholder
favoritism may, ironically improve overall corporate welfare. To do so, we
employ a simple 33 example drawn from game theory that analyzes how
managers might constrain their abilities to take private benefits within the
31. Put another way, the manager's representation lacks credibility. Absent constant monitoring,
once the pressure on managers is relieved, managers will simply appropriate as much value as possible.
Of course, in a repeat relationship, managers may attempt to develop a reputation for maximizing
corporate value above their own narrow self-interest. For a discussion of reputation among other
devices for committing managers to limiting their private benefits of control, see infra Part III.C.2.
32. We explore these various devices and others. See infra Part III. We also discuss two other
(less pivotal) assumptions that underlie our analysis: the increasing marginal cost of purchasing a block
of shares and the allocation of bargaining power between the block shareholder and the manager. See
infra Part 111.
33. As noted above, while we pursue a simple example for reasons of tractability, our analysis
extends to a more general environment. See Choi & Talley, supra note **.
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shadow of a legal rule that alternatively prohibits and then permits
favoritism. Using this example, we demonstrate how, if patronage were
allowed, managers would prefer to deter the entry of block shareholders
who expect patronage, and in so doing would commit to even less value
diversion than they would in situations where favoritism is prohibited. Part
IV discusses various reform implications from this insight. Because
numerous means of favoring shareholders are possible, we argue that
lawmakers should consider the interaction of these different payment
schemes with one another. In particular, while courts and policymakers
have moved to regulate the most easily observable forms of opportunistic
payments more stringently, our analysis suggests that a better course of
action (at least in certain circumstances) may be to permit more direct and
observable forms of shareholder favoritism while regulating the more
indirect forms. Part V concludes, discussing possible extensions of our
analysis.
II. FAVORITISM IN PRACTICE
In order to conduct a meaningful assessment of shareholder
favoritism, it is first important to be clear about how and when it is
observed in practice. This Part, therefore, provides a description of various
methods by which managers favor shareholders selectively and discusses
the challenges that courts and legislatures have had in regulating them.
Although ostensibly distinct, all of the methods noted below share at least
two mutual characteristics. First, each provides an institutional mechanism
for allocating to a favored shareholder some benefit, property, or legal
claim whose value exceeds (in a pro rata sense) what other shareholders
receive. Second, the methods below historically operate as instrumental
alternatives for one another. In other words, the introduction of a
prohibition against one method of selective payment can shift managerial
behavior toward some alternative (and as yet unregulated) method. This
cat-and-mouse game is reflected in a pattern of piecemeal regulation in
which courts and legislators struggle to keep pace with an ever-shifting
system of shareholder patronage. Thus, conscientious regulators must
assess the desirability of regulating each selective payment method not
only individually, but also in light of the likely substitution effects that
34
would occur after regulation.
34. Regulators, of course, could respond with an attempt to block all forms of selective
payments. Such a broad regulatory prohibition, however, is not without cost. Different forms of
selective payments may generate varying benefits to overall corporate welfare. Prohibiting all
interested transactions with shareholders, for example, may rob the firm of an important source of
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For clarity of exposition, we shall employ throughout the remainder of
this Article a hypothetical designed to illuminate many of the central issues
at play. Consider Acme Corporation, a nationally prominent manufacturer
of ten-gallon cowboy hats. Acme has 10 million shares of common stock
outstanding, trading initially on NASDAQ at a secondary market price of
$100 per share, thereby giving Acme a total market capitalization of $1
billion. Assume that this initial $100 per share price reflects the true
fundamental value, in present discounted value, of Acme's future cash flow
(that is, if managed selflessly). Unless otherwise specified, we presume
Acme to have many thousands of dispersed, well-diversified shareholders,
each of whom holds a negligible percentage of Acme's shares. Acme's
management team acts as a cohesive group, owns zero common shares in
Acme, and individually receive a fixed wage.3 5 In addition, we consider
one other possible player, Merit Investments, a privately owned mutual
fund. Like other shareholders, Merit initially owns a negligible stake in
Acme, but it has sufficient liquidity to amass as much Acme stock as it
desires. By purchasing a sufficiently large block, Merit might be in a
position to demand patronage from Acme's management team, threatening
to consummate a takeover (displacing current management) if its demands
are not satisfied.
A. A TAXONOMY OF PATRONAGE

Ignoring any legal prohibitions, Acme management has numerous
mechanisms at its disposal to confer benefits on Merit. Although it is
beyond our ken to canvass every one of them, six warrant explicit
enumeration: (1) direct distributions of cash and property; (2) loans and
capital contributions; (3) interested transactions between a firm and its
shareholders; (4) the allocation of corporate opportunities; (5) the
allocation of business activities; and (6) the selective disclosure of
nonpublic information. We address each in turn, briefly analyzing their
current legal status as well.
1. Distributions of Cash and Property
Outright transfer payments are perhaps the most obvious means to
confer benefits on shareholders.
Most directly, Acme may simply
capital and expertise. Moreover, as the next Part discusses, social welfare may benefit from even the
opportunistic use of payments to select shareholders.
35. In order to concentrate on the takeover market as a disciplining device, we suppress (for
now) the role that incentive compensation (such as options or stock compensation) might play in
providing managerial incentives.
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distribute cash drawn from the corporation's treasury to Merit (and
potentially other block shareholders); Acme could also transfer title to
some of its assets or entitlements directly to Merit, possibly as a part of
sales transaction at a price far below market value.
Somewhat less directly, Acme might also be able to transfer cash to
Merit through the selective repurchase of Acme's shares.
Share
repurchases may occur in any number of ways, including negotiated oneon-one transactions, open market repurchases, or formal repurchase tender
offers on behalf of the corporation. 36 Note, however, that if they are done
at prevailing market prices, share repurchases do not systematically favor
the tendering shareholders over others. Indeed, suppose that Merit
Investments has accumulated a large block of shares (say 1 million), and
Acme now seeks to repurchase some of them. If the purchase price were
set at $100 per share-the prevailing secondary market price-Merit would
not experience an appreciable gain from the repurchase. 37 Only if the
purchase price exceeded $100 per share does Merit Investments gain at the
expense of the nonselling shareholders. 38 Referred to as greenmail within
the takeover context,39 favorably priced share repurchases from select
shareholders can occur at any time (even in the absence of an imminent
acquisition).4"
More subtly still, Acme may be able to bestow favor on Merit by
purchasing other shareholders' stock at a discount. Of course, such a
transaction would require Acme to convince other shareholders to sell
below intrinsic value, but in certain circumstances this might be

36. For a discussion of the different types of share repurchases, see Jesse M. Fried, Insider
Signaling and Insider Trading with Repurchase Tender Offers, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 421, 427-34 (2000).
37. Some gains, nevertheless, are possible. A large block shareholder may not have the ability to
sell a significant fraction of its shares into the secondary market at the prevailing secondary market
price. Once the market learns of the large block shareholder's planned sale, for example, the secondary
market price may drop. The drop could occur either because the market takes the planned sale as a
signal that the block shareholder believes the secondary market price is too high or because of the
pressure a large influx of new shares into the market places on the secondary market price. The block
shareholder could, of course, attempt to disguise its sales or negotiate a sale to one party seeking to
accumulate a large number of shares.
38. Suppose that Merit sells I million shares back to Acme at a price of $200 per share. After
the repurchase, Acme will have a total value of $800 million (down from its initial $1 billion) and
Acme will have 9 million shares outstanding. Each share will then be worth only eighty-eight dollars.
39. See Bayne, supra note 12, at 514-15 (defining greenmail).
40. After Ross Perot resigned from the board of General Motors in 1986, for example, GM
repurchased all of Perot's shares in GM for $700 million. GM Stockholders Irked by Buy-Out of Perot
Warn Against 'Greenmail',ARIz. REPUBLIC, Jan. 29, 1987, at C2.
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accomplished. 4 1 For example, suppose that Acme management has just
learned some nonpublic information about its future prospects (such as
signing Garth Brooks to a cowboy hat endorsement deal) that would
increase its fair market value to $1.2 billion, resulting in a per share value
of $120. Acme might seek to repurchase 5 million shares from non-Merit
shareholders at the prevailing market price of $100 per share. After the
repurchase, Acme will be left with $700 million and 5 million outstanding
shares, giving a per share value of $140. If Merit does not tender any of its
shares, Acme's purchase from others will leave Merit with gains of twenty
dollars per share.4 2
Selective transfers of firm resources then impose at least two potential
harms on nonfavored shareholders. First, the firm suffers a reduction in its
amount of resources available to itself and the shareholders as a group.
When Acme's managers seek to favor Merit Investments with a transfer of
cash from Acme's bank account, Acme's total value drops. To the extent
the payment is non-pro rata, the transfer results in a net decrease in value
for some shareholders matched with an increase in value for the recipient
shareholders.
Second, the reduction in resources may affect the firm's ability to fund
new and ongoing projects. With a lower amount of cash reserves, Acme
will have a reduced ability to initiate new research projects or enter into
new product markets, for example. To the extent the firm's projects have a
positive net present value, however, the firm may go to the capital markets
and other sources of funding to finance the projects. In situations where
imperfect capital markets exist, nevertheless, the reduction in resources in
the firm may leave the firm without adequate resources to pursue even
positive net present value projects. Firm value therefore suffers an indirect
loss equal to the expected return from the foregone projects.43

41.
Note that a large-scale repurchase of the shares of public shareholders may be characterized
as a repurchase tender offer. As a tender offer, such transactions are then subject to federal securities
regulation under the Williams Act. The "Williams Act" refers to Pub. L. No. 90-439, 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. (82 Stat. 454) 281 l(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-78m(e), 78n(d)-78n(f)
(2000)). For a discussion of the issues surrounding the regulation of repurchase tender offers, see
Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock Repurchases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1377,
1384-87 (1986).
42. Merit, of course, must know enough not to tender its shares. Some form of selective
disclosure must therefore occur from management to Merit. For a discussion on the limits of firms to
engage in selective disclosures, see infra Part II.A.6.
43. Note that this capital reduction may also be true for pro rata distributions, but it can be
particularly salient in non-pro rata repurchases, particularly when the recipient shareholder is a potential
competitor. See infra note 56 (discussing a similar point with respect to Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien,
280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971)).
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Of those transactions discussed above, a feature that distinguishes
outright cash distributions from other types is the ease with which they can
be observed and verified in court. Indeed, assessing a direct cash
distribution requires only that one observe the amount of dollars
transferred. Once this amount is known, no other uncertainty exists as to
the value of the transfer. In contrast, when assessing transactions that
involve a more indirect transfer of value to a block shareholder (such as a
share repurchase at a premium) courts must compare the contracted price
with the prevailing market price to determine whether the firm transfers
any value to the shareholder. In a share repurchase, courts must assess the
price paid against the value of the shares; even so, the presence of a liquid
secondary market for most publicly held corporations provides courts with
44
an easily observable market price to use as a proxy for share value.
Perhaps accordingly, both courts and regulators are quickest to scrutinize
non-pro rata cash transfers, and do so in at least four ways.
First, federal tax law imposes a cost on all forms of distributions of
cash and property, whether pro rata or not. Consider the direct distribution
of cash and property to shareholders. To the extent a corporation has
positive earnings and profits, shareholders must treat the transfer of cash or
property from the corporation as a dividend, taxable at ordinary income
rates.45 Even shareholders of corporations without sufficient earnings and
44. Whether the market price in fact is a good proxy for share value depends on whether the
market price in fact incorporates all available information related to the value of the share. The
efficient capital market hypothesis provides one justification for this assumption.
Several versions of the efficient market hypothesis exist. The strong form of the hypothesis holds
that all information, whether public or nonpublic, is incorporated in the secondary market securities
price. The semi-strong version of the efficient capital markets hypothesis in turn posits that the
secondary market price of companies reflects all publicly available information on the company. See
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383
(1970) (providing a survey of theoretical implications of efficient markets and empirical testing of the
efficient markets hypothesis). See also Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the
Fraud on the Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 911-12 & n.Il (pointing out that "[tihe
empirical evidence to date (with some exceptions) appears to establish the validity of the weak and
semi-strong versions but not the strong form of the efficient capital markets hypothesis"). Unless
otherwise specified, the Article utilizes the term "efficient market" to refer to a trading market that
displays features of a semi-strong efficient market.
Others have argued that markets are not efficient because of investor irrationalities and cognitive
limitations in processing information. See Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and
Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 853-54 (1992); Lynn A.
Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement,Market Failure,and Securities Regulation, 81
VA. L. REV. 611, 648-50 (1995) (reporting skepticism on the part of financial economists on the
validity of the efficient market hypothesis).
45. Under Section 301(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, distributions considered a "dividend"
are taxed as ordinary income. I.R.C. § 301(c)(1) (1994). Section 316 then defines a dividend as a
distribution to the extent of available current and accumulated earnings and profits. I.R.C. § 316.

20021

PLAYING FAVORITES WITH SHAREHOLDERS

profits must pay taxes at capital gains rates to the extent the total amount
they receive from the corporation exceeds their individual bases in the
corporation's stock.46 The tax on distributions from the corporation
therefore reduces the value of direct transfers to shareholders. For every
dollar a manager uses to favor a particular shareholder, the shareholder
47
receives much less than a dollar due to taxes.
Second, in the context of share repurchases for cash, pro rata
repurchases generally are treated the same as a direct distribution of cash
and property for tax purposes. 4 8 For non-pro rata repurchases, however,
selling shareholders usually face (more favorable) capital gains treatment
for any excess price paid above their basis to the extent the repurchases are
substantially disproportionate. 49
Nonselling shareholders that gain
disproportionate value as a result of repurchases from others may also face
taxation. 50 Interestingly, then, disproportionate repurchases that favor
Although not formally defined in the tax code, the earnings and profits concept attempts to track the
total capital surplus within the corporation. See JACOB MERTENS, JR., THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION § 38C:01 (1997) (defining earnings and profits as "an economic concept the tax law utilizes
to approximate a corporation's power to make distributions in excess of shareholders' initial
investments"). Adjustments to earnings and profits are provided under Section 312. I.R.C. § 312.
46. See I.R.C. § 301(c)(2), (3).
47. Although note that nonprofit shareholders pay no taxes on investment gains, among other
things. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
48. See I.R.C. § 302(b)(1); United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 312 (1970) ("Congress clearly
mandated that pro rata distributions be treated under the general rules laid down in §§ 301 and 316
rather than under § 302, and nothing suggests that there should be a different result if there were a
'business purpose' for the redemption.").
49. See I.R.C. § 302(b)(2) (providing that a distribution to a particular shareholder is
disproportionate if "the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation owned by the shareholder
immediately after the redemption bears to all of the voting stock of the corporation at such time, is less
than 80% of. . . the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation owned by the shareholder
immediately before the redemption bears to all of the voting stock of the corporation at such time").
Repurchases that are "not essentially equivalent to a dividend" are also granted basis return and
preferential capital gains treatment. I.R.C. § 302(b)(1). Repurchases that completely terminate the
shareholder's interest in the firm or result in a partial liquidation of the corporation also receive such
favorable tax treatment. See I.R.C. § 302(b)(3), (4).
50. See I.R.C. § 305(b)(2), (c); Treas. Reg § 1.305-3(e), Example (8) (as amended in 1995). See
also MERTENS, supra note 45, § 38B:92 (noting that "periodic redemptions are particularly suspect
under the disproportionate distribution rules of Section 305(b)(2)"). Mertens writes:
For example, if pursuant to a plan for periodic redemptions a corporation agrees to redeem up
to 5% of each shareholder's stock each year and some but not all of the shareholders have
stock redeemed under this plan, the remaining shareholders' proportionate interests in the
assets and earnings of the corporation will be increased. Provided that the cash received by
the shareholders who have some of their stock redeemed is taxable under Section 301, the
remaining shareholders will be deemed under Section 305(c) to have received a taxable
distribution under Section 305(b)(2) equal to their proportionate increase in the ownership of
the redeeming corporation.
Id. On the other hand, a single isolated redemption will probably not result in the nonredeemed
shareholders being deemed as receiving a distribution under Section 305(c). See id.
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particular shareholders may receive even more favorable tax treatment than
pro rata purchases. Nevertheless, to the extent gain exists on the shares,
even under the more favorable tax treatment the recipient shareholder must
pay some amount of taxes.
Third, state corporate law systematically prohibits virtually all non-pro
rata cash distributions to favored shareholders. Typically addressed in the
context of dividend payments that favor a dominant shareholder, 5 1 state law
52
bans outright any non-pro rata dividends paid to shares of the same class.
Moreover, even when a corporation has several classes of shares and makes
correspondingly different dividends to the separate classes, courts
frequently apply the stringent "intrinsic fairness" standard to ensure that a
dominant shareholder does not benefit at the expense of minority
shareholders holdings shares of a different class. 53 Pro rata cash
distributions, on the other hand, have generated far less judicial scrutiny.
In SinclairOil Corp. v. Levien,54 for example, the Delaware Supreme Court
declined to overturn a large pro rata dividend that depleted a corporation's
liquidity, arguably to the benefit of the parent corporation that was the
dominant shareholder. Instead, the Court applied the business judgment
rule to the dividend,5 5 holding that absent waste the dividend was not a

51.
For a good discussion of the law dealing with controlling shareholders see Mary Siegel, The
Erosion of the Law of Controlling Shareholders, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27 (1999).
52. See ERNEST L. FOLK, RODMAN WARD JR., EDWARD P. WELCH, & ANDREW J. TUREZYN,
FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW, Fundamentals § 170.2, at 34-41 (1993). See
also JAMES D. Cox, THOMAS LEE HAZEN, & F. HODGE O'NEAL, CORPORATIONS 526 (1997) ("the
distribution of dividends among shareholders of the same class must be without discrimination and pro
rata unless it is otherwise agreed by all"); II FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORP. § 5352 (perm.
ed. rev. vol. 1995) (stating that dividends generally must be made on a pro rata basis but that
"[sihareholders of closely-held corporations may unanimously agree upon a scheme other than pro rata
distribution"); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-Specific
Assets and Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, 24 J. CORP. L. 913, 921 & n.22 (1999) (noting
that "[i]t would be clearly illegal-and easily challenged-if the majority shareholder paid itself $1 per
share in dividends, while only paying minority shareholders $. 10 per share").
53. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721 (Del. 1971) (noting in dicta that a
parent corporation that receives an overly large dividend for one class of shares compared with minority
shareholders holding another class of shares would face the stringent "intrinsic fairness" standard of
court review).
54. 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
55. Id. at 721-22 (stating that "Sinclair [the parent] received nothing from Sinven [the
subsidiary] to the exclusion of its minority stockholders. As such, these dividends were not self-dealing.
We hold therefore that the Chancellor erred in applying the intrinsic faimess test as to these dividend
payments. The business judgment standard should have been applied."). See infra note 60 (describing
the business judgment rule).
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violation of the parent corporation's fiduciary duty to the subsidiary's
56
minority shareholders.
Finally, state corporate law also scrutinizes the managers themselves
who cause the payments to be made, imposing upon them the fiduciary
duty to act in the best interests of the firm and its shareholders as a group.
Managers who force the firm to make a payment to a specific shareholder
solely for the purposes of entrenching their own positions would violate
that duty of loyalty, and would therefore be subject to liability.57 At the
same time, demonstrating an actual loyalty violation in court is no simple
feat. Unlike situations where managers obviously stand on both sides of
the transaction (and where courts apply heavy scrutiny 58 ), acts of
favoritism toward block shareholders do not clearly evince self-interested
motives. 59 In order to proceed on a duty of loyalty claim, then, plaintiffs

56. Sinclair Oil Corp, 280 A.2d at 720-23 (stating that the intrinsic fairness test for transactions
involving a parent and subsidiary corporation will be applied only where self-dealing is present and
defining self-dealing as occurring "when the parent, by virtue of its domination of the subsidiary, causes
the subsidiary to act in such a way that the parent receives something from the subsidiary to the
exclusion of, and detriment to, the minority stockholders of the subsidiary").
The law, however, is not perfect in its attempt to block the ability of corporations to favor
shareholders disproportionately even through cash payments. Even pro rata distributions of corporate
resources may benefit individual shareholders differentially. Return to the Sinclair Oil case. 280 A.2d
717. Although the minority shareholders received the same pro rata portion of the cash dividend as the
parent, the different sets of shareholders may still have had conflicting interests. The parent, for
example, may have faced a large liquidity crisis, leading it to remove cash from the subsidiary even
where the cash would provide a higher long-term value within the subsidiary. Other minority
shareholders lacking such a liquidity crisis may very well have desired to keep the money inside the
subsidiary.
57. The fiduciary duty of loyalty forms the core prohibition against managerial appropriation of
private benefits. The duty of loyalty prohibits managers from competing against the corporations.
Managers may not generally profit at the expense of the corporation. Self-dealing transactions between
the managers and the corporation are not allowed unless deemed objectively "fair." See Meinhard v.
Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464 (1928) (stating that the duty of loyalty involves "the exercise of the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive"). See generally CLARK, supra note I, § 18.4 (describing the
duty of loyalty under state corporate law). Self-dealing transactions lose the more favorable business
judgment standard of review. Instead, courts apply the much more stringent "entire fairness" standard.
See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710-11 (Del. 1983). Delaware, nevertheless, allows
managers to cleanse a self-dealing transaction through a variety of procedural means, including a vote
on the part of disinterested directors or shareholders. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1991).
58. See Heckmann v. Ahmanson, 168 Cal. App. 3d 119, 128, (1985) (describing appropriate
judicial scrutiny the court stated, "Once it is shown a director received a personal benefit from the
transaction ... the burden shifts to the director to demonstrate not only the transaction was entered in
good faith, but also to show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation .... ").
59. Several corporate welfare enhancing motivations may lie behind favoring shareholders
selectively. For example, firms may seek to subsidize the formation of blocks of shares that may have a
greater incentive and ability to monitor managers for agency problems. Without more, therefore, the
mere flow of payments to a block shareholder does not necessarily imply opportunism. Moreover, even
where opportunism exists, the support of the block shareholder for management is often indirect and
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must be able to demonstrate a sufficient nexus between the act of patronage
and managers' personal interests, or risk dismissal under the business
judgment rule. 60 Moreover, complaining shareholders must navigate a
tedious and complicated set of procedural hurdles associated with asserting
such claims derivatively-hurdles that become more difficult to cross in
61
cases where the alleged disloyalty is relatively attenuated.
The ability of managers to play favorites without violating their
fiduciary duties, therefore, turns in part on their ability to obscure their selfdealing motives from courts, usually by burying the transfer within a larger
transaction. While share repurchases would seem to be one way to obscure
a naked transfer, any premium above market price is also a relatively easy
red flag to which plaintiffs may point.62 And thus, even though courts have
therefore hard to observe. Block shareholders, for example, may support management through votes in
subsequent proxy contests.
60. Delaware's statement of the business judgment rule is represented in Smith v. Van Gorkom,
488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985):
Under Delaware law, the business judgment rule is the offspring of the fundamental principle,
codified in 8 Del. C. § 141(a), that the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation are
managed by or under its board of directors. In carrying out their managerial roles, directors
are charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders. The
business judgment rule exists to protect and promote the full and free exercise of the
managerial power granted to Delaware directors.
Id. at 872-73 (citations and footnote omitted). See also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984); 3A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 52, § 1036 (describing the application of the business
judgment rule). In Aronson the court stated that the business judgment rule:
is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company. Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment will be respected by
the courts. The burden is on the party challenging the decision to establish facts rebutting the
presumption.
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. Plaintiffs that seek to allege waste face a high hurdle:
Where waste of corporate assets is alleged, the court, notwithstanding independent
stockholder ratification, must examine the facts of the situation. Its examination, however, is
limited solely to discovering whether what the corporation has received is so inadequate in
value that no person of ordinary, sound business judgment would deem it worth what the
corporation has paid.
Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962).
61.
A manager's duty of loyalty is technically owed to the firm, and thus the firm enjoys the sole
right to pursue such suits. See CLARK, supra note 1, § 15.1 (1986); DEBORAH A. DEMOTr,
SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:01 (1987) (stating that "[d]erivative
litigation is a uniquely complicated form of civil litigation, in part simply because the real party in
interest in the litigation, the corporation, is not the plaintiff'). Consequently, a plaintiff must first
demand that the board pursue the action (which is often unlikely), or the plaintiff must successfully
claim that making a demand was excused, as it was futile. See Carol B. Swanson, Juggling Shareholder
Rights and Strike Suits in Derivative Litigation: The ALl Drops the Ball, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1339,
1349-56 (1993) (describing the demand requirement, excuse, and waiver of demand). Although what
makes demand futile varies across jurisdictions, most jurisdictions require some degree of involvement
in the challenged transaction on the part of the board assessing the demand. Id. at 1351.
62. See supra text accompanying note 44 (discussing the efficient capital market hypothesis
justification for the assumption that the market price reflects the value of a firm).

2002]

PLAYING FAVORITES WITH SHAREHOLDERS

accorded presumptive validity to share repurchases on terms deemed "fair"
to the corporation,6 3 the inability to disguise a premium over market price
makes it significantly harder for managers executing non-pro rata
repurchases either to invoke the business judgment rule or to rely on
procedural hurdles in order to forestall litigation. As such, managers have
turned, over time, to less telltale forms of favoritism, which we take up
64
below.
2. Loans and Capital Contributions
From time to time, it is typical for firms like Acme to require
additional capital in order to fund new and ongoing endeavors. In such
situations, Acme might choose to seek funding from any number of
sources, including internally generated funds, bank loans, and capital
markets. 65 If, however, Acme's management team also wishes to conceal
favoritism toward a shareholder like Merit, it may often be possible to do
so as a part of the terms of a loan executed directly with Merit. In a similar
vein, Acme might be able to issue additional securities to Merit in return
for hard capital.
In any transaction between a firm and one of its shareholders, the
potential for favoritism obviously exists. In this case, for example, Acme
might agree to pay an excessively large interest rate, or otherwise provide
Merit with new securities at a discounted price for securities issued in
return. Suppose once again that Merit owned 1 million of Acme's
10 million shares outstanding. So long as it has sufficient treasury shares,
Acme may decide to sell 1 million additional shares to Merit in return for
$50 million (or fifty dollars per share). After the transaction, Acme will
have a market capitalization of $1.05 billion and 11 million shares
outstanding, resulting in a $95.46 per share value. Although Merit loses
along with all other shareholders on the shares held prior to the sale, Merit
63. See Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964) (applying heightened judicial scrutiny to
greenmail agreements). See also Viacom Int'l Inc. v. Icahn, 946 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1991); Grobow v.
Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 191 (Del. 1988) (upholding a greenmail repurchase of shares because the terms
were "fair").
64. While it may still sometimes be possible for managers to pay patronage by purchasing
others' shares at below-market prices, the factual premises needed to convince shareholders to sell at a
discount (such as private information about firm value) are somewhat uncommon.
65. See Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock
Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 648 (1988) (noting that "[internal
o]perating revenues finance an average of 61% of corporate expenditures") (citing R. BREALEY & S.
MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 291, table 14-3, (2d ed. 1984)). For a discussion of the

disadvantages of relying on bank financing or internally generated funds, see Bernard Black, The Legal
and InstitutionalPreconditionsfor Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 832 (2001).
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also gains $45.46 on each share that it purchases. All told, then, Merit's
66
net benefit from the transaction is equal to $40.9 million.
Although raising capital from a favored shareholder at discount prices
also faces several legal obstacles, such obstacles appear to be somewhat
less prohibitive than those applicable to direct payments. First, no direct
tax consequences affect Merit Investments from this transaction. Merit
loses some value on its preexisting shares and more than makes up for it on
the discounted shares it purchases in the above example. The gain on the
shares to Merit, under present federal tax law, is not realized until Merit
actually disposes of the shares. 67 So long as Merit holds onto the shares,
the gain will remain unrealized and therefore nontaxable. Compared with
direct payments of cash or property, managers may therefore transfer a
greater amount of corporate value to a particular shareholder through the
issuance of new securities. Recipient shareholders that seek to convert this
value into cash, however, will eventually face tax consequences when they
68
sell their shares.
Second, while fiduciary duties still constrain self-interested decisions
to raise capital, the practical reach of those duties is somewhat constrained
by a court's limited ability to observe and verify the manager's intent to
self-deal in the issuance of securities. Unlike direct distributions of cash or
property, it is much harder to detect a non-pro rata distribution in the
context of raising capital through issuing new securities. Indeed, not only
do such transactions carry the pretext of having a legitimate purpose, 69 but
Acme managers can often also demonstrate legitimate justifications for the

66. Merit loses $4.54 on each of its initial I million shares (for a total loss of $4.54 million) but
gains $45.46 on each of the new I million shares it purchases (for a total gain of $45.46 million). The
net gain to Merit is therefore equal to $40.9 million.
67. The realization requirement under federal tax law requires that a sale or exchange, among
other possible realization events, must occur before the gains or losses on an asset are recognized for
tax purposes. See I.R.C. § 1001 (1994). See also WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOSEPH BANKMAN, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION 271 (1 th ed. 1997).
68. Because sales may occur in the future, the shareholder still benefits from the deferral of tax
consequences.
69. Indeed, evidence exists that the market reacts favorably to news of an equity private
placement. See Sophie Hopper Wruck, Equity Ownership Concentration and Firm Value: Evidence
from Private Equity Financing, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 8-9 (1989) (finding a positive secondary market
reaction to news of an offering in a study of equity private placements into the United States from 1979
to 1985). In particular, where share concentration increases as a result of the offering, the secondary
market reaction is even more positive. See id. at 10-23 (arguing that greater share concentration leads
both the increased monitoring of management and a raised probability of an eventual takeover). Wruck
theorizes that private equity placements typically involve a fewer number of purchasers able to
negotiate with management for access to nonpublic information to gauge the value of the company. See
id. at 10.
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apparent discount given to Merit. For example, U.S. securities laws
severely limit the ability of purchasers to resell securities purchased
through a private placement,7 0 and thus part of the discount Merit receives
could represent compensation for future illiquidity. Additionally, the
decision to raise capital may send an adverse signal that managers believe
the company to be overvalued, or reveal a liquidity crisis within the firm.
71
Such a signal would cause any purchaser to demand a discounted price.
Viewed in this light, preexisting shareholders (such as Merit) who are
relatively familiar with the company are somewhat less vulnerable to such
signals. As such, these investors-while still demanding a discountmight nonetheless require less of one than would third parties not already
familiar with Acme's operations.72 With such readily available
justifications, managers stand a good chance of defending discounted sales
to a block shareholder under fiduciary principles even where the stated
justification is simply a pretext.
Finally, capital market transactions with block shareholders face only
minimal scrutiny from federal securities laws. For private placement
transactions with a specific shareholder, the securities laws provide a safe
harbor under Regulation D7 3 of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities
Act"), 74 imposing only minimal disclosure requirements. Under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"), 75 reporting companies
that seek to raise capital through a private placement only need to furnish
their most recent annual Form 10-K filing to purchasers, among other

70. Securities sold through private placements are typically referred to as "restricted" securities.
Absent an exemption from the public registration requirements of the securities laws, investors may not
resell restricted securities without engaging in a registered public offering. SEC Rule 144 provides one
such exemption. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2001) Under Rule 144, investors must hold their restricted
securities at least one year, among other requirements, before engaging in resales. Id.
71. See Stewart Myers and Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financingand Investment Decisions
When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, 132 J. FIN. ECON. 187, 219-20 (1984)
(describing the incentive of managers to sell securities where the secondary market price overvalues the
company relative to its fundamental value).
72. Because the comparison is between the discount the preexisting shareholders actually
negotiate against what discount, hypothetically, outside investors would have demanded for the same
securities, courts may have difficulties in observing the reduction in discount that preexisting
shareholders may demand. For example, a preexisting shareholder may negotiate a discount of 15%.
Without more, this discount seems large in magnitude. However, where the firm's next best alternative
is to issue equity to an outsider at a 20% discount, the firm in fact saves 5% in financing costs by
issuing the securities to the preexisting shareholder.
73. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-230.508.
74. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (2000). Regulation D provides a safe harbor for private placements
pursuant to Sections 3(b) and 4(2) of the Securities Act. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504, 230.506.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 78.
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things.76 To the extent the shareholder is considered an accredited investor,
moreover, firms are not affirmatively required to disclose any
information."
Block shareholders that own greater than 5% of any
outstanding class of equity securities, on the other hand, face disclosure
78
requirements under the Williams Act.
It is difficult to justify (at least on first principles) the differential
degree of regulation that governs capital market transactions versus direct
payments. Indeed, the risk of opportunism in the two types of transactions
seems strikingly similar. In theory, managers may opportunistically
transfer just as much corporate value through the issuance of securities as
through the direct distribution of cash or property to a particular
shareholder. Although the corporation does not directly suffer a reduction
in capital on its books, it does bear a loss relative to the value it would have
obtained had the securities been sold at a fair market price. 79 The cash

76. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(ii). See also 15 U.S.C. §7. Form 10-k, available at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/forms/Ok.htm (as of Dec. 23, 2001).
77. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1) (noting however that "[w]hen an issuer provides information
to investors pursuant to paragraph (b)l, it should consider providing such information to accredited
investors as well, in view of the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws"). Accredited
investors are defined to include investment companies registered under the Investment Company Act of
1940, corporations with total assets in excess of $5 million, and any natural person meeting minimum
net worth or income requirements. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a).
Regulation D imposes a number of additional requirements. Among such requirements is the
requirement that the issuer not engage in "general solicitations." See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c). Private
placements pursuant to Rule 504 that are "exclusively in one or more states that provide for the
registration of the securities, and require the public filing and delivery to investors of a substantive
disclosure document before sale, and are made in accordance with those state provisions" (among other
exceptions) are exempt from the prohibitions on general solicitations. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1).
In discussing the scope of the general solicitation requirement, Donald Langevoort writes that:
ITihe SEC has adhered to a subtextual principle: any "general solicitation" of investors is
necessarily inconsistent with the notion of a nonpublic offering. In other words, one cannot
advertise or otherwise cast one's net broadly in the hopes of finding qualified investors, but
instead must solicit only those whom, based on some pre-existing relationship, one has good
reason to believe do not need the protection of the registration requirement.
Donald C. Langevoort, Angels on the Internet: The Elusive Promise of "Technological
Disintermediation" for Unregistered Offerings of Securities, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. I
(1998). The general solicitation requirement may therefore channel issuers seeking to raise a small
amount of capital quickly to turn to a preexisting investor in the company.
78. The Williams Act requires persons with a beneficial ownership interest of more than 5% in a
class of a firm's equity to make a Schedule 13D disclosure filing with the SEC pursuant to Section
13(d) of the Williams Act and the SEC's own rules and regulations. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l).
Among the required disclosure items include the identity of the owner, the source and amount of the
funds used to make the purchase, and any plans the owner may have to liquidate, merge, and make a
major change to the corporation if the purpose of the owner is to acquire control. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(d)(l )(A)-(C).
79. All shareholders of the corporation suffer pro rata from this loss in potential value.
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infusion from the offering proceeds, moreover, may provide managers with
a greater ability to siphon off resources for their own personal uses.
Moreover, by channeling managers toward this less regulated
mechanism for favoritism, the existing legal regime may have created even
greater inefficiencies. Indeed, bestowing patronage through the issuance of
shares may impose additional costs that are not present with a direct
payment of cash or property. First, although Merit may have some
informational advantage over the outside market in valuing Acme, Merit
still suffers from an informational disadvantage, compared with the
management team itself, on the exact value of the firm. To the extent the
block shareholder is wary that the firm's managers may in fact be selling
overvalued securities, the shareholder will demand an additional discount
for the risk it bears. Moreover, the issuance of new shares will cause the
purchasing shareholder to increase its undiversified ownership of securities
in the firm. 80 The shareholder will therefore raise its level of firm-specific
risk and require a larger discount in compensation.8 1 In light of these
added costs, the systematic discouragement of direct payments may well
have induced an alternative outcome that is even more inefficient.
3. Interested Transactions
Another mechanism that is often available for benefiting select
shareholders consists of more garden-variety business relationships. A
firm might, for example, hire representatives of a block shareholder as
employees, or to provide independent contracting services. Where a block

80. In addition, the federal securities laws restrict the ability of investors that purchase shares
through a private placement to resell the shares (termed "restricted shares") immediately. Rather, the
investors must either have the issuing corporation register the shares under Section 5 of the Securities
Act or the investors must find an exemption from Section 5 to resell the shares. See 15 U.S.C. § 78e.
For example, investors may resell restricted shares pursuant to Rule 144 of the Securities Act to the
extent the investors, among other requirements, hold onto the shares for at least a one-year period. See
17 C.F.R. § 230.144. Investors in private placements within the United States, therefore, face an
illiquidity risk during the period in which resales are prohibited and will demand a greater discount
from the issuer to compensate for this illiquidity.
81. Empirical evidence exists that shares sold through a private placement typically are sold at a
large discount from the issuer's current secondary market price. See Michael Hertzel & Richard L.
Smith, Market Discounts and Shareholder Gains for Placing Equity Privately, 48 J. FIN. 459, 478
(reporting a 35% mean discount for equity private placements of greater than $25 million in securities);
William L. Silber, Discounts on Restricted Stock: The Impact of Illiquidity on Stock Prices, FIN.
ANALYSTS J., July-Aug. 1991, at 60 (reporting a 33.75% mean discount for a sample of equity private
placements involving 69 issuers).
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shareholder operates a separate line of business, the firm may also transact
82
for the provision of goods and services from the separate business.
Where the transactions occur at prevailing market rates, the
shareholder acts as any other market provider. Firms will utilize the
shareholder as opposed to other providers of goods and services only to the
83
extent the shareholder provides greater value than the other providers.
Not all transactions, however, occur on market-based terms. Managers that
seek to favor a particular shareholder may do so through a contract that
provides the shareholder terms more favorable than in the market.
Suppose, for example, that Merit operates a temporary financial analyst
service, providing consulting services for a fee. Acme could employ
Merit's analysts at higher than market rates, thereby shifting value from
Acme to Merit.
As with direct payments of cash and property, legal limits exist on the
ability of firms to favor particular shareholders through interested
transactions. Once again, however, the limits are not as stringent in
practice as those facing direct payments. Tax law does provide some
limitations on these forms of business transactions. Although not formally
a dividend, federal tax law may recharacterize an interested transaction as a
"constructive dividend," forcing the corporation to lose a potential business
expense deduction for the payment84 and, to the extent the shareholder
otherwise would not face a tax on the payment, 85 rendering the premium

82. For example, Ed Rock details the relationship between General Motors and the Du Pont
Company, which was a major shareholder in General Motors in the first half of the 1900s. See Edward
B. Rock, Controlling the Dark Side of RelationalInvesting, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 987, 995-97 (1994)
(providing examples of "bad" relational investing where the outside large shareholder uses its influence
to obtain private benefits). Du Pont served as a major supplier to General Motors during the time
period and kept many Du Pont people within General Motors to keep "tabs on the amount of GM
business going to Du Pont and the amounts placed with Du Pont's competitors." Id. at 997.
83. In many situations, for example, a firm's shareholders may act as the best outside source for
a particular good or service. A firm's shareholder, for example, may have better information than
others about the particular needs of the firm and therefore enjoy a greater ability to tailor its goods and
services for the firm. As well, a firm may place greater credibility in a shareholder that it knows well
and that has an incentive derived from its share ownership to want the firm to succeed compared with
other outside providers of a good or service.
84. Note that the loss of a business deduction to the corporation ultimately reduces overall
corporate value and thereby hurts all shareholders on a pro rata basis.
85. For example, where the corporation pays for a shareholder's "expenses" made on behalf of
the corporation, the shareholder ordinarily would not have to pay taxes on the payments as income. See
I.R.C. § 62(a)(2)(A) (1994) (providing for the deductibility of reimbursed business expenses paid to an
employee from gross income).
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over market price as taxable to the shareholder.8 6 Tax officials seeking to
apply the constructive dividend doctrine, however, face a challenge when
the good or service at issue is sold within a thin market.8 7 For here, in
order to detect a premium, courts must first determine the fair market value
against which to measure the contractual price. In the absence of a wellestablished market, this determination is fraught with inaccuracy, and
perhaps consequently, many courts tend to err on the side of resisting the
88
constructive dividend doctrine, except in extreme and egregious cases.
This obfuscatory advantage of thin market transactions provides managers
with a limited cover to bestow patronage through business transactions-at
89
least on the margin-without triggering the law's scrutiny.

86. For a description of the constructive dividend doctrine, see MERTENS, supra note 45, § 38:47
(noting that "[b]y their nature constructive dividends must be determined by the facts and circumstances
of a particular case").
87. Courts also provide a higher level of scrutiny on transactions involving closely held
corporations where the shareholder also acts as a director of the corporation. See, e.g., Seminole
Thriftway, Inc. v. United States, 42 Fed. Cl. 584, 590 (Fed. Cl. 1998) (noting that "closely-held
corporations are operated by their shareholders, who often take on the management roles of officer and
director in order to serve their shareholder interest"). Managers of publicly held corporations that use
interested transactions to favor particular outside shareholders may therefore have an easier time to
avoid the constructive dividends doctrine.
88. Many cases that actively recharacterize interested transactions as a constructive dividend
involve egregious fact patterns. See Frazier v. Comm'r, 85 F.3d 640 (10th Cir. 1996) (unpublished
table decision) (treating corporate payments for a CEO-shareholder's travel and entertainment
expenses, including payments for the CEO's spouse's expenses as well as for visits to friends and
relatives, as a constructive dividend where the expenses were primarily for the CEO's personal benefit);
Hardin v. United States, 461 F.2d 865, 872-73 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that payments by a corporation
to the widow of a shareholder's brother as a constructive dividend to the shareholder where the
corporation had never paid a formal dividend, the widow was not a shareholder of the corporation, and
the corporation owed no formal legal obligation to the widow); Estate of Chism v. Comm'r, 322 F.2d
956, 956 (9th Cir. 1963) (upholding a tax court decision treating "loans" from a corporation to
shareholders as a constructive dividend where the loans were never "evidenced by promissory notes or
other written instruments, no interest was ever paid or charged on the outstanding balance, and no
collateral security was ever given for them," no expectation for repayment exists, and the corporation
had never paid any formal dividends); Seminole Thriftway, Inc., 42 Fed. Cl. at 591 (treating fees paid to
shareholders for their guarantee of a loan to the corporation as a constructive dividend because the fees
were paid many years after the guarantee was actually given and thus were not required to obtain the
guarantee). Cf Alpha Medical, Inc. v. Comm'r, 172 F.3d 942 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding all of a sole
shareholder's payment from the corporation of $4.4 million for work done as president of the
corporation as deductible compensation and not a constructive dividend because "reasonable
shareholders ... would have agreed to [the shareholder's] level of compensation" because of the
shareholder's "accomplishment, the risks he assumed, and the amazing growth [in the corporation]").
89. Because of the emphasis on whether an "arms-length" transaction took place, shareholders
and the corporation have a greater ability to avoid recharacterization as a constructive dividend to the
extent formalities are followed. In addition, because of the lack of precision in determining when a
payment to a shareholder truly is a constructive dividend, a corporation may seek to spread an intended
dividend to a shareholder across many different forms of interested transactions to avoid the scrutiny of
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State fiduciary law also limits the ability of managers to engage in
interested transactions where the managers benefit at the expense of
shareholders. As a practical matter, however, the deterrent effect of state
law is relatively limited in scope. Ordinarily, when a firm engages in an
interested transaction with a dominant shareholder, courts treat such
transactions as presumptive self-dealing, applying intensified scrutiny to
the transaction. 90 However, many block shareholders are not currently
"dominant" under conventional definitions due to their lack of a 50% or
more ownership stake or explicit control over the corporation. 9' In such

the IRS. See, e.g., An Introduction to Business Entities, WFT-BUSENT Ch. 10 Doc. 4, at
2001 WL 423413 (US).
If shareholders wish to distribute corporate profits in a form deductible to the corporation, a
balanced mix of the possible alternatives lessens the risk of constructive dividend treatment.
Rent for the use of shareholder property, interest on amounts borrowed from shareholders, or
salaries for services rendered by shareholders are all feasible substitutes for dividend
distributions. But overdoing any one approach may attract the attention of the IRS.
Id. See also Exacto Spring Corp. v. Comm'r, 196 F.3d 833, 835 (7th Cir. 1999) (contending that multifactor tests used to determine whether executive compensation in fact should be recharacterized as a
constructive dividend "invites the Tax Court to set itself up as a superpersonnel department for closely
held corporations, a role unsuitable for courts"). Judge Posner writing for the Seventh Circuit in Exacto
Spring Corp. instead followed an "independent investor" test under which a court must ask whether a
passive, independent investor would pay the compensation. Id. at 838 ("If the rate of return is
extremely high, it will be difficult to prove that the manager is being overpaid, for [replacing the
manager with a lower-paid manager] .. . would be killing the goose that lays the golden egg."). While
avoiding the pitfalls of having courts determine proper compensation levels, the independent investor
tests gives great leeway to companies eaming superior returns for investors to disguise dividends as
compensation.
90. See Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 42 (3d Cir. 1947) (holding that a controlling
shareholder owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders similar to that of a director);
Judah v. Delaware Trust Co., 378 A.2d 624, 628 (Del. 1977) ("Where the majority shareholders stand
to benefit at the direct expense of the minority shareholders by action of a board of directors they
control, the backdrop provided by the fiduciary obligations owed by the directors to the minority
requires that the proposed action be closely examined before being effectuated."). See also FLETCHER,
supra note 52, § 5811.10 ("When a majority, dominant or controlling shareholder deemed to be a
fiduciary is challenged for having engaged in self-dealing in property or services of the corporation, that
shareholder has the burden of coming forward with evidence and the burden of persuasion to show that
the transaction was scrupulously fair."); Id. § 5810 (noting that "[t]he same fiduciary duty is due from a
dominant or controlling shareholder or group of shareholders to the minority as is due from the director
of a corporation to the shareholders").
In a transaction between a parent and subsidiary corporation, Delaware, among other
jurisdictions, has applied the stringent "entire fairness" standard in reviewing the transaction. See
Summa Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 540 A.2d 403, 406 (Del. 1988) ("It is well established in
Delaware that one who stands on both sides of a transaction has the burden of proving its entire
fairness."). But see Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (stating that the entire
fairness standard of review will be applied to a parent-subsidiary transaction only if the parent "receives
something from the subsidiary to the exclusion of, and detriment to the minority stockholders of the
subsidiary"-and holding that a pro rata dividend did not meet this test).
91.
Shareholders with a 50% or more ownership stake in a corporation's outstanding stock are
presumed in control of the firm. For a shareholder that owns less than 50% of a corporation's

20021

PLAYING FAVORITES WITH SHAREHOLDERS

cases, a finding of self-dealing seems significantly less likely for numerous
reasons. First, just as above, it is often difficult to discern whether the
challenged transaction really does result in a benefit to the outside
shareholder, especially in thin markets. Where the transaction is on purely
market-based terms, the outside shareholder benefits no more than from
any other market transaction. Furthermore, even where the outside
shareholder clearly benefits relative to a market-based transaction, the
benefit may actually be demonstratively justifiable. Merit, for example,
may possess better expertise than other providers of services in the market,
or it may enjoy greater productivity (therefore justifying a higher rate per
hour). In addition, as noted above, Merit may have a better understanding
of the firm's needs than outside suppliers, giving it a lower cost of
providing services for the firm.
As before, the reduced scrutiny of interested transactions compared to
direct transfers may channel many managers toward bestowing favoritism
through interested transactions. And, just as with sales of securities, this
indirect form of transferring benefits may introduce greater inefficiencies
as well. Indeed, interested transactions may crowd out contracts between
the firm and more efficient providers of a good or service. By hiring Merit
to do its financial analysis, Acme may well bypass higher quality or lower
cost analysts. From Acme shareholders' standpoint, it would be far better
to retain the services of one of these alternative providers, even if Acme
subsequently made a side payment to Merit to induce its quiescence.
In-kind favoritism, therefore, tends to introduce additional technical
inefficiencies, reducing overall corporate welfare.92
outstanding stock, whether the shareholder is considered a "controlling" shareholder for fiduciary duty
purposes depends on whether the shareholder exercises control over the firm, an issue of fact for the
court to determine. See FLETCHER, supra note 52, § 5811 (stating that a shareholder with less than 50%
ownership of a corporation's outstanding stock is not considered a controlling shareholder unless there
is "some evidence demonstrating control ... since the presumption is against it") (citing Gilbert v. El
Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050, 1055 (Del. Ch. 1984)). See also Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230, 235 (5th
Cir. 1983) (imposing a fiduciary duty on a shareholder owning only 34.8% of a corporation because the
shareholder exercised "actual control and direction over corporate management"); Kahn v. Lynch
Communication Sys., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994) (holding that a shareholder with a 43.3% minority
ownership interest was a controlling shareholder because of the shareholder's exercise of control over
the corporation).
92. Managers might attempt to avoid the crowding out effect by hiring the shareholder for a
service that the firm does not otherwise require. Acme, for example, may hire representatives from
Merit Investments to conduct worthless "market research" for Acme on the dynamics of the beach
scene in the Bahamas, paying Merit an exorbitant fee for the research. Such transactions, however, are
arguably just as inefficient given that there are other individuals with modest opportunity costs (such as
the authors of this Article) who would be willing to do the same sort of market research at cost.
Moreover, such contrived expenditures may begin to look clearly like direct payments, triggering the
enhanced legal scrutiny noted above. See supra text accompanying notes 48-56.
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Significantly, the inefficiencies introduced by business transactions
with a favored shareholder are likely to increase with the size of the desired
transfer. Merit, for instance, may offer only a certain "package" of
financial services to the market. Fiduciary duties and market-constraints
may then limit the ability of managers to pay too much above the
prevailing market-based fee for such a package. 93 Thus, where Acme's
managers seek to use interested transactions to transfer even more to Merit,
Acme may need to employ alternative services that Merit is not well
equipped to supply. 94 For example, Acme may very well hire Merit to help
manufacture more ten-gallon cowboy hats for Acme's discount mall sales.
To the extent Merit's comparative advantage lies in financial services,
however, Merit will serve as an ill-suited source for cowboy hats.
Compared with direct selective payments of cash or property,
therefore, interested transactions constitute both a less scrutinized and less
efficient mechanism for playing favorites. Most immediately, the law
provides greater leeway for a firm to favor shareholders with interested
business transactions, therefore channeling the firm toward such activities
instead of direct distributions.
Consequently, the use of interested
transactions to generate support will tend to cause the firm to employ
technically inferior inputs in their production process, generating even a
larger social loss than that which would occur in the context of cash
distributions.
4. Allocation of Opportunities
A fourth manifestation of shareholder favoritism comes through the
allocation of potential business opportunities that the firm has yet to
exploit. Such corporate opportunities may arise from any number of
sources, such as specific assets and expertise within a firm's scope of
control, information learned within the course of the firm's business, or
simple happenstance. For some opportunities, such as new potential
customers for its existing product line, the firm itself is clearly the highest
valuing recipient. Other opportunities, however, may provide profit to a
wide variety of different possible recipients. Acme, for example, may learn

93. For example, the firm may pay Merit $200 per hour for its analysts as compared with the
prevailing market payment of $100 per hour. Once the firm starts paying Merit $1,000 per hour or
higher, however, the firm may attract unwanted scrutiny from potential hostile acquirers, tax officials,
and plaintiffs' attorneys seeking to initiate a fiduciary duty suit.
94. See An Introduction to Business Entities, supra note 89 (which recommends spreading
favoritism across a series of different possible interested transactions to reduce the possibility of IRS
attention).
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of new valuable mineral resources located on property next to its
production facility. Acme could exploit such an opportunity through the
purchase of the property itself, or others connected with the firm may
appropriate the profit from the mineral find through a purchase of the
property. Managers, for example, could increase their private benefits of
control through the direct purchase of the property. Managers that desire to
benefit a particular block shareholder could also notify the shareholder of
the property, giving the shareholder the opportunity to purchase the
property.
As with new issues of securities and interested transactions, federal
tax laws provide few barriers to the allocation of opportunities. Because
shareholders engage in no direct transactions with the firm to obtain the
opportunities, no taxable transaction exists (at least with respect to the
shareholders' expropriation of the opportunities). General state law
fiduciary duties continue to apply under the rubric of the corporate
opportunities doctrine. 95 Courts applying the corporate opportunities
doctrine follow a two-stage approach, asking first whether a particular
business project in fact is a corporate opportunity and then whether
management, in giving an opportunity to a particular outside shareholder,
has taken the proper steps in appropriating the opportunity. 96 Under the
most prominent test for whether a business project constitutes a corporate
opportunity, courts examine whether the project is in the same "line of
business" as the corporation.9 7 Although somewhat vague concerning what
constitutes a line of business, courts in applying the line of business test
focus on the ability of the corporation to exploit the opportunity, based on
98
the corporation's endowment of resources and expertise.

95. See generally Eric Talley, Turning Servile Opportunities into Gold: A Strategic Analysis of
the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, 108 YALE L.J. 277, 286-310 (1998) (discussing the corporate
opportunities doctrine).
See also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 5.05 (1994) (defining a corporate opportunity as

including "[alny opportunity to engage in a business activity of which a senior executive becomes
aware and knows is closely related to a business in which the corporation is engaged or expects to
engage"). Under the American Law Institute approach, a manager may take a corporate opportunity
only to the extent (a) full disclosure is made to the corporation; (b) the corporation rejects the
opportunity; and (c) either the rejection meets a test of total fairness, disinterested directors reject the
opportunity in advance, or disinterested shareholders ratify the manager's appropriation of the corporate
opportunity. See id.
96. See Talley, supra note 95, at 286-310.
97. See id. at 289 (stating that the line of business test "pulls within its ambit any project that the
corporation-given its current assets, knowledge, expertise, and talents-could adapt itself to pursue").
98. See id.
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Nevertheless, while funneling new business prospects to shareholders
may constitute a technical violation of the corporate opportunities doctrine,
managers engaging in such activities are unlikely to face a serious risk of
liability. First, the manager's self-interested motivation is often difficult to
detect, since it is not the manager who ultimately appropriates the
opportunity, but rather a noncontrol block shareholder. Courts and other
outsiders may have difficulty in distinguishing whether the shareholder
obtained the opportunity from the managers or through bona fide
competition. When Acme informs Merit of valuable mineral resources on
property adjoining Acme, Merit may react through a purchase of the
property before news of the mineral resources becomes public. Only
Merit's purchase transaction, however, is directly observable to outside
parties. Without a clear trail leading back to Acme's tip to Merit, Merit's
purchase is consistent with Merit itself engaging in research and
uncovering the presence of mineral resources on the land without Acme's
assistance. 99 Moreover, to the extent no direct cash payments occur from
the block shareholders to the managers, no evidentiary trail exists to link
the shareholder's use of the opportunity with the managers.
Much like the foregoing examples, the use of corporate opportunities
to benefit a particular shareholder may introduce several inefficiencies
compared with direct payments of cash or property. Suppose, for example,
that Acme received an opportunity to enter into a new market for western
clothing tailored to women, and the Acme management passed this
opportunity on to Merit Investments. Being unfamiliar with the western
clothing market characteristics, Merit might view the new opportunity as
risky relative to the perception of a well-established market participant like
Acme. To the extent that Merit is averse to these risks, it will discount the
value of the opportunity it receives. 00 In addition, Acme's experience in
the market also puts it at a comparative advantage to exploit the
opportunity. Indeed, Acme's expertise and sunk investments in production
technology may make Acme a relatively low cost entrant into the new
market. Thus, although Merit may profit from the opportunity, it will not
receive as much profit as Acme could itself. The cost to Acme will
therefore exceed the benefit transferred to Merit. Once again, the legal
attractiveness of using business opportunities to dole out favoritism comes

99. Of course, where the information is clearly the type that only Acme would know, Merit may
have a harder time convincing a court that it generated the information independently.
100. For the same amount of dollar benefit Merit receives, therefore, Acme's managers must
expend greater resources providing this benefit through the allocation of corporate opportunities
compared with outright cash payments.
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with an inefficiency cost that would not be realized in the instance of a cash
payment.
5. Allocation of Business Activities
Closely related to the granting of interested transactions is the
allocation within the firm of resources to particular business activities.
Firms engage in all sorts of business activities, from the purchasing of
inputs, to the hiring of employees, to marketing, distribution, and ultimate
sale of their outputs. The allocation of the firm's resources among these
tasks may have significant indirect effects on others' business-including
that of a block shareholder.
For example, Acme's cowboy hats might be made out of any number
of materials, including straw, wool, felt, and beaver fur. 10 1 Suppose that
Merit Investments has purchased a large ownership position in one of the
chief national producers of wool felt. Acme's managers could indirectly
assist Merit by increasing the number of hats they produce composed of
felt, thereby increasing the market price of the material and buoying
Merit's ownership stake. Alternatively, the managers could have Acme
reduce its own in-house production of felt, directing it to buy rather than
make the material, which would again increase the overall market price of
10 2
felt, indirectly benefiting Merit.
Several other means exist for a firm to rechannel its own business
activities to benefit one of its shareholders even without an explicit
contract. Acme might lobby for regulatory reforms that work to favor
investment companies like Merit. Acme could also expend money in
developing common resources that benefit the two companies' businesses.
For example, Acme may research common technology that benefits both
Acme and Merit's businesses and then release the technology into the
public domain. Acme may also develop human capital in its workers
tailored specifically for the needs of Merit's business, thereby saving Merit
10 3
the training costs for any employees it hires laterally from Acme.
101.
Readers who find their appetites whetted for the purchase of a cowboy hat may refer to the
Cowboy Hat Store, at http://www.cowboyhatstore.com (last visited July 10, 2001) for a wide variety of
hats.
102. Note that Merit does not necessarily need to purchase from Acme to obtain the benefit of the
lower cost. Because the overall market supply has increased, Merit may turn to any supplier to receive
a lower price.
103. For example, Acme could expend considerable resources training its own in-house financial
analysts using methods of analysis that Merit prefers and then terminate the analysts at the end of
training. Merit could then attempt to hire the analysts. Significantly, the tailored expertise in the hands
of the analysts will not draw a significant increase in wage from other competing employers to the
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There are virtually no adverse tax consequences that stem from the
10 4
reallocation of (generally deductible) business expenses within a firm.
As to fiduciary duties, state law limits-at least in theory-a manager's
ability to allocate business activities opportunistically.
In practice,
however, the probability of facing heavy judicial scrutiny is low. As with
several of the other forms of opportunistic payments to outside
shareholders, managers are not directly benefited. Instead, favored
shareholders may repay managers later through their support in proxy
voting.' 015 Courts and other outside observers therefore face a challenge in
determining whether a particular allocation of business activities in fact
constitutes self-dealing. Without hard proof, plaintiffs will find it difficult
to rebut the business judgment rule presumption, leaving them with the
more daunting task of demonstrating that the directors' decisions
constituted waste. 10 6 Indeed, because no ready measuring stick exists for
evaluating how a firm should allocate its business operations, courts may
find it next to impossible to determine whether a particular allocation is
driven from a self-dealing motivation.
Almost by definition, the reallocation of business activities within a
firm done for the sole purpose of paying patronage introduces productive
inefficiencies. Not only is the benefit to the block shareholder highly
uncertain and speculative, but each dollar spent on benefiting the block
shareholder almost certainly generates less than one dollar's worth of
expected benefits. Firms that seek to enter a new product market to benefit
a block shareholder, for example, must expend resources designing and
advertising the new product. As well, the firm must search for new
employees to provide needed expertise related to manufacturing, marketing
and distributing the product, among other things. Industries in which
extent the expertise is specific for Merit. Merit may therefore hire the analysts at a fair market wage
and profit from lack of any need to expend resources in training the analysts.
104. To the extent no market transaction occurs, the reallocation of assets within a firm would
lack the required realization event required for taxation. See supra note 67 (describing the realization
requirement). In theory, the expenditures made within the firm solely to benefit an outside shareholder
selectively may be viewed as a "business gift" to the extent the firm receives nothing in return.
Business gifts are generally not deductible to the donor to the extent such gift exceeds twenty-five. See
I.R.C. § 274(b) (1994). Nevertheless, the IRS, among others, would find it difficult to recharacterize a
shift in internal business activities that results in no direct flow of cash or property to the outside
shareholder as a gift.
105. Shareholders typically vote to elect the board of directors, to ratify certain self-dealing
transactions on the part of managers, to affirm an amendment to the corporate charter, and to approve
(some but not all) mergers involving the corporation, among other things. For a general discussion of
shareholder voting, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game Theoretic
Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 347 (1991).
106. See supra note 60 (citing Delaware's formulation of the business judgment rule).
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economies of scale exist may require the firm to expand volume rapidly to
achieve such economies. 107
But even beyond these fixed costs, opportunistic reallocation of
activities leaves the firm relatively unbalanced in its portfolio of outputs,
production technology, and inputs. Accordingly, the total value of the firm
will suffer. For example, by supporting an artificially high price in the
market for wool felt production, Acme may be required to generate demand
by reducing its retail price far below cost, thereby losing money. For the
sake of favoring a particular block shareholder, then, managers may shift
the firm into activities that have low or even negative net present values.
Thus, significant inefficiencies (relative to outright cash distributions) may
be an unintended consequence of the relative laxity of legal restrictions on
favoritism through business activities.
6. Disclosure of Nonpublic Information
Finally, firms at many important junctures are repositories of a wealth
of nonpublic information that, once made public, materially affects the
trading price of their securities. 10 8 Acme, for example, may have nonpublic
information that its upcoming quarterly earnings will fall short of market
expectations. Investors who learn this information before it is publicly
disclosed can reap a significant trading advantage, selling their inventory of
Acme's shares at the prevailing (and overvalued) market price.
Alternatively, the informed investors could sell Acme's shares short,
borrowing shares to sell immediately at the overvalued price and then
purchasing shares after the earnings announcement is made at the new
lower expected price. 10 9 If Acme management sought to favor Merit, then,

107.

Indeed, in many industries, high barriers to entry exist. See JOE STATEN

BAIN, BARRIERS TO

NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1956)

(identifying economies of scale and sunk costs, product differentiation, and absolute cost advantages as
three possible barriers to entry). But see Harold Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 47
(1982) (questioning the relevance of barriers to entry).
108. Extensive evidence exists, for example, that insiders profit significantly from the use of the
firm's nonpublic insider information. See generally Jesse M. Fried, Reducing the Profitability of
Corporate Insider Trading Through Pretrading Disclosure, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 303, 321-22 (1998)

(citing several empirical studies showing that insiders earn significant excess returns through insider
trading and hypothesizing that "the most plausible explanation for this result is that insiders are trading
on information that is not available to the rest of the market").
109. Short sales allow an investor to sell shares that the investor does not own. Investors seeking
to execute a short sale first borrow shares from a broker. Then the investor sells the borrowed shares at
the prevailing secondary market price, pocketing the cash from the sale. The investor must later repay
the borrowed shares through the purchase of new shares in the market. Where the repurchase price is
lower than the price the investor initially sold the borrowed shares, the investor profits.
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it might do so by disclosing nonpublic information to Merit selectively
before its public announcement.
Several layers of legal prohibitions exist against the provision of
selective disclosures in situations where managers seek to entrench
themselves. First, state corporate law fiduciary duties nominally prohibit
such activity. As before, however, many forms of information disclosure
can occur from benign motivations, such as a desire to disseminate
information on the company to the market, increasing stock price accuracy
to the benefit of all shareholders." 0 In both cases, neither the manager nor
the shareholder receives a detectable payment. As such, it is at least
possible that courts would find it difficult to distinguish benign instances of
disclosure from opportunistic ones." I
Second, the federal securities laws may treat shareholders receiving
nonpublic inside information from managers in violation of their fiduciary
duty as similar to insiders. The Supreme Court, in Dirks v. SEC," 2 set
forth the test for when a tippee receiving nonpublic material information
from a corporate insider faces insider-trading liability. Writing for the
Court, Justice Powell held that shareholders who receive a tip from an
insider, in a situation where the shareholder knows or should know that the
insider is breaching a fiduciary duty, commit insider trading when they
trade based on the information. 3 Justice Powell further elaborated on
what constituted a fiduciary breach on the part of a tipper, writing that a
breach occurs when "the insider receives a direct or indirect personal
benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational
benefit that will translate into future earnings." 1 4 Despite the theoretical
reach of insider trading prohibitions to block the opportunistic use of tips to
outside shareholders, enforcement is often problematic due to the difficulty
of demonstrating that the manager violated any fiduciary duty where the
manager in fact received no direct trading profits.
110. For a discussion of the beneficial uses of selective disclosures, see Stephen Choi,
Symposium, Selective Disclosures in the Public Capital Markets, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (forthcoming
2002).
111. For example, Acme's managers may transmit information on Acme's upcoming financials to
Merit Investments. Merit, in turn, may trade based on such information for its own profit without
sharing anything directly with Acme's managers. Instead, Merit may simply vote for the managers'
candidates for directors at the next proxy vote in return. To the extent their relationship is long-term,
Merit and the managers may engage in such activity without the need of any formal contractual
relationship. Lacking any traceable direct benefit to Acme's managers from the disclosure, courts may
find it difficult to discern a fiduciary duty violation.
112. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
113. See id. at 660.
114. Id. at 663.
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Third, the SEC has recently promulgated new regulations to block the
transmission of material, nonpublic information to selective recipients
altogether. Encompassed within Regulation FD, 1 5 the new rules define a
as
class of recipients to which the firm, top officers of the firm, as well 116
employees that speak for the firm may not make selective disclosures.
Among such recipients are broker-dealers, investment companies,
investment advisors, and investors that are reasonably expected to trade
based on the information. 1 7 Regulation FD requires firms that engage in
such selective disclosures intentionally to disclose the information
immediately to the public markets." 8 For unintentional disclosures,
Regulation FD still requires firms to make the information known to the
commences on
public markets within twenty-four hours or when trading
1 19
sooner.
is
whichever
Exchange,
Stock
York
the New
The SEC's approach to selective disclosures differs from the
regulatory prohibitions applied to most of the other forms of selective
payments to shareholders. Unlike the approach taken for issues of new
securities, interested transactions, and the allocation of business
opportunities and activities, the SEC's approach does not attempt to divide
between opportunistic and more benign forms of payments to shareholders.
Instead, Regulation FD resembles the outright prohibition on non-pro rata
direct dividends from a corporation to shareholders of the same class. As
such, firms seeking to grant favoritism to block shareholders are relatively
disclosures than through one of the other
less likely to do so by selective
120
mechanisms studied above.
115. See Promulgating Release, supra note 14. Regulation FD represents the culmination of one
of former SEC chairman Arthur Levitt's top priorities. See David Schellhase, Arthur Levitt's Cultural
Crusade, RECORDER, Aug. 16, 2000.
116. See Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(b) (2001) (defining "issuer" to encompass primarily
Exchange Act reporting companies); 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(c) (stating that "'Person acting on behalf of
an issuer' means any senior official of the issuer .... or any other officer, employee, or agent of an
issuer who regularly communicates with any person described in Rule 100(b)(1)(i), (ii), or (iii), or with
holders of the issuer's securities.").
117. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(l).
118. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a)(1) (requiring simultaneous disclosure in the case of intentional
selective disclosure).
119. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a)(2) (requiring disclosure "promptly" in the case of unintentional
selective disclosures); 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(d) (defining "promptly"). Because of the possibility of
nuisance suits, Regulation FD excludes the possibility of private causes of actions based on violations
of Regulation FD. See Promulgating Release, supra note 14.
120. We should note that in proposing Regulation FD, the SEC focused much attention on the
danger of selective disclosure to analysts (and in particular on the risk that managers may give
information selectively to analysts in return for the analysts' willingness to give the company's stock a
good recommendation). See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release Nos. 337787, 34-42259, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,592 (Dec. 28, 1999). Nevertheless, the scope of Regulation
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In spite of the relatively significant degree of regulation that selective
information disclosure faces, it is not altogether clear from an efficiency
12 1
perspective that such practices always reduce overall corporate welfare.
Firms, for example, may use selective disclosures to subsidize analysts
initiating coverage of the firms as well as the formation of blocks of shares
that work to monitor the firm for agency costs. Selective disclosures may
also provide firms an easy avenue to inform markets without compromising
confidential information or exposing the firm to frivolous antifraud
lawsuits. 122 The prohibition on selective disclosures may cause firms to
remain silent, inducing some outside analysts to make large expenditures in
uncovering similar information on which to make trading profits. 123 Given
that these analysts may not be the lowest cost investigators, the prohibition
of selective information may generate unnecessarily high and duplicative
research costs in the securities markets.
On the other hand, of course, allowing selective disclosures has its
drawbacks as well. Indeed, nonblock outside shareholders would probably
expect always to be at a disadvantage relative to a favored recipient, and
would therefore pay much less up front than they otherwise would for the
firm's shares. Moreover, nonfavored analysts may reduce their coverage of
the particular firm (given their disadvantage relative to analysts that receive
selective disclosures), increasing the amount of price volatility in the stock
and raising the cost to investors of engaging in research related to the firm.
Managers will then face a reduced amount of firm resources from which
24
they may appropriate. 1

FD as promulgated includes investors reasonably expected to trade on the information. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 243.100(b)(1).
121. For a discussion of the beneficial uses of selective disclosures, see Choi, supra note 110.
122. See id.
123. See David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model of Insider Trading, 80 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1449, 1463-64 (1986).

See also Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How Corporations

Speak to the Market, 77 VA. L. REV. 945, 992-95 (1991) (describing market specialists as "palace
guards" able to learn material corporate information prior to other outside investors).
124. Where firms choose to make selective disclosures to favored block shareholders, various
externalities may result in the securities market. To the extent analysts are crowded out through the
transfer of inside information to block shareholders, analysts may choose not to engage in as much
securities research on the firm. Zohar Goshen and Gideon Parchomovsky make the argument that
analysts provide a benefit to all investors from their research activities that they only partially capture.
See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets, and "Negative" Property
Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229 (2001). Crowding out analysts, therefore, may hurt the
ability of all investors to engage in informed securities analysis. Such investors therefore may pay less
for the firm's security when the firm initially raises capital, leaving managers with less money to
appropriate.
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B. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH PROHIBITION
As we noted in the Introduction, the practice of bestowing favoritism
on block shareholders (regardless of the precise means for doing so) evokes
deep suspicion among many legal scholars. Indeed, it is eminently
plausible that a chief motivation behind such patronage is to entrench
managers, negating the block shareholders' takeover threat, and thereby
harming overall corporate welfare.' 2 5 If this view is correct, then
shareholder favoritism is undeniably problematic, and may warrant
prohibition.
Nevertheless, even if one were sympathetic to the prohibitionist
argument in theory, 126 implementing it in practice can be at best difficult,
and at worst haphazard and counterproductive.
Perhaps the most
immediate practical problem (noted numerous times above) stems from the
multiplicity of mechanisms that managers can employ to play favorites,
including outright transfers, capital market transactions, business dealings,
diversion of corporate opportunities, selective information disclosure, and
so forth. Each of these devices individually is likely to play an important
role in patronage, and collectively they are likely to be perceived as
substitutes of one another in the eyes of a manager.
Piecemeal prohibitions against one form of payment or another, then,
are apt to have little overall effect beyond shifting activity toward other
forms of patronage. For example, the stringent prohibitions on making
outright cash distributions to a block shareholder might well cause
managers instead to seek a one-sided contractual relationship with or shift
their business activities to the shareholder. While this regulatory cat-andmouse game is a difficult and costly one to play in its own right, the
inefficiencies it presents are not limited to the costs of designing new
regulations and devising end runs around them. Indeed, many substitute
mechanisms for playing favorites-those that are least susceptible to
effective regulation-impose additional inefficiencies themselves. While
direct cash distributions result in a dollar-for-dollar transfer in value, for
instance, patronage through transferring corporate opportunities to a
favored shareholder can decrease efficiency by channeling projects to a
higher-cost producer.

125. See supra note 9 (citing commentators that view defensive tactics that simply close off the
possibility of a hostile takeover as inimical to shareholder welfare).
126. We question whether, as a theoretical matter, prohibitions against managerial favoritism of
shareholders in fact increase overall shareholder welfare. See infra Part III.
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Regulators, of course, might attempt to respond to this problem by
categorically tightening all prohibitions of favoritism. Indeed, the SEC's
Regulation FD might represent such an attempt for informational
patronage. But even here, it seems unlikely that regulating entities will be
able to capture the entire domain of circumstances where favoritism can
exist, or alternatively that highly motivated managers cannot eventually
find a way to skirt the prohibition, perhaps by some ingenious innovation
that introduces even more technical inefficiencies.
Another problem with such across-the-board regulation is the danger
of over-inclusiveness. In many circumstances, a number of legitimate
justifications exist for managers' business decisions, even if (on first blush)
they resemble in-kind favoritism.
Indeed, a manager may hire a
shareholder as a consultant to the firm because the shareholder in fact holds
valuable expertise.
Alternatively, a shareholder may have good
information on the firm, and might therefore serve as the lowest-cost
source of capital for a loan. Particularly for hard-to-value goods and
services, courts often lack the ability to distinguish when the purpose of a
particular act of largess represents favoritism or simple good sense.
Finally, as if the above impediments were insufficient, regulators
seeking to prohibit shareholder favoritism across all possible circumstances
face one additional hurdle. The present barriers to patronage span federal
and state tax law, federal securities law, and state corporate law. Devising a
cohesive system to address all instances of shareholder favoritism therefore
requires some degree of coordination across these varying regulatory
bodies-not all of which focus on shareholder welfare as their primary
regulatory goal. Although not impossible in a theoretical sense, the
necessity of harmonizing these various bodies of law presents a daunting
challenge to even the most stout-hearted of regulators.
Such impediments have perhaps led courts and policymakers, at least
in part, to resist across-the-board proscription, focusing on the most direct
and obvious mechanisms for playing favorites, such as cash distributions,
as the chief targets for scrutiny. Such a pattern seems all the more natural
given that the more direct the benefit, the more transparent and verifiable it
is to third parties. What this regulatory scheme has wrought, however, is a
perforated legal landscape, rife with safe havens for managers willing to
supply patronage to favored shareholders through less direct but often more
costly methods. Thus, even if one were committed to the proposition that
favoritism warrants abolition, it does not necessarily follow that instituting
a series of piecemeal prohibitions can feasibly allay these concerns.
Regulators may simply drive managers toward the less direct means of
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favoring shareholders, resulting in just as much opportunism but at a higher
inefficiency cost to the detriment of all shareholders. An apparent
conundrum therefore exists: Regulators who wish to ban favoritism
completely must strengthen legal restrictions against not only direct but all
indirect forms of selective wealth transfers to shareholders. Regulators,
however, who seek to ban all forms of potential favoritism will almost
certainly sweep too broadly, eliminating even value-increasing transactions
between firms and shareholders. In the next Part, we attempt to provide a
partial solution to this puzzle, arguing that regulators may wish to reassess
whether permitting acts of patronage may have unappreciated, efficiencyenhancing effects (at least in certain situations).
III. REASSESSING FAVORITISM
Our discussion thus far has focused on the legal regulation of
shareholder favoritism from an administrative-cost perspective. In other
words, we have taken for granted the desirability of prohibition and have
questioned whether such a goal is a practical feasibility. We now turn to
our theoretical argument, which requires us to reverse logical course,
presuming the feasibility of effective regulation and questioning whether
the argument for prohibition is self-evident on its own terms. We argue
that it is not and that, much to the contrary, allowing managers to play
favorites may have an independent efficiency rationale that cuts to the very
heart of a firm's incentive structure.
The kernel of our argument is simple. As noted in the Introduction, a
legal regime that permitted favoritism for widely held firms would expose
managers to an increased risk that outside investors would assemble a
block of shares solely for the purpose of "holding up" the management,
extracting some sort of payment in consideration for abandoning the
takeover attempt. By paying off the block shareholder, then, management
may be able to entrench itself, but only at the price of sharing the private
benefits of control. Alternatively, management could attempt to deter the
formation of a block (and thus the ensuing bribe) in the first instance, by
committing to a governance structure that limits its own ability to
appropriate firm value. So doing both increases the cost of forming a
toehold, and credibly limits the size of the bribe that managers are willing
to pay. We argue below that in many plausible circumstances, managers
would prefer deterrence to acquiescence, and accordingly that permitting
favoritism can work in the interests of all shareholders.
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A. RECEIVED WISDOM

As a prelude to our conceptual analysis, it is perhaps worthwhile to
pause at this juncture to review what one might call the "received wisdom"
about shareholder favoritism. Doing so will help to gain perspective both
on our contribution and its relationship with the (admittedly vast) law-andeconomics literature on corporate governance.
Most economically motivated descriptions of the corporation (and
ours is no exception) have at their core what might be called an "agency
cost" account of the firm. This perspective emanates from a familiar
observation that shareholders in publicly held corporations face a
127
significant incentive problem in dealing with a company's managers.
Particularly when shares are widely dispersed, no single shareholder has
both the incentive and resources to monitor management closely. After all,
a principal reason to employ managers in the first place is to allow
numerous public shareholders to provide their capital but not their time or
expertise to a business. 128 This separation of ownership from control, in
turn, provides managers with considerable discretion to make decisions that
systematically benefit their own interests at the expense of rationally
ignorant shareholders, either through shirking or outright appropriations of
company value.
Such perverse managerial incentives can be disquieting for any
number of reasons. From an economic perspective, however, acts of
managerial self-interest are a concern principally because they are
organizationally inefficient-that is, the benefits to self-serving managers
are strictly less than the costs imposed on shareholders (along, perhaps,
with other stakeholders), thereby causing aggregate company value to fall
short of its potential. Rational shareholders, of course, can (at least in
theory) anticipate downstream managerial misconduct and adjust their
initial behavior accordingly, by either refusing to invest in the company or
by investing only on highly discounted terms. 129 But even so, this
127.

See, e.g., Fama, supra note 1; Fama & Jensen, supra note 1, at 304; Jensen & Meckling,

supra note 1, at 308-10.
128. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). Recently, economists have introduced evidence that large publicly-held
corporations lacking significant blocks of shares are a relatively rare phenomenon in the world capital
markets. Many firms outside the United States and the United Kingdom, in fact, are characterized by a
controlling block shareholder comprised of either a controlling family or the state. See, e.g., La Porta et
al., supra note 30, at 471. Our analysis, therefore, applies most directly only to the United States, the
United Kingdom, and other markets where shareholders are dispersed.
129. For example, a well-documented lack of protections for minority investors against the
opportunism of managers in Russia has led to extremely low asset valuations in that country. See Alan
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adjustment increases the cost faced by a corporation of raising outside
capital, an impediment that causes many socially valuable business
ventures to be passed up. Consequently, much scholarship within
corporate law focuses on how legal rules, compensation schemes,
ownership structures, and outside markets can each help mitigate the
agency costs that dwell within the gulf between ownership and control.
One oft-proposed "Coasean" solution to this problem combines
market forces and legal constraints. At the time a firm initially goes public,
the firm's promoters have a strong incentive to make credible assurances
that corporate management has a limited ability to self-deal. Indeed, so
doing can reduce the firm's cost of raising capital in the securities market.
Consequently, this argument contends, the entrepreneurs in control of the
firm will find it attractive to implement contractual obligations and
corporate governance structures that efficiently limit the ability of
management to expropriate value from shareholders. 30 If courts stood by
reliably to enforce such self-restraints, this type of ex ante commitment
becomes credible, and can significantly decrease the equity premium
attributable to prospective managerial agency costs.
In practice, of course, the Coasean solution often falls far short of its
theoretical promise. For starters, ex ante contracting is a costly and time
consuming endeavor, requiring significant and detailed foresight about the
future obstacles and opportunities a company may face. Entrepreneurs
frequently lack the requisite ability to specify sufficiently detailed
provisions to govern every possible future contingency.
In such
circumstances, an attempt to limit managerial discretion ex ante may
backfire and stifle future corporate flexibility. In addition, even if such
contractual foresight were possible, nothing guarantees that a court or other
regulatory body, attempting to interpret the terms years after they were
executed, would be able to decipher them accurately.
In light of these limitations, alternative means for aligning the
incentives of managers and shareholders must play a greater role.
Corporations scholars have therefore directed significant efforts toward
specifying and formalizing such alternative mechanisms. For legal
scholars, state corporate law and other forms of regulatory intervention
have traditionally received significant attention. 131 Most notably, fiduciary
Cullison, Merger Madness Hits Russia's Exporters, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2001, at A22 (reporting that
low asset valuations are leading to a merger wave in Russia).
130. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 305-07.
131.
Indeed, recently economists have focused attention on the value of strong minority investor
protections in explaining differences in financial development across countries. See Rafael La Porta,
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duties can work to restrict the ability of managers to expropriate corporate
value selfishly.' 32 Whether managers attempt to extract value directly
(through outright transfers of cash to themselves) or more indirectly
(through, for example, shirking or conflicted transactions with the firm),
the duties of loyalty and care can act as an effective deterrent. But
regulatory approaches are not without their own limitations.
The
requirement that shareholders seeking to enforce the duty of loyalty must
do so through a derivative suit imposes large procedural impediments to
such suits-such as demand requirements, heightened pleading standards,
and deference to independent litigation committees. 133 While restricting
the number of frivolous suits, such procedural hurdles potentially render
mute numerous legitimate suits aimed at opportunistic managers.
Moreover, even for those plaintiffs who can surpass the procedural
obstacles, the contours of the substantive law they will face frequently lean
toward management's corner, through either the protective business
judgment rule or the well-known "cleansing" procedures through which
directors can insulate themselves.134 As such, regulatory approaches alone
are not likely to be a complete solution to agency cost problems.
Given these difficulties, numerous law and economics scholars have
also championed market forces as a potentially important device for
effecting managerial discipline. Managers who care about their future
employment prospects in the labor market, for example, may limit the
amount they expropriate.1 35 Managers may also work pursuant to
employment contracts that provide for variable pay based on the firm's
performance; similarly, managers may receive stock options tied to the
value of the firm's stock. 136 Product market competition may also reduce
the rents within the corporation available for managers to purloin as private
Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes, & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN.
1131 (1997) (demonstrating link between investor protection and capital market activity).
132. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 8.30(a) (1998) ("A director shall discharge his
duties as a director, including the duties as a member of a committee ... in a manner he reasonably
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation."). See also Robert Cooter & Bradley J.Freedman,
The FiduciaryRelationship: Its Economic Characterand Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045
(1991) (providing a law and economics analysis of the fiduciary duties); supra note 57 (describing the
duty of loyalty).
133. See supra note 61 (discussing the demand requirement).
134. See supra note 57 (discussing ratification under Delaware state corporate law).
135. See Fama, supra note 1, at 305-06. Cf. Senbongi & Harrington, supra note 5, at 305-06
(predicting that managers produce more quantity than necessary to maximize profits in imperfectly
competitive industries as a means of increasing their reputation in the managerial labor market).
136. See Michael C. Jensen, Management Compensation and the ManagerialLabor Market, 7 J.
ACCT. & ECON. 3, 4-6 (1985); Michael C. Jensen & Jerold L. Zimmerman, Eclipse of the Public
Corporation,HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 64-66.
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benefits of control. 137 And shareholders may even attempt to rely on the
138
business ethics of managers not to purloin too great a level of firm value.
Of all these market-based approaches, however, the market for
corporate control is one of the most oft-cited sources of discipline
constraining managerial agency costs. Particularly when a company's
outstanding shares are publicly traded and widely dispersed, a hostile
takeover may become attractive when the overall performance of a
manager results in anemic corporate value. Indeed, the worse a manager's
performance becomes, the lower the company's share price will sink, and
the more attractive a takeover becomes. Managers who slack or choose to
divert corporate resources for their own individual purposes may therefore
be the authors of their own demise.
Because of the unique role played by takeover markets in disciplining
managers, most corporate law scholars agree that it is important to maintain
the robustness and competitiveness of such markets. This attention is for
good reason-managers may be able to take a number of actions that
reduce the effectiveness of the takeover market. They may, for example,
implement a poison pill, 139 which forces a potential acquirer to first wage a
proxy contest to takeover the board of directors before it may cancel the
pill. 140 In addition, managers may respond to the threat of a proxy contest
through a classified board. Directors on a classified board typically hold
their seats for overlapping terms of three or more years, 14 1 forcing an
acquirer to wait years before obtaining control over the board. To the extent
that these (and other) maneuvers dilute and retard the market for corporate
control, shareholders as a body lose.

137. See Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L.
& ECON. 375, 379 (1983). But see Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 330 ("[Tihe existence of
competition in product.., markets will not eliminate the agency costs due to managerial control
problems.... If my competitors all incur agency costs equal to or greater than mine I will not be
eliminated from the market by their competition.").
138. Many business schools, for example, require students to enroll in business ethics courses.
See Richard Donkin, Business Ethics: The Rights and Wrongs, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1997, at 4.
139. Although a wide variety of poison pills exist, all of them share a type of "scorched earth"
feature: that is, once a change in control becomes likely, the pill provides attractive rights to outside
parties that drastically reduce the value of the company (thereby rendering the takeover unprofitable).
See generally HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SECURITIES & FEDERAL CORPORATE
LAW § 25:79 (1998) (providing a description of poison pills).
140. Under so-called dead hand pills, even newly-elected boards of directors of the target
corporation are unable to redeem the outstanding poison pills. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, "Just Say
Never?" Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Shareholder-Adopted By-Laws: An Essay for Warren
Buffett, 19 CARDOzO L. REV. 511 (1997).
141.
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (1998); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §8.06 (1979).
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Viewed in this light, it should not be surprising that shareholder
favoritism is thought to constitute yet another device that impairs the
takeover market. In particular, managers fearing a hostile takeover may
seek to form a coalition with a block shareholder to ensure that
shareholder's quiescence. Such coalitions can be helpful even when the
block shareholder does not own sufficient shares for control, since the
block shareholder's cooperation with management will increase the cost to
other outside investors contemplating a hostile takeover. In the context of
our earlier example, Acme management's alliance with Merit means that
any third party acquirer would have to assemble a block larger than Merit's
(since Merit strongly supports Acme management in return for
management's favoritism). And, since Merit probably acquired its shares
14 2
from the shareholders with the lowest reservation price for their shares,
the remaining dispersed shareholders are likely to be even more reluctant to
43
sell their shares, raising the cost to another outside investor yet again.
Alternatively, the preexisting block shareholder itself may represent the
most likely candidate to initiate a hostile takeover. A payoff may therefore
reduce the value of pursuing a costly control contest to the block,
redounding to the benefit of the incumbent managers.
Much of the received wisdom on shareholder favoritism maintains
that opportunistic patronage works to entrench managers and reduce overall
shareholder welfare.' 44 Indeed, selective payments to favored shareholders
can represent a thinly veiled quid pro quo for the block shareholders'
ongoing passivity.
Acme's managers, for example, may desire to
appropriate significant private benefits from the firm, perhaps in the form
of higher wages, greater perks, or interested transactions between the
managers and the firm. If left unaddressed, the very existence of Merit as a
potential acquirer clearly constrains management's ability to appropriate
such benefits. Indeed, as value appropriation increases, the trading price of
the firm's shares will drop, making an acquisition of the firm a more
credible threat. 145 By assembling a toehold, block shareholders like Merit
put themselves in an even better position to engineer such a takeover, since

142. Although this may sound peculiar on first blush, shareholders can have differential
proclivities to sell because of different tax status, expectations of firm value, and the like.
143. For a discussion of the rationale behind an upward sloping supply curve, see infra text
accompanying notes 171-74.
144. See Rock, supra note 82 (providing examples of "bad" relational investing where the outside
large shareholder uses its influence to obtain private benefits).
145. Alternatively, large block shareholders may find it worthwhile to employ substitute
mechanisms of disciplining managers including a proxy control contest as well as the initiation of a
fiduciary duty derivative lawsuit.
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they have already traveled part of the way there by virtue of their existing
ownership stake. Obtaining the support of block shareholders, then, is of
preeminent importance to Acme management, for it both nullifies their
takeover threat, and it further raises the cost of assembling an independent
control block for other outside investors. Managers therefore may enjoy an
increased ability to appropriate private benefits in the presence of such
payments.
While Acme's management has obvious incentives to cut a deal with
Merit, Merit itself may stand to gain from one as well. 146 Indeed, payments
of cash (and to a lesser extent, property or other business activities) provide
a fixed and certain benefit for the recipient shareholder. In deciding to
support management in return for the payment, the shareholder can avoid
bearing the high costs and risks implicit in attempting to make good on a
takeover threat. Moreover, the ease with which cash distributions are
valued (versus other sorts of favoritism) may further enhance this benefit.
Consequently, it is perhaps easy to understand why selective payments are
so attractive to managers and large block shareholders. Likewise, it is easy
to understand why courts and legislatures have viewed such side payments
so critically.
Notably, a small number of legal scholars have questioned whether
this common wisdom is correct, positing (as do we) that shareholders as a
group can benefit from such transfers. In the context of an active takeover
contest, for example, Jonathan Macey and Fred McChesney have argued
that paying greenmail to a potential acquiring shareholder may help
compensate the shareholder for its initial investigation in determining a
worthwhile takeover target. 47 The prospect of receiving greenmail,
therefore, may help induce value-increasing takeovers.
While this
explanation is a good one for rationalizing patronage in the immediate
context of a takeover contest, it has less explanatory power in situations
where takeovers are not a looming threat.

146. Merit may use not only the threat of a takeover but also the threat of initiating a shareholder
issue proposal or a proxy control contest among other actions to extract rents from managers. See
generally Gordon, supra note 105, at 376-84 (providing a discussion of how shareholders may seek to
extract their own private gains when given the power to pursue shareholder initiatives). Significantly,
the larger the size of Merit's block of shares, the more votes Merit will supply in favor of its
shareholder initiative and the more likely other shareholders may view Merit's proxy issue proposal or
control contest as legitimate (to the extent Merit will have a greater incentive to maximize share value
the greater the fraction of shares in Merit's hands).
147. See, e.g., Macey & McChesney, supra note 11. Alternatively, managers may use greenmail
to payoff an initial bidder, giving other higher valuing bidders the necessary time to put forth their own
bids. See id.
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Outside of the takeover context, Ian Ayres and Peter Cramton have
highlighted the possibility that block shareholders may also become
excellent monitors. 148 In particular, block shareholders that maintain a
long-term relationship with the firm may work to monitor management and
149
help implement implicit contracts that would not otherwise be possible.
Since the benefit from such activities accrues to all shareholders, however,
it is unlikely that a single investor will have sufficient incentives to form a
block of shares in order to monitor. The prospect of receiving payments
from the firm may, Ayres and Cramton note, help induce outside investors
50
to form such relational blocks of shares.'
While Ayres and Cramton's account also seems plausible, it suffers
from one potentially significant drawback: nothing in their theory precludes
the possibility that a block shareholder, once occupying that position, will
find that collecting side payments from opportunistic management is more
lucrative than monitoring.' 5' Even under Ayres and Cramton's view, then,
regulators may still wish to prohibit acts of patronage when done solely to
nullify a takeover threat and induce the block shareholder to abstain from
monitoring. 152 Discerning the "noble" acts of patronage from those that are
merely "opportunistic" presents its own set of substantial problems.
Thus, while other commentators have made specific arguments that
selective payments to shareholders may have benefits that counteract the
costs of opportunism, we take a different approach. In short, we embrace
148. See Ian Ayres & Peter Cramton, Relational Investing and Agency Theory, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1033, 1062-63 (1994) (arguing that block shareholders with a long-term relation with
management may serve to monitor for agency problems and help implement optimal implicit
contractual arrangements). See also Roberta Romano, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, 5
INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 277, 298-303 (1996) (summarizing various theories of relational investing);
Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J. POL. ECON.
461 (1986) (noting that large block shareholders have greater incentives than small dispersed
shareholders to monitor managers for agency problems).
149. In addition, a block shareholder's repeat relationship with a firm's management allows for
various implicit contractual devices to reward and punish managers. For example, not all instances of
opportunism are verifiable in a court. Nevertheless, a block shareholder with a high level of monitoring
may observe such violations and condition their support of management on controlling the level of such
violations. See Ayres & Cramton, supra note 148, at 1062-63.
150. See id. at 1051. One of the authors has made the argument that firms may use selective
disclosures as an inducement to outside investors to form blocks of shares that work to monitor
management, to the benefit of all shareholders. See Choi, supra note 110. In contrast, Ian Ayres and
Peter Cramton also remark that: "The occasions in which incumbent management have subsidized the
creation of a relational owner have included a number of entrenching maneuvers. Therefore, it is
unsurprising to find that such friendly preferred placements have often lead to reductions in the value of
common stock." Ayres & Cramton, supra note 148, at 105 1.
151. And Ayres and Cramton note as much. See Ayres & Cramton, kupra note 148, at 1051.
152. This paper later questions this view of regulation. See supra Part III.
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opportunism-or at least the credible threat of it--on its own terms. In
many circumstances, we argue, regulators in fact may wish to ignore
motivation entirely, and simply allow unimpeded favoritism for two
reasons.
First, as we argued in Part II, even if patronage were anathema to
corporate welfare, regulators would be foolish to focus their sights solely
on individual acts without also considering substitute mechanisms available
to managers intent on transferring value to a favored shareholder.' 5 3 At the
very least, the presence of such substitute mechanisms renders questionable
the efficacy of prohibitions against direct selective payments. In fact, if
anything, the effort spent by managers concocting substitute mechanisms
and the added distortions they introduce represent additional inefficiencies
and costs of overinclusiveness that might reduce overall corporate welfare
even further. Moreover, because patronage agreements are likely to be
implicit and difficult to detect, it is doubtful that courts would be able to
detect and sanction them with great reliability.
Second (and more importantly), we submit that judging shareholder
favoritism only in light of ex post effects misses an important piece of the
puzzle, particularly for advocates of the takeover market. In the
subsections below, we offer a somewhat more general argument that
regulators do not need to distinguish opportunistic driven forms of
shareholder favoritism.
Opportunistically driven payments to block
shareholders may in fact work to increase overall corporate welfare through
deterrence. Even where an opportunistic payment completely eliminates
the possibility of a takeover, a judicial policy of permitting such payments
may make shareholders even better off from an ex ante perspective. In

153. In the context of greenmail, Ronald Gilson notes one objection against potential greenmail
prohibitions is that "clever" lawyers and investment bankers may devise equivalent methods of
indirectly providing greenmail. Gilson, supra note 12, at 350-51. Gilson responds that the "substance
of a greenmail transaction is far less malleable than its form" and thus despite different possible forms,
courts should have the ability to identify greenmail "equivalent" transactions. Id. Gilson's analysis,
however, ignores the problem with the selection of a form of greenmail payment that also may have
legitimate uses. In such situations, courts may have difficulty untangling whether in fact the particular
transactional form is being used for greenmail or for a legitimate use. Particularly where thin markets
exist and whether the shareholder recipient of a payment is in fact receiving a premium is difficult to
ascertain, courts may need to expend large amounts of resources in making a decision. Moreover, from
the perspective of managers and large shareholders, forms that provide the most "cover" against courts
recognizing the true nature of the transaction also may generate the most inefficiency. As discussed in
Part II, a straight cash payment from the firm to a particular shareholder is the most efficient means of
transferring value. Once a firm shifts toward hiring the shareholder for a job to which the shareholder is
ill-suited (among other indirect forms of payments), the firm incurs large additional costs for each
dollar of value transferred to the shareholder. See supra Part 11.
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such circumstances, regulators may wish to rethink their opposition to
shareholder patronage.
B. A NEW THEORY OF PAYMENTS TO SHAREHOLDERS

In this section, we turn to a more formal presentation of the conceptual
portion of our argument, developing a simple game-theoretic model to
study the strategic interaction between rational managers and rational
potential block shareholders. 154 Using this model, we demonstrate how
giving managers the ability to make selective bribes to shareholders may,
ironically, provide managers incentives to take value-maximizing actions
and choose efficient governance mechanisms, in order to deter outside
investors from building blocks solely for the purpose of extracting side
payments. Consequently, we show, permitting favoritism can benefit even
those shareholders who receive no patronage.
1. Basic Framework
In order to facilitate our analytical argument, we resuscitate the Acme
Corporation hypothetical narrative developed in Part II. Recall that Acme is
a publicly traded firm with 10 million shares of common stock outstanding,
and 10 million well-diversified and highly dispersed shareholders, each
155
owning a negligible fraction (in particular, one share) in the company.
The relevant activities we consider take place over two periods, which we
denote as "Period 1" and "Period 2." We further assume that future
payoffs are discounted to present value at a uniform rate of 10%-and thus,
a one dollar payment in Period 2 is worth approximately ninety-one cents
in Period 1.156 Our principal enterprise is to consider (i) how Acme's
management team (denoted as player M) will choose to manage the
company in light of a potential threat from an external block shareholder
(denoted as player B); (ii) whether allowing "side deals" between M and B
changes significantly the results of this interaction, and (iii) if so, what it
means for other shareholders and corporate welfare as a whole.

154. We present only a simple, primarily numerical example to illustrate the intuition of our
argument in this paper. In the companion technical piece we provide a more rigorous mathematical
model of the impact of managers playing favorites with shareholders. See Choi & Talley, supra
note **.

155. So long as Acme's shareholders are all relatively dispersed, nothing turns on the one-shareper-shareholder assumption.
156. That is, ($1 / 1.10) = $0.9090.
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In order to proceed with our analysis, it is important for us to spell out
precisely how the relevant parties are assumed to interact with one another
in each period as summarized below:
Period 1: Management (M) chooses the maximal level of private
benefits (X) to which it commits, and the outside investor (B) decides
whether to purchase a block of shares. M may also be able to negotiate
with B for the payment of a "bribe" to B in return for B's support of
management (depending on whether such bribes are legally permitted). If
no such deal is permitted or bargaining fails, B may decide to purchase a
controlling stake in the firm.
Period 2: Player M (or B, if a takeover has occurred) cho6ses the
subject to the maximal
amount of private benefits to expropriate,
57
1.1
Period
in
set
M
that
level
commitment
Of the two periods, Period 2 is easiest to describe. In this period, only
one relevant decision is made: M (or its successor 5 8) decides how much of
firm value it will appropriate in the form of private benefits of control. If
Acme were managed in a completely selfless fashion, its expected fair
market value at the end of Period 2 would be $1.1 billion-or $110 per
share. When discounted back to present value at the beginning of Period 1,
then, a selflessly managed firm would have a total market value of
$1 billion-or $100 per share.' 59 Nevertheless, M may have some ability
to appropriate a fraction of the firm's value in Period 2 for its own personal
benefit. For convenience, we will sometimes denote this fractional value
by the variable x. Thus, if M appropriated say, x = 25% of Acme's firm
value, Acme's Period 2 value would be 75% of $1.1 billion, which has a
present value (as of Period 1) of $750 million-or seventy-five dollars per
share. While hurting Acme's shareholders, such a diversion obviously
helps M. Nevertheless, we shall assume that, in spite of M's personal gain,
such actions are socially wasteful and that for each dollar of firm value

157. Here we abstract from the possibility that B may actually enjoy synergy advantages that
result in a higher overall valuation for the firm in B's hands than in M's hands. While certainly an
important motivating force behind a takeover, we contend that synergy is simply orthogonal to our
analysis. Whatever the value of a taking control to B, the prospects of also benefiting from extraction
of rents from managers (when B forms a toehold block as we discuss later in the paper) will increase the
willingness of B to purchase shares to form a block potentially opposed to management.
158. As it will turn out in our model, this party will always be M, who will have done "just
enough" in the previous period to remain in control and fend off a hostile takeover.
159. At a 10% rate of discounting, the present value of $1.1 billion is equal to
($1.1 billion) / (1 + 0.10) = $1 billion.
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appropriated, M only benefits by forty cents.' 60 Consequently, by reducing
Acme's present value by $250 million, M reaps a substantially smaller
benefit, valued at $100 million.
To focus squarely on the role of the market for corporate control as a
disciplining device, we assume that M's decision about how much value to
appropriate is "non-contractible," in that M's wages and other forms of
compensation cannot be tailored to punish it for taking private benefits of
control. All that constrains M during this period is whether M has
previously (in Period 1) placed a credible constraint upon itself, effectively
putting an upper bound on the amount of private benefits M can appropriate
(described at greater length below).
Assuming the parties anticipate these actions in Period 2 (all the while
discounting them to present value in Period 1), we can now describe the
first (and more interesting) period of the model. As noted above, we
assume that in Period 1, M can commit to a maximal level of private
benefits it can expropriate from the firm, which we will call X. And it is
here where the presence of the outside investor, B, becomes important. For
B (as well as other investors), a failure by M to make any such commitment
toward abstinence is tantamount to a manifest intent to pillage the firm,
decimating its future value. 161 In Period 2, player M-assuming there are
no constraints on its behavior-will choose simply to abscond with the
entire firm. Anticipating this outcome, shareholders in Period 1 will
discount the per-share price they are willing to pay for the firm (down to
zero), thereby making it relatively easy for the outside investor to take over
the firm by purchasing a majority stake, firing M in the process. It is the
fear of just such an acquisition that can (and, as it turns out, will) motivate
M to commit voluntarily to some maximal level of value appropriation, X.
Although we later catalog a variety of means with which M can so
constrain itself in a credible fashion through various corporate governance
160. The choice of forty cents on the dollar (representing an efficiency of 40%) is somewhat
arbitrary. Nevertheless, the concept that M will experience inefficiency in expropriating private
benefits of control is not. To the extent fiduciary duties limit egregious acts of appropriation, for
example, managers may need to hide their private benefits through perks and other nonmonetary means
of transferring value that may not provide full dollar value to managers. The very act of hiding benefits
may also require costly resource expenditures. Managers may also force the firm to deviate to less
profitable activities to enhance their ability to appropriate value. For each dollar benefit that a manager
receives from appropriation, firm value as a result may drop by more than one dollar. Moreover, the
inefficiency is likely to increase the higher the levels of expropriation. The 40% average level of
expropriation inefficiency assumption is therefore justified at least at high levels of expropriation.
Overall corporate welfare therefore is maximized in the simple model when managers appropriate no
private benefits.
161. See infra text accompanying note 226 (discussing the problem of credible commitment).
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devices, 6 2 for current purposes we remain agnostic about the precise
means for doing so. At the very least, M may want to constrain itself just
enough to keep the stock price relatively high, and by so doing make a
takeover somewhat expensive to engineer.
Continuing with Period 1, once Acme's management has chosen the
commitment level X, the outside investor decides whether to purchase
shares with an eye toward a takeover. 163 Although in the real world, such
purchases can take place incrementally over time (through, say, a
"creeping" tender offer), we shall simplify the analysis somewhat so that
the outside investor must make all its purchases in at most two
transactions-both occurring during Period 1 164 First, player B can
attempt to purchase a "toehold" position in the firm-one that falls short of
taking a majority of shares, but nonetheless gives B a credible threat to
carry out a takeover. Second, B can decide to increase its toehold position
in the finn by purchasing whatever shares are still needed to take control of
65
the firm, which we shall assume takes place at the 50% threshold.
Permitting B to purchase shares at two discrete points during Period 1
allows us to study how bargaining between M and B in the intervening time
affects overall corporate welfare. It is the spoils of this bargain that we
perceive to be the motivation behind both shareholder favoritism and ex
ante deterrence. Indeed, if M can make an opportunistic payment to secure
the support of the toehold shareholder, then M will find itself in a difficult
position of choosing either (1) to form a coalition with the noncontrol block
shareholder or (2) to commit to such selfless governance that the block
shareholder never emerges despite the possibility of extracting rents from
managers. As we shall demonstrate below, rather than share with a toehold

162. See infra Part Il.C.2.
163. For now, we shall assume that only one outside investor possesses the financial resources to
assemble something more than a trivial block of shares. We shall return to the possibility of numerous
block shareholders shortly (a complication that reinforces our thesis rather than undercutting it). See
infra text accompanying note 239.
164. This assumption is consistent with modem securities law, given that creeping tender offers
must now be disclosed early on. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2000).
Under state corporate law, shareholders elect the board of directors. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
165.
§ 211 (b) (1998); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.03(d) (1979). The board of directors is given the power
(unless otherwise specified in the corporate charter) to manage the business and affairs of the
corporation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b). Directors are elected
through a plurality of the votes cast unless the corporate charter specifies cumulative voting. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214; MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.28.
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block, M will often prefer to commit to a lower level of private benefits
(i.e., a lower X) so as to deter the formation of any toehold.166
With the basic framework in hand, our next task is to characterize how
the equilibrium level of value appropriation changes in the absence and
presence of bargaining, respectively. We discuss each of these cases in
turn.
2. The Takeover Deterrent in the Absence of Favoritism
Consider first the constraints that the takeover market places on
managerial opportunism in a world where bargaining for patronage by B is
prohibited. As noted above, managers who appropriate a large fraction of
firm value can induce depressed share prices, thereby increasing the
possibility of a hostile takeover. In particular, mismanagement by M can
make it profitable for B to assemble a block of shares sufficient to obtain
control over the corporation. Once in control, B can replace M with itself
(or loyal agents), change firm policies, and (possibly) appropriate private
benefits.
At the same time, however, even with obvious mismanagement,
takeovers are costly to engineer. An outside potential acquirer faces not
only legal requirements with respect to disclosure and the price paid, but
may also suffer higher costs due to implementation of various antitakeover
devices. And importantly, the acquirer must usually pay a "premium" to
dislodge current shareholders from their interest-a premium that increases
67
with the size of the block purchased. 1
Such costs, in turn, provide managers with at least some leeway to
appropriate private benefits without tempting a takeover. To represent this
concept, we shall assume that M can commit to a ceiling that limits its own
ability to siphon corporate wealth (which we have called X). If M is
interested in maintaining its position, it will attempt to select this ceiling so
that it "just" deters a takeover from occurring. When no bargaining is
allowed, we shall define this critical ceiling as Xv.. Critically, if X,, is
sufficiently small to drain all the profit incentives from an acquisition, B
will choose not to engage in one.

166. The alert reader will no doubt recognize that allowing for a two-stage purchase by B is
meaningful only insofar as bargaining is allowed between purchases. If no bargaining occurred, then
nothing is added by explicitly permitting B to make a two-stage purchase.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 217-25.
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Just what value, then, will M choose to set for X,,5 ? To investigate this
question, we need to "solve" the game backwards starting with Period 2.168
Assume that M has retained control of the company during Period 1, and is
now considering how to manage the firm in the second stage. Here, the
incentives are fairly straightforward: No longer facing the specter of a
hostile acquisition, M will have an incentive to divert as much value as
possible (subject, of course, to the ceiling that Xflb imposes). Consequently,
then, the company will be worth (1 - Xb)x ($1.1 billion) in Period 2, which
has a discounted value of $( - X) billion dollars at the beginning of
Period 1.
Now, consider B's position in Period 1, contemplating whether to
engineer a hostile takeover of Acme. 169 In deciding whether to construct a
control block to takeover the firm, the outside investor will compare the
benefits it receives for taking over the firm to the costs it must pay to
construct a control block. As to the benefit, B's return is made up of two
probability-weighted components. First, B might be able to appropriate
private benefits after a takeover-though it might do so only somewhat
inefficiently: just like M, we assume that B benefits by only some fraction
of a dollar for each dollar's worth of firm value appropriated. 170 But
second, an acquiring B might find that because it owns a large fraction of
equity in the company, B's interests would be better served by maximizing
the value of the firm and realizing a large capital gain over its investment.
As to the cost of amassing a control share of the firm, B must be
willing to offer a sufficiently large price to lure a strict majority (i.e.,
5 million plus one) of Acme's shareholders to tender their shares. This can
be a costly enterprise, and B must take care to anticipate the "supply curve"
of shares accurately. As with many applications in finance theory, 17 1 we
shall assume that it becomes increasingly costly on the margin for B to
amass larger and larger blocks of shares, and thus this supply curve is an
upward sloping one. While this assumption is critical to our analysis, it can
occur for many nonexclusive reasons. For example, shareholders may face

168. Our analysis uses a rather conventional "backward induction" approach to characterize
equilibrium behavior. That is, we begin with an analysis of the outcome of Period 2 of the model, and
then discuss of the impact of that behavior on the parties' behavior in Period 1.
169. As noted above, the absence of bargaining in this version of the analysis allows us to collapse
the two-stage purchase by B into a single one, implicitly assuming that B purchases nothing at the first
opportunity to purchase shares.
170. See infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
171. For an extensive review of the evidence in support of upward sloping supply curves for
shares, see Fried, supra note 36, at 434 n.65.
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a range of different tax consequences from the sale of their shares. 172
Shareholders may also have a range of heterogeneous expectations as to
firm value. 173 And finally, as the outside investor assembles a sufficiently
large block to make a takeover inevitable, the news may filter into the
market, raising the expectation of shareholders in the market as to the value
174
of their stock and thereby the secondary market price.
We therefore posit that the outside investor faces an upward sloping
supply curve for shares, and thus must pay a higher premium (over present
value) the larger the block of shares it seeks to construct. In particular, to
animate our analysis, we assume that the supply curve of shares has the
following specific functional form: If the outside investor offers a price of
P dollars for each share, shareholders as a group will tender the quantity
Q(P) of their shares, where:
Q(P)=(10million).

11l

E(V)
10.-

The term E(V) in this expression denotes the expectation that
tendering shareholders have of the Period 2 per share value of the company
should they tender.' 7 5 Importantly, this value may shift depending on
whether the shareholder believes itself to be a "pivotal" shareholder in an
acquisition-that is, if its share is required to cause a change in control to
occur. In this case, a pivotal shareholder will realize that if it refuses to

172. For example, some shareholders may be nonprofit organizations and face no tax liability.
Other shareholders may hold shares primarily purchased over one year in the past and therefore enjoy
long-term capital gains preference on any appreciation in their shares. Still other shareholders may hold
shares purchased within one year and face taxation at ordinary income rates for the appreciation in their
shares. Shareholders who face differential tax liability upon the sale of their shares will require
differential prices to induce them to sell, a trait that leads directly to an upward sloping supply curve for
shares. See also David T. Brown & Michael D. Ryngaert, The Determinants of Tendering Rates in
Interfirm and Self-Tender Offers, 65 J. Bus. 529, 530 (1992) (reporting evidence that public
shareholders with varying tax costs associated with tendering may result in some shareholders accepting
a tender offer while others decline such an offer).
173. See Stout, supra note 44, at 625-35 (1995) (advancing the theory that investors in the stock
market may hold heterogeneous expectations as to share values).
174. To be sure, this generalization is not without caveats. For instance, investors may not have
full information on the incentive of an outside investor in forming a block of shares. Often blocks of
shares are assembled even when a takeover is not imminent. Under the Williams Act's 5% rule, for
example, outside investors may assemble a block consisting up to 5% of the outstanding stock without
having to disclose their ownership. See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text. The outside
investor may therefore obtain the initial toehold block without having to pay a significant premium. On
the other hand, the differential tax and heterogeneous expectations explanations for an increasing
supply curve for shares may still result in the outside investor paying a premium even for blocks smaller
than 5% of the outstanding shares. We concentrate on the tax rationale below.
175. More formally, E(V) stands for the expected per share value of the corporation in Period 2.
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tender, the firm will continue under current management, while if it
tenders, the firm will be governed by new management in a (possibly)
different fashion. To the pivotal shareholder, therefore, E(V) will represent
the expected Period 2 value of the firm where a takeover does not occur
(because it is the pivotal shareholder's potential decision not to take the
offer that may scuttle the takeover). 176

30-

p
28-

Q(p)
FIGURE

1:

(in millions)

GRAPH OF THE SUPPLY CURVE

Figure 1 depicts the relationship between the size of the block and the
price that the outside investor must pay for the block, under the assumption
that E(V) = $30 (giving a total firm a value of $300 million in Period 2).
Although seemingly arbitrary, the specific supply function for shares we
use in fact represents the supply for shares that dispersed shareholders with
177
varying tax rates would provide the purchasing outside investor.
Consider a particular shareholder facing the decision whether to tender
shares to B in Period 1 or to hold on to the shares until Period 2.
Shareholders that tender their shares in Period 1 face an immediate tax
consequence on any gain, and then can invest their after-tax earnings at
some outside interest rate (which we assume arbitrarily to be 10%), which
176.
We assume that a takeover requires strictly more than 50% of outstanding shares, and thus
the shareholder that represents the 5,000,001st share of B's nascent control block realizes that its share

is pivotal. Given the differential tax rate assumption behind the upward sloping supply curve for shares,
the shareholder selling the 5,000,001st will realize this pivotal position based on that shareholder's tax
rate relative to other shareholders. In more realistic settings, the shareholder may not know this with
certainty, of course. But even here, every shareholder may be able to make relatively accurate
conjectures of their positions, so that something close to what is described in the text occurs.
177.
See supra note 172 (describing various sources for differential tax rates among shareholders).
The mathematical derivation of this supply curve can be found in Choi & Talley, supra note **.
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is itself taxed in Period 2. All told, then, shareholders who do not tender
retain the ability to avoid any taxes in Period 1 (and thereby enjoy tax-free
buildup of their investment). Any shareholder with a positive marginal tax
rate, therefore, will demand some premium be paid on top of the present
value of the shares. By correlative reasoning, the higher the tax rate facing
a shareholder, the greater the premium that shareholder will demand.
Although we adopt this "tax" account for presentational ease, the intuition
of our analysis applies regardless of the specific reason that supply function
is upward sloping; what is critical is that the average cost of building a
block of shares is increasing with the size of that block.
Our supply function implicitly assumes that B must pay the same price
to all shareholders. 178 Under this assumption, note from the figure that if B
offers thirty dollars per share in Period 1 (equal to the future expected per
share value of the firm in Period 2), it can purchase all 10 million shares.
Even shareholders facing relatively high tax rates will choose to sell their
shares in Period 1 for thirty dollars in present value terms (and then face
taxes on any gain) rather than wait until Period 2 to receive the same
nominal thirty dollars (again facing taxes on the gain). 179 Conversely, if B
offers any less than approximately $27.27 (i.e., the present discounted
value of thirty dollars in period 2), no one will tender.' 80 Finally, if B
offers (approximately) $28.58 per share, then it can induce 5,000,001
shareholders to tender. 8' This last figure is a critical threshold for B, since
178. This assumption is justified in part by the best price rule for tender offers under the Williams
Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (2000).
179. Assume that a shareholder faces a 95% tax rate on any gains (and has a zero basis in the
shares). If choosing not to tender, the shareholder will receive $30 (E(V)) for its shares in Period 2 and
will be taxed at the 95% rate, leaving the shareholder with $1.50 at the end of Period 2. Discounting
back to Period 1, the shareholder will receive a net expected value of $1.36. On the other hand, if the
shareholder tenders in Period I for thirty dollars to B, the shareholder will receive $1.50 in Period I
(and is thus better off compared with the situation where the shareholder does not tender). In fact, for
all tax rates up to 100%, the shareholder is strictly better off from tendering where B makes E(V) the
Period I bid price.
180. Assume that a shareholder faces a 5% tax rate on any gains (and has a zero basis in the
shares). If choosing not to tender, the shareholder will receive $30 (E(V)) for its shares in Period 2 and
will be taxed at the 5% rate, leaving the shareholder with $28.50 at the end of Period 2. Discounting
back to Period 1, the shareholder will receive a net expected value of $25.909. On the other hand, if the
shareholder tenders the shares in Period I for $27.27 to B, the shareholder will receive $25.907 after tax
in Period I (and is thus worse off compared with the situation where the shareholder does not tender).
In fact, for all tax rates down to 0%, the shareholder is strictly better off choosing not to tender where B
makes $27.27 (equal to E(V)/l. 1) the Period I bid price.
181. This last number (and the specific supply function for shares used in the paper) depends on
the assumption that Acme's shareholders are arrayed uniformly in their tax rates from 0% to 100%. As
with the other specific assumptions used to generate the paper's example, our analysis does not depend
on this assumption. The key point is that shareholders may differ in their tax rate and thus face varying
preferences between tendering today compared with staying invested in the firm's shares into the future.
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it is the least costly manner in which to engineer a takeover; purchasing a
larger stake would not only require B to raise the price paid to the
additional shareholders, but since B cannot determine who is the highest
versus the lowest valuer among existing shareholders, it would have to
raise the offered price to all tendering shareholders.18 2 Engineering such a
takeover would therefore cost B (in183this particular case) a total of
($28.58)x(5,000,001) = $142.9 million.
Hence, for this particular example, player B will find a takeover
profitable when and only when the private payoff from such a purchase
exceeds this cost. To determine the benefit side of this comparison, realize
that B gains in one of at least two possible ways from a successful purchase
of a control block. First, B may choose to operate the firn at full
efficiency, maximizing the value of the firm for all shareholders (including
B). The firm value in Period 2 where B successfully engages in a takeover
and pursues a strategy of maximizing firm value will be E(V) = $1.1
billion. Because B owns a little over 50% of the outstanding stock, B will
receive an expected benefit of $550 million in Period 2 (equal to $500
million in Period 1 dollars).
Alternatively, B may choose to use its control to expropriate private
benefits from the firm. As with the managers, B will suffer some
inefficiency in engaging in expropriation. 184 Unlike the managers,
however, B suffers an additional cost from expropriation of value. The
more value B expropriates, the lower the value of B's own shares of
common stock in the firm. In fact, only where B's efficiency at
expropriation exceeds 50% will B prefer extracting private benefits
compared to the first strategy of maximizing overall firm welfare. For
example, B may enjoy the ability to capture sixty cents for every dollar
taken as private benefits. In this situation, for each dollar B expropriates, B
gains sixty cents directly and loses fifty cents from the loss in value of B's
control block (as the firm value is reduced by one dollar, B's control block
of a little over 50% of the shares drops in value by fifty cents accordingly).
B will therefore choose to expropriate the maximum possible level of
A different range of tax rates would result in a different breakpoint price at which 5,000,001
shareholders will choose to tender their shares to B. The supply equation also depends on the
assumption that all shareholders share the same equilibrium expectation of the future value of the firm.
For an explicit derivation, see Choi & Talley, supra note **.
182. Moreover, under the Williams Act, to the extent a formal tender offer is initiated, the acquirer
must pay all shareholders the highest price it offers any shareholder. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (2000).
183.

More generally, we can calculate the offer price P that B must put forth to obtain a control

block of shares: P = (20/21) E(V).
184.

See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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private benefits, constrained only by the incumbent managers' initial
selection of corporate governance devices to constrain private benefits,
x

185

We assume that B will not know its precise efficiency at expropriating
private benefits until after B in fact obtains control over the firm. 186 To
determine B's overall expected benefit from purchasing a control block,
therefore, we need an assumption on the probability that B will in fact have
the ability to expropriate private benefits at an efficiency level greater than
50%. We assume that B's efficiency at expropriation is distributed
uniformly from 0 to 1.187 Under our assumptions, it turns out that B will be
a relatively efficient appropriator half of the time (while the other half of
the time B will find that maximizing firm value to be more profitable).
Moreover, we assume that when B in fact is able to expropriate at a greater
than 50% efficiency level, B's expected efficiency is equal to 75%. 188 B's
expected benefit from assembling a control block (E(;r,)) is therefore equal
to: 189

E(xrB) = ($1.1 billion)(0.5 + O.125Xb)
185. Suppose instead that for each dollar B expropriates, B gains forty cents directly (due to a 40%
efficiency in extracting rents from the firm) and loses fifty cents from the loss in value of B's control
block (as the firm value is reduced by one dollar, B's control block of a little over 50% of the shares
drops in value by fifty cents accordingly). B in this case will lose ten cents for every dollar
appropriated as private benefits. B, accordingly, will choose to operate the firm at its maximal value
without any private benefit expropriation.
186. B, for example, may not have full knowledge of the various confidential projects and
opportunities within the firm from which B may have some uncertain (and unknown at least prior to a
takeover) degree of success in expropriating value.
187. The assumption of a uniform distribution simplifies our analysis but is unnecessary. All that
matters is that the block shareholder expects with some positive probability (even if this probability is
small) to be able to extract private benefits at an efficiency level greater than 50%. Our qualitative
analysis also changes little if the block shareholder knows the marginal value of the available private
benefits at the beginning of the model (though the analysis becomes quantitatively a bit more
complicated).
188. Given a uniform distribution, there is a 50% probability that B's efficiency of expropriation
is 50% or under (and that therefore B-holding a control block of slightly more than 50% of Acme's
shares-will not find expropriation of value profit-maximizing). Moreover, conditional on the
efficiency of expropriation being larger than 50%, the mean efficiency level given a uniform
distribution is equal to 75%. Once again, these assumptions are not critical to our analysis, but lend
themselves to greater tractability.
189. More formally we can state that: E(7rf) = Prob(efficiency < 0.5).(0.5$1.1 billion) +
Prob(efficiency > 0.5).(0.5(I - X,)($1.1 billion) + (0.75. X, .$].I billion)). Where B's efficiency of
expropriation is 50% or under, B gains more from maximizing the value of the 50% block rather than
expropriating any value. Where B's efficiency of expropriation is more than 50%, B gains from
expropriating value in an amount equal to the efficiency of expropriation (assumed equal to 75%) times
the level of expropriation (Xb -$1.1 billion). In addition, B suffers a loss on the 50% block of shares
equal to the level of expropriation. Note that we assume that both Prob(efficiency < 0.5) and
Prob(efficiency > 0.5) are equal to 0.5 (or 50% each).
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Note that as shareholders expect incumbent managers to expropriate a
higher level of firm value in Period 2 (based on the managers' choice of a
relatively high value of potential private benefits Xb through the corporate
governance structure) the expected profit to B from engaging in a takeover
increases. As well, the cost of engineering a takeover will decline as the
expectation of the pivotal shareholder of the value of the firm without such
a takeover E(V) is reduced (corresponding to a lower level of X d,).
Given the above reasoning for B, consider now the ex ante incentives
of Acme management, who will anticipate the possibility that B will
acquire the firm if it is managed too poorly. The more that M ties its own
hands through its choice of X, the lower the benefit to the outside investor
from obtaining control. At the same time, the large cost of assembling a
control block provides the manager with a bit of slack to appropriate at
least some value without tempting a takeover. Managers will therefore set
the level of private benefits just under the cost to an outside investor of
assembling a control block. Put another way, M will set X," such that the
outside potential block shareholder B will find it unprofitable to assemble a
control block.
Solving for Xb in the above example yields the condition that M can
forestall a takeover by B whenever X b < 3.67%. 19 ° Put another way,
managers who do not "self-constrain" to appropriating 3.67% of firm value
or less will induce a hostile takeover with probability one. 9 ' Given the
alternatives, M's best option is to commit to a ceiling of X~b = 3.67%, so
that B finds it just barely unprofitable to pursue a takeover, and stays out of
the market. Consequently, the Period 1 market price of Acme's shares is
equal to $96.33 per share. Managers in Period 2 then are able to extract a
maximum total value of $16.15 million (i.e., 3.67% of $1.1 billion,
multiplied by the managers' 40% efficiency of expropriation level), the
Period 1 present value of which is $14.68 million. We use the Period 1

190. B's Period 1 cost of assembling a control block is equal to 5,000,001.(2021).E(V). The
present value (in Period 1) of B's expected profit from assembling a control block is equal to E(7r)/(I.1)
= ($1.1 billion)(0.5 + O.125X.,Y(1.1). Using the fact that E(V) = (1 - X,)($1.l billion)/(10 million), we
can solve for the level of X, that just makes B indifferent about assembling a control block. With the
specific numbers in the Acme example, X,b is equal to 3.67%. Given this value of X b note that the total
cost of assembling a block of 5,000,001 shares is equal to $504.59 million. If a takeover does not
occur, B may sell the block of shares back into the market at the pre-takeover price of $96.33 for
proceeds of $481.65 million. Thus, the net cost to B is equal to $22.94 million. Similarly, the net
benefit of a takeover for B (after subtracting the value of the 5,000,001 shares without a takeover) is
equal to $22.94 million. We assume that if B is indifferent, B will choose not to assemble the block.
191. We leave for later discussion the mechanisms by which a manager might do so. See infra
Part III.C.2.
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private benefit level of $14.68 million as the benchmark to compare with
the outcome when shareholder favoritism is allowed.
The case just analyzed-where bargaining between M and B is not
permitted-provides the baseline for our analysis in the next subsection of
favoritism toward block shareholders. When we extend the model to allow
bargaining, the manager's decision becomes somewhat more complex.
Now M, in deciding on the level of private benefits to appropriate, will
make this decision under the shadow of either a possible takeover, or the
prospect of a "bribe" to an outside investor in order to discourage a
takeover. As we demonstrate, the added possibility that B forms a
noncontrol toehold block simply for its "hold up" value in extracting a
bribe can provide an additional ex ante deterrent effect on managers
seeking to pilfer private benefits.
3. Allowing Favoritism to Shareholders
Imagine now that managers are free to bestow favoritism (e.g., pay
bribes) on outside investors using corporate resources, in order to deter
takeovers, and that such bribes are enforceable (in either judicial or extrajudicial venues). Through patronage, managers may be able to obtain the
cooperation of a block of shares in supporting the managers' efforts at
appropriating private benefits. Although the conventional wisdom is that
such bribes decrease overall corporate welfare, this section makes the
argument that from an ex ante standpoint, the ability to make bribes may
actually be welfare enhancing.
As with the above case, we will continue to assume that M can
credibly commit to an "upper bound" on the fraction of firm value it can
appropriate, or X; once management has made a decision to commit to this
ceiling, it cannot change this commitment. 92 The incentive effect of a
possible takeover therefore occurs through M's expectations about how the
outside investor will react to the ceiling that is chosen. Note also that
without an actual takeover, extracting a bribe is the only reason B would
ever build a toehold block to begin with: for to do so requires paying a
premium over present value, and if no takeover occurs, player B cannot
recoup this premium.' 93 Consequently, our analysis turns on a block
192. Although managers might try to represent (without any commitment) that they will
appropriate a reduced amount, in the absence of a commitment, this representation is not credible. In
such a case, investors that choose not to engineer an outright acquisition cannot expect any value of the
company to remain.
193. On a related note, Arturo Bris presents evidence from a sample of tender offers in the United
States from 1985 to 1998 that only 3.2% of the bidders had a prior toehold stake. See Arturo Bris,
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shareholder who is motivated solely by holding up management to extract a
portion of M's private benefits. 194 If M acquiesces, it stays in power and
might even benefit from an enhanced ability to extract private benefits from
the firm; at the same time, however, M also loses from having to share the
spoils with another party. 195 Management thus faces a choice. It may
acquiesce to the appearance of an outside investor, implicitly agreeing to
pay a portion of M's private benefits; in anticipation of this strategy, M
may then raise the commitment ceiling X on the maximum level of private
benefits M can appropriate. Alternatively, however, M might opt for the
path of self-interested self-abnegation, committing a lower ceiling on
private benefits in order to deter the formation of a toehold block
altogether. Although the overall private benefits extracted will be lower,
the manager may keep all of the benefits.
To analyze the impact of allowing favoritism, we now explicitly
permit B to make purchases at two points during Period 1. First, B can
purchase a toehold position in the firm, which falls short of the 50%
threshold of control, but is large enough to make the threat to complete a
When Do Bidders Purchase a Toehold? (Sept. 2001), at http://faculty.som.yale.edul-ab364/
toehold.PDF. Bris hypothesizes that assembling a toehold prior to a bid signals to the market the
possibility of a takeover and thereby may lead to a run-up in the secondary market price, making the
purchase of subsequent shares in the target more expensive for the bidder and decreasing the probability
of a successful takeover. Id.
194. Note that we treat B as a unified entity seeking to maximize the net worth of B. For many
institutional investors, nevertheless, this assumption may not hold true. Instead, agency problems may
exist within institutional investors between the ultimate providers of capital and the managers of the
institution. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
ShareholderActivism, 79 GEO. L. J. 445, 468-78 (1991). Money managers in charge of B that seek to
maximize their own personal wealth may, for example, choose to accept a smaller payoff (directed
toward the money managers' own interests) from Acme's managers in return for B's support of the
Acme's managers expropriation of private benefits. Money managers that are sufficiently indifferent to
the welfare of B's ultimate owners may also choose not to have B engage in opportunistic rent-seeking
against Acme's managers to the extent the money managers bear at least the effort cost related to
identifying a suitable target and assembling a toehold block of shares. We abstract from the issue of
agency problems within institutional investors in this Article.
195. Implicitly, our analysis presumes that in any such division of benefits, M simply diverts some
portion of M's private appropriations to B. As such, regardless of how such rents are divided, we
presume for simplicity that so long as M remains in control, the "M-B team" still can only appropriate
value at the M's 40% efficiency rate. Variations of the model might allow side payments to B which
exhibit either greater or lesser efficiency levels than those of M. While we do not explore such
variations here, we conjecture their impact on our normative arugment to be relatively small. For an
extreme example, if side payments could be directed to B at 100% efficiency, then M and B would
likely agree that M would manage the firm efficiently, and direct all its value to B (in return for some
up-front cash payment from B to M). While seemingly strange, such an equilibrium would actually
constitute a first-best outcome from a social efficiency standpoint, and thus is consistent with our
contention that permitting favoritism can be a socially desirable way to stem agency costs. (We thank
Ed Kitch for providing this example.)
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takeover a credible one. After this initial purchase (if any) we allow for
bargaining between M and B. We suppose that the parties have equal
bargaining power so that any gains from trade are divided into 50-50
portions. 196 It is this payment that constitutes the bribe. Note that
bargaining between managers and a toehold shareholder is allowed prior to
the decision on the part of the toehold shareholder to continue on to a full
control block. In the analysis of the toehold shareholder bargaining model,
we once again proceed backwards through the stages in the model.
Except for a small variation, Period 2 of the model plays out much
like before. Suppose M has already set a fixed maximum level of private
benefits, which we will now label X, (as opposed to Xb from before). And
moreover, suppose that M has retained control (through either deterrence or
an effective bribe). If B has been deterred entirely, M will appropriate and
retain the entire fraction allowable, Xb. On the other hand, if B has formed
a toehold and formed a coalition, M will still appropriate the full amount,
rendering unto B whatever payment is due per their agreement.
Working backwards to Period 1, things become more interesting. As
noted above, prior to selecting an expropriation ceiling Xb, M has to decide
whether to opt for deterrence or accommodation of B. If M opts for
deterrence, it must obviously choose X, sufficiently small to vitiate any
gain to B from either (a) taking over the firm or (b) purchasing a block and
demanding patronage. We know from the above analysis that an outright
takeover never occurs so long as M commits to X= X ' = 3.67% or less. It
turns out, however, that when bargaining is allowed, simply deterring a
takeover is insufficient. Indeed, even though such a ceiling would certainly
deter B from assembling a control block in a single transaction, B has the
magic of "sunk costs" on its side. 197 Explicitly, B still has the option of

196. The gain from trade in this instance is the difference if any between (a) the expected private
benefits that M can glean if retaining control; and (b) the expected benefits that a toehold shareholder B
can capture (ignoring any sunk purchases) from going through with a takeover. The results derived
below persist so long as M does not possess "too much" of the bargaining power. See Choi & Talley,
supra note **.

197. Sunk costs are expenditures that the outside investor is unable to recover once made. Of
course, to the extent another potential acquirer exists, the outside investor may be able to resell its
toehold block to the other acquirer at a premium (and thus take the loss of such a premium as part of the
opportunity cost of undertaking a takeover). Nevertheless, in the absence of a readily identifiable
buyer, the outside investor will find it difficult to liquidate the minority, noncontrol toehold block
without suffering a loss (or experiencing delay). For a recent example, see Cassell Bryan-Low,
Priceline.com Founder Jay Walker Sells Stock at Bargain Price, WALL ST. J., Aug 22, 2001, at CII
(reporting that Priceline.com founder Jay Walker sold most of his remaining minority block of shares to
Cheung Kong and Hutchison Whampoa for $4.37 for share when the secondary market price equaled
$6.35 per share).
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purchasing a tiny fraction of Acme (e.g., one share) so that the prospective
gains from a takeover are barely positive, disregarding the now-sunk costs
it took to purchase the toehold. By so doing, B can become a credible
negotiator with M, and B's share of the bargaining pie might be large
enough to offset the cost of assembling the toehold.
Applying this reasoning to the instant example exposes the folly of
selecting the expropriation ceiling Xb equal to X b (that is, the equilibrium
value of X when no bargaining is allowed). Indeed, if M were to do so, it
would-by definition-make the immediate costs of a takeover for B (with
no toehold) exactly balance the present value of the benefits (see Figure 2
below).' 98
FIGURE 2: B's DECISION TO ASSEMBLE A CONTROL BLOCK

When Xb = Xb= 3.67%
Net Benefit

$22.94 million

Net Cost

$22.94 million

Now suppose in contrast that B purchases a single share of Acme (for
$96.33).99 With the ownership of this single share, B now faces a lower
incremental cost of assembling a full control block. In particular, the
incremental cost of assembling a full control block is now less than prior to
the purchase of the single share (since B now only needs to purchase
5,000,000 shares to obtain control). Holding the single share, B's calculus
198. For a derivation of the numbers in Figure 2 see supra note 190 (calculating the maximum
level of X b where managers still deter an outright takeover given a prohibition against side payments to
shareholders).
199. We assume that the shareholder that sells the single share to B in Period I does so at a price
equal to the expected per share value of the firm in Period 1. The price of a $96.33 per share depends
on managers expropriating $3.67 per share of private benefits from the firm (corresponding to X ,
= 3.67%). Where, of course, managers choose to expropriate a lower amount to deter the formation of
toehold blocks-as we discuss in this Article-the expected per share value will be correspondingly
higher.
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on whether to assemble a control block when the maximum level of private
benefits set by M is equal to Xb now is fundamentally altered. Treating the
cost of the single share as sunk, in making the second purchase, B will
consider a takeover as providing a net profit equal to B's reduced cost to
assemble a control block. This single share purchase tips the balance for B
in favor of going forward with an outright acquisition, and thereby gives B
credible bargaining power against M (see Figure 3 below).2 00
FIGURE 3: IMPACT OF A TOEHOLD OF 1 SHARE
When Xb = Xb = 3.67%

Net Benefit

Net Cost

$22.94 million
$22.94 million - $4.59

Armed with a bona fide takeover threat, B can now attempt to extract
a significant portion of M's $14.68 million worth of private benefits.
Assuming the bargaining surplus is split 50-50, M will be forced to pay a
bribe of approximately $7.34 million in Period 1 dollars to keep B from
completing the takeover (leaving $7.34 million for M). 20 1 Note that where
B seeks only to establish a credible takeover threat to extract rents from the
managers, B will seek the smallest toehold block that gives it credibility.

200. Calculating this net profit requires some additional steps. First, B's net profit will equal the
saved premium B would otherwise have to pay on the one share if purchased as part of the control block
transaction. Where E(V) = $96.33, the Article's assumed supply curve for shares requires an offer price
of $100.92 for B to purchase 5,000,001 shares. Because shares are valuable even without a takeover,
the net saved premium will equal the amount above the no-takeover value of the one share that B no
longer must expend to form a control block. Thus, B's net profit from proceeding to a takeover (given a
toehold of 1 share) will equal $100.92 (the premium price for the I share given a takeover) - $96.33 (the
value of the I share without a takeover) = $4.59.
201. To see this, note that the bargaining range is the interval between ninety-six dollars
(constituting the present value of B's gain from going forward with a takeover) on the lower end, and
$33.61 million (constituting the present value of M's benefit from appropriating 3.67% of firm value in
Period 2) on the upper end. Splitting this bargaining range in half yields B's share.
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Purchasing a larger toehold simply raises B's cost without increasing its
credibility.
The specter of paying off B obviously reduces M's private benefits of
control. Thus, if M wished to avoid having to split the rents, M would have
to choose an even smaller value for X--sufficiently small that B will find it
unprofitable to form a toehold block from which to generate credibility in
20 2
negotiating with M.
As it turns out in the Acme example, in order to deter B from ever
buying a toehold in the firm, M would have to choose X, = 2.12%, more
than 1.5 percentage points lower than Xb. Note that at Xb = 2.12%, the
Period 1 value of each share without a takeover is equal to $97.88.203 The
price, on the other hand, that B must pay to acquire 5,000,001 shares (given
the upward sloping supply function discussed above) is equal to $102.54
per shares as measured in Period 1.214 Consequently, the net unrecoverable
20 5
cost from assembling a control block is thus equal to $23.3 million.
Against this is the net expected Period 1 benefit that B can anticipate from
assembling a full control block of shares, which is equal to approximately
$13.24 million.20 6 Obviously, an outright takeover (starting from zero
shares) is not credible for an outside investor holding no shares (because
the takeover would result in a net loss of $10.1 million to B) (see Figure 4
below).

202. This value of X, clearly must be lower than the value of X, derived in the "no patronage"
case for two reasons. First, if the manager were to set the maximal level of private benefit expropriation
above X ,, we know from the prior section that B will simply takeover the firm, leaving managers with
zero profits. Second, as managers reduce the maximal level of private benefits below X ,, the outside
investor B must form increasingly larger toeholds to generate a credible threat of engaging in a
takeover. Lower levels of benefit expropriation translate into a lower potential profit for B from
engaging in a takeover. All other things being equal, B will need to shift more of its costs of
assembling a block to the initial "sunk" stage-through a larger toehold purchase-to present a credible
subsequent threat of takeover to the incumbent managers. Where the cost of obtaining a toehold is
increasing with the size of the toehold, B may eventually find it not worthwhile to assemble the toehold
(even given the prospects of rent extraction from managers) where managers have reduced their level of
private benefits sufficiently.
203. The Period I value of the shares without a takeover is derived from (I - X,).($1.1
billion)/(( 10 million)( 1.1 )).
204. The price per share to acquire 5,000,001 shares was derived in note 183 and is equal to:
((20/21)E(V)) where E(V) is ((I - 0.0212)($1.1 billion)/(10 million)) or $107.67. See supra note 183.
The per share acquisition price is therefore equal to $102.54.
205. This is obtained from 5,000,001.($102.54- 97.88).
206. The Period I value of the control block posttakeover is equal to ($1.1 billion)(0.5
+ 0.125(0.0212))/1.l or $502.65 million. The Period 1 value pretakeover is equal to 5,000,001.$97.88
or $489.40 million. The expected benefit is thus equal to $502.7 million minus $489.4 million or
$13.24 million.
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FIGURE 4: B's DECISION TO ASSEMBLE A CONTROL BLOCK

When Xb
Net Benefit

2.12%
Net Cost
$23.30 million

$13.24 million

Assembling a noncontrol toehold may shift some of the unrecoverable
cost of assembling a control block into sunk costs. It is no longer possible,
however, for B to become a credible bargainer after purchasing a single
share. Because B starts from a net loss of $10.1 million from engaging in a
takeover, B will have to assemble a toehold of sufficient size to reduce B's
incremental cost to constructing a control block by least $10.1 million
(corresponding to a toehold of 21.6% of the outstanding shares) to generate
20 7
a credible takeover threat.
In deciding whether such a large toehold is worthwhile, B will
compare the costs of assembling the 21.6% toehold against the size of the
bribe that B can hope to extract. As to the latter, when X is equal to 2.12%
and managers extract rents with a 40% efficiency (as assumed in the Acme
example), the Period 1 present value of private benefits is equal to $8.48
million. 20 8 Splitting this rent in half gives B an expected share of $4.24
million. As to the net cost of assembling the toehold, the required price for
the toehold shares is equal to the price necessary to acquire a block of size
21.6% of the shares, and not the full 5,000,001 necessary for a control

207. If B assembles a toehold of 2,160,249 (corresponding to 21.6% of the shares of Acme) then B
will need to purchase an additional 2,839,752 shares to form a control block. Following the assumed
supply curve for shares, B must expend $102.54 per share (when X,= 2 .12 %) to purchase the remaining
shares required for control. B's total incremental net cost will therefore equal 2,839,752 x ($102.54
- 97.88) = $13.23 million, giving B a credible threat of engaging in a takeover.
208. Where X, is equal to 2.12% the amount of rents extracted (measured from Period 1) is equal
to 0.0212.($1.1 billion)/(I.l) or $21.2 million. When managers suffer from only a 40% efficiency in
extraction (due to fiduciary duty constraints among other things) this leaves only $8.48 million of rents.
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20 9
block, leading to a lower per share price for the toehold in equilibrium.
From the supply curve posited above, the price of such a purchase is
therefore equal to $99.84 per share, representing an unrecoverable $1.96
premium over fair market value. The total sunk cost of assembling a
toehold of 21.6% of the shares is thus equal to $4.24 million, making B just
indifferent between assembling a credible toehold to extract rents from
managers, and doing nothing at all (and we implicitly assume without loss
of generality that indifference leads to intransigence). By reducing X to
2.12%, then, M can ensure itself a level of private benefits of $8.48 million,
smaller than what is otherwise available, but one that need not be shared
with B.

The path of deterrence, however, is not the only option available to
incumbent management. Player M might alternatively respond to player
B's threat by deliberately inviting a coalition with B. While this seems
counter-intuitive at first, note that at least theoretically, it could be in M's
interests to do so if it allows M to appropriate even more value than would
otherwise be available under a strategy of deterrence. Under this view, a
manager might set Xb extremely high, knowing full well that it will induce a
block shareholder to appear, but even after paying B off, M may have a
significant portion left over to retain. Interestingly, however, analysis of
this option yields the result that even if M chooses accommodation, Xb
would still be optimally set equal to 3.67%. Note that Xb equals X., the
value of appropriation in the case where patronage is prohibited.
One might think on first blush that an accommodating manager might
rationally go even higher still, content in the safety that a coalition with B
would bring. It turns out, however, that this strategy would not be in M's
interests. While it would permit a higher level of private benefits to be split
between M and B, it simultaneously increases the profits that B can expect
from an outright takeover (in which M is displaced). 21 0 Because of this
latter factor, B's "threat point" becomes more and more demanding as X
increases above Xb, and M must fully compensate B for these foregone
takeover profits, leaving an even smaller portion of the surplus available
for M.2 1I For example, if M raises the level of private benefits one dollar
beyond those benefits extracted with X., then potentially forty cents (given

209. Note that since a bribe forestalls any takeover, no one expects an outright takeover to occur,
and the market values the company as if current management will stay in power with certainty.
210. Where managers select X , then B is just indifferent about engaging in a takeover (and
expects zero profits from doing so).
211. More formally, we adopt the notion of bargaining to split the surplus from an agreement first
put forth in John F. Nash, Jr., The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950).
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M's 40% inefficiency of extraction) of additional benefits are available to
split between M and B. B, however, will now enjoy a possible profit of
fifty cents from engaging in a takeover and maximizing firm value (given a
50% control block) and will demand at least fifty cents compensation (if
not more) 212 from M for entering into a coalition with M. M therefore must
not only give the entire forty cents additional private benefit surplus to B
but also an additional ten cents. Raising the level of private benefits past
X., (where B receives a zero profit from engaging in a takeover) therefore
213
leaves managers worse off.

It therefore turns out that a manager in our model seeking to
accommodate entry would set the maximal level of private benefits X,
equal to X,,, (or 3.67% in the Acme example). In response, player B would
purchase a single share, and would extract a bribe of approximately $7.34
million from M. 214 After accounting for this side payment, M's expected
payoff from forming a coalition with B would be $(14.68 million - 7.34
million) equal to $7.34 million.
Three aspects of these calculations described above deserve special
attention. First, and most important, note that the net value retained by M
under a strategy of accommodation ($7.34 million) is strictly less than that
yielded from a strategy of deterrence ($8.48 million). In other words, the

212. B will require at least fifty cents in compensation because at a minimum B will be able to
increase the value of its block by fifty cents by eliminating all private benefits through a takeover. B
may also enjoy the ability to extract private benefits (to the extent the efficiency of B's expropriation
exceeds the size of B's block of shares). See supra notes 184-89 and accompanying text. Managers
seeking to pay off B, thus, must also compensate B for B's own foregone potential private benefits of
control.
213. Note that this depends on the assumption that managers are relatively inefficient (less than
50% efficiency) at extracting private benefits. Where managers are more than 50% efficient at
extracting private benefits, the possibility exists that the managers may seek to commit to a level of
private benefits greater than X... At higher levels of private benefit expropriation, the inefficiency from
theft is increasing (as managers find it more difficult to hide their expropriation from various legal
barriers). Thus, the assumption of less than 50% efficiency is plausible (at least at higher levels of
theft). Moreover, regulators may adjust the level of efficiency with which managers transfer side
payments to outside block shareholders. Below, we argue that regulators may wish to allow managers
to make direct cash payments to outside block shareholders. See infra Part IV.A.I. Nothing stops
regulators from imposing a tax on such payments. A tax on side payments has the same effect as
increased manager expropriation inefficiency: for each dollar that a manager expropriates, less than one
dollar is available to transfer to the outside block shareholder, making accommodation more costly.
Too high a tax, of course, may lead managers to shift their side payments back toward more indirect
routes (such as shifting corporate opportunities).
214. Where X, is equal to 3.67% the amount of rents extracted (measured from Period 1) is equal
to 0.0367.($1.1 billion)/(l.1) or $36.7 million. When managers suffer from only a 40% efficiency in
extraction (due to fiduciary duty constraints among other things) this leaves only $14.68 million of
rents. A half-share of the rents therefore is equal to $7.34 million.
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manager finds it less profitable to split a larger private benefits pie with B
than it is to consume a small one alone. If given the choice, then, M would
opt for deterrence over accommodation, selecting a small enough value of
Xb to ensure that B never finds it profitable to buy a toehold for its hold-up
value. It is this calculation that is at the core of a central argument in this
Article: Permitting favoritism may, ironically, induce more conscientious
stewardship by incumbent management; who must now work harder to
deter the entry of opportunistic investors seeking to extract side payments
in exchange for their quiescence.
Second, note that this deterrence effect has an important impact on
share value when compared to the case where bargaining was not allowed.
Recall that in that case, M would set X b= 3.67%, and the resulting share
price would be $96.33. When bargaining is allowed in this example, M
chooses an even more extreme form of deterrence, setting Xb = 2.12%, so
that the resulting Period 1 share price is $97.88, a gain of $1.55 per share
over the prohibitionist status quo ante. Spread across the 10 million shares
outstanding in Acme, this implies that allowing favoritism would confer a
gain on nonblock shareholders as a whole of over $15 million. Moreover,
this figure is not merely a transfer payment from management to
shareholders, but a bona fide efficiency gain. Given that M only benefits
by forty cents on the dollar, the $15 million worth of recaptured value
comes at a cost of only $6 million to M.215 On a related note, in our model
it turns out that B does not actually benefit from the legal status of
favoritism one way or another. Indeed, in either case, M deliberately
constrains itself to induce B to walk away from any purchases, and thus B's
payoff is zero regardless of whether favoritism is allowed or prohibited.
Finally, note that even if M decided (against its own interests) to
accommodate rather than to deter B, the level of private benefits M would
choose is no higher than (and is in fact exactly the same as) that chosen
under a regime of prohibition. In other words, even in the worst case
scenario, where coalitions form between M and B, it is far from clear that
M will choose to divert more value than it would in a world where
favoritism is prohibited. On the one hand, the result may be somewhat
more sensitive to the actual numerical parameters chosen. 2 16 Nonetheless,
even where our formal model may indicate that M may wish to appropriate
215. At the same time, however, shareholders must pay differential taxes on this capital gain,
which would be a portion of social welfare but not of organizational welfare. But even accounting for
these taxes as per the model, the recapturing of $15 million dollars in value confers an after-tax benefit
of $1.5 million on the corporation.
216. See supra note 213.
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a level of private benefits greater than where bribes are prohibited, for good
reasons the amount of such benefits is limited. In particular, when M
decides to form a coalition with B, M still runs a real risk of setting X "too
high": By extracting too much of the firm's value, M might drive share
prices so low that B would prefer to engineer an outright takeover, leaving
M out in the cold. Recall, the path of accommodation entails splitting the
spoils between M and B. If Acme becomes too tempting a takeover target,
B would prefer to buy it outright than to share any surplus with M. It is this
fear that induces M to be relatively conservative about appropriating firm
value even when it envisions a coalition with B. As such, from the
incumbent shareholders' perspective, allowing favoritism in this example is
a no-lose proposition-it is either strictly preferable to prohibition (i.e.,
when M chooses deterrence), or is identical to it (when M chooses
accommodation).
Reiterating our main points, allowing patronage from managers to
block shareholders that work to entrench management may, on first blush,
seem to reduce overall corporate welfare. From an ex ante perspective,
however, the possibility that outside investors may assemble blocks of
shares simply to extract a bribe from management may have underappreciated positive welfare implications: In particular, it creates an added
incentive for management to work hard so as to avoid being held up by
opportunistic block shareholders. Viewed in this sense, two wrongs can
indeed make a right. Opportunism on the part of outside investors seeking
a bribe can dampen the effect of managerial agency costs, causing
managers to commit to a lower level of private benefits to deter the outside
investors from forming a block in the first place. Although managers may
gain from a coalition with the outside investor, they must share part of the
gain with the investor. In the case where bargaining power is roughly
equal, managers will tend to prefer not to share. Forming a coalition means
that managers must compensate the block shareholder for the loss on their
shares due to the private benefits in addition to splitting any surplus. As
well, outside constraints from fiduciary duties and reputational concerns
may limit the ability of managers to increase radically the amount of
private benefits they appropriate even with the possibility of a coalition
with a block shareholder.
C. CAVEATS AND CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS

As with most economic arguments premised on a theoretical model,
our analysis has invoked a number of assumptions intended to simplify the
analysis and isolate the most critical interactions at play. While such
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simplifications are quite standard for economic models, we would be
remiss to rely too confidently on the numerical results above without
exploring whether-and to what extent-they depend critically on
assumptions that are either implausible or cannot withstand being relaxed.
To the extent that they do so depend, we would be forced to cabin the
practical reach of our theory accordingly. In this Section, then, we briefly
explore what we believe to be the five assumptions of our model that are
most open to question, assessing (a) their realism, and/or (b) the robustness
of our argument to their relaxation.
1. Premiums and Block Size
A central conceptual feature of our model relates to the cost of
purchasing shares in the market. Indeed, key to our analysis is the
assumption that outside investors must pay a premium over the prevailing
secondary market price to construct a block, and that this premium
increases on the margin with the size of the block purchased.
Consequently, we argued, it is significantly cheaper on a per-share basis for
B to form a modest toehold (as a baseline for subsequent bargaining) than it
is to engineer an outright acquisition. It is management's knowledge (and
fear) of this modest toehold cost that induces M to work particularly
selflessly in situations where favoritism is allowed. Clearly, then, if the
required premium did not increase with block size, the cost advantage of a
forming toehold would begin to narrow. As such, the advantage for
management of choosing deterrence over accommodation also becomes
less pronounced.
Nevertheless, we contend that our assumptions about premia and
block size are eminently realistic, and, in any event, not absolutely critical
to the model. First, both intuitively and empirically, there are numerous
reasons to believe that block purchases become more costly as the block
size increases. As explored in our model above, shareholders may face
differential tax consequences from selling their shares. At one end of the
spectrum are nonprofit institutions that are not subject to any tax from
selling their shares. 2 17 Where shares have appreciated in value, nonprofit
institutions will be the most willing, all other things being equal, to part
with their shares for any given price. Shareholders that face a tax on the
sale of their shares, on the other hand, give up the deferral of tax on this
gain and therefore may require a premium in compensation. Among
taxable investors, the U.S. tax laws impose two levels of tax. Gains on
217.

SeeI.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994).
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shares held under one year are subject to ordinary income tax. 218 Gains on
shares held for one year or more, on the other hand, are limited to the longterm capital gains rate ceiling. 21 9 Shareholders with a mix of more recently
purchased shares will face primarily ordinary income rates while those with
a mix consisting more of shares purchased over one year in the past will
face lower rates. Moreover, where the stock price is volatile, some
shareholders may hold a portfolio of shares in the same company with
different size gains and losses (depending on when the shares were
purchased), thereby receiving differential tax treatment based on their
220
relative mix of gains and losses.
But even beyond tax liability, upward-sloping supply curves can be
artifacts of other realistic phenomena. For example, shareholders may hold
heterogeneous expectations with respect to the value of a particular firm.2 21
Determining the true value of a firm's shares is both a costly and uncertain
process. Shareholders with different beliefs and information may hold
varying expectations about firm value. Although the market price may
reflect the median valuation, individual shareholders may differ around this
median. 222 Any outside investor seeking to assemble a block then will find
it initially less costly to purchase shares as those shareholders with a belief
that the share price is overvalued sell their shares. As the block size
increases, however, the outside investor must purchase shares increasingly
from investors that hold beliefs that the secondary market price
undervalues the firm.
Alternatively, shareholders that construct relatively small blocks do
not face any mandatory disclosure requirements under the federal securities
laws. Once a block shareholder beneficially owns greater than 5% of the
outstanding shares of a company, however, the Williams Act imposes
reporting requirements on the shareholder. Section 14(d)(1) of the
Williams Act, in particular, requires the owner of more than 5% of a class
of a firm's securities to make a filing with the SEC containing information
218. Termed "short-term capital gains," taxpayers may use such gains to offset capital losses
without limit. See I.R.C. § 1211.
219. Termed "long-term capital gains," taxpayers presently face a 20% maximum tax rate for such
gains. Taxpayers in the 15% tax bracket face a 10% maximum tax rate. See I.R.C. § l(h).
220. For example, Jake is an investor in Acme. Jake may have purchased 1,000 shares in Acme
over a year ago at fifty dollars per share. Jake may have also purchased 2,000 shares six months ago at
a cost of $200 per share. Given Acme's present secondary market price of $100 per share, Jake will
face a capital gains tax on the 1,000 shares purchased over a year ago as well as a potential short-term
capital loss deduction on the 2,000 shares purchased six months ago.
221. See Stout, supra note 44, at 625-35 (1995) (advancing the theory that investors in the stock
market may hold heterogeneous expectations as to share values).
222. See id.
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disclosure required under Section 13(d) of the Williams Act and the SEC's
own rules and regulations. 223 The required disclosure items include the
identity of the owner; the source and amount of the funds used to make the
purchase; and any plans the owner may have to liquidate, merge, and make
a major change to the corporation if the purpose of the owner is to acquire
control.224 To the extent the market reacts to news of the formation of a
large block positively, the cost to the outside investor of constructing a
larger block increases. The market, for example, may take the construction
of a large block as a sign that a takeover of the firm is more likely. Even
past the 5% threshold, announcements of the intention to assemble
increasingly larger blocks provide a stronger signal of a potential takeover
to the market, leading to a larger secondary market price increase and
thereby a higher cost to purchase additional shares in the block.225
Consequently, then, our assumption that the supply curve for Acme's
shares is upward sloping does not appear to be overly brave or unrealistic.
On the contrary, there are many good reasons to believe that shares of
virtually any publicly traded firm have similar qualitative characteristics.
But even if one were not prepared to accept this assumption, it is not
absolutely necessary for our principal thesis to hold. Indeed, so long as the
block shareholder must pay some premium on the margin over fair actuarial
value to buy Acme's shares, purchasing a toehold in order to extract a side
payment can still dominate a hostile acquisition. Where a premium exists
for each share (even if not increasing in block size), the block shareholder
still has the ability to reduce its incremental costs of engaging in a takeover
through the prior purchase of a toehold. Through a toehold (and the sunk
cost expense of assembling the toehold), the block shareholder may
increase the credibility of the takeover threat and thereby extract part of the
managers' private benefits of control. Thus, while our assumption about
increasing marginal premiums accentuates the quantitative aspect of our
argument, it is not altogether critical for our qualitative thesis to hold.
2. Credible Commitments
A second critical assumption in our analysis is that managers are able
to use corporate governance or other mechanisms to commit up front to a

223. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (2000).
224. See id. § 78m(d)(l)(A)-(C).
225. On the other hand, outside acquirers that conduct a coercive tender offer may "force" outside
investors to tender their shares for less than their actual value. For a general discussion, see Lucian
Arye Bebchuk, Toward UndistortedChoice and Equal Treatment in CorporateTakeovers, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 1695, 1696 (1985) (describing the impact of coercive tender offers on efficiency).
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ceiling on their ability to appropriate firm value, and in a fashion that is
binding on potential acquirers. Without such an ability to commit,
managers may not credibly deter the entrance of a block shareholder. For
example, recall that absent a threat from the takeover market, Acme's
226
management would appropriate all of the firm's value of $1.1 billion.
Eager to exploit this potential, Acme's management might consider simply
"announcing" that they plan to appropriate only $20 million worth of the
company's assets. Without any form of commitment, however, once the
outside investor passes on the opportunity to form a toehold block, Acme's
managers would simply appropriate the full value of the firm. Realizing
this commitment problem, the outside investor will treat Acme's managers'
representations as mere "cheap talk," treating matters as if Acme
management had made no representations whatsoever. Thus, for the
deterrence arguments in this paper to work, it is important that managers
have the capacity to commit credibly to an upper bound on their ability to
appropriate value.
As above, however, we contend that this assumption is also quite
plausible. In fact, several methods exist for Acme's managers to commit to
a particular level of private benefits. First, managers may utilize various
corporate governance devices to control the possibility of managerial
opportunism. For example, managers may install a board of directors
consisting of outside independent directors with a reputational interest in
monitoring managers. The credibility of such a board over time, moreover,
may be enhanced through the use of a staggered board structure that limits
the ability of managers and shareholders to remove certain directors
without significant delay. Alternatively, the corporation could employ a
confidential voting policy aimed at increasing the willingness of
shareholders to vote against management during a proxy contest. Although
managers may later attempt to reverse such corporate governance choices,
reversal may be difficult. Reversal, for example, may send a negative
signal to the market reducing share value and attracting the attention of
potential corporate acquirers. Managers may also commit to certain
devices through a corporate charter amendment to reduce the risk of
reversal.22 7

226. Note that this result abstracts from other mechanisms that may constrain the ability of
managers to expropriate private benefits including contractual devices, reputation, and fiduciary duties.
Nonetheless, the point remains that the amount of private benefits that managers may expropriate
increases absent the ever present threat of a takeover.
227. For example, managers may place a term in the corporate charter requiring a two-thirds
supermajority vote on the part of shareholders to approve a reversal.
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A second means of commitment is to utilize state corporate law more
directly. Managers may incorporate the firm in a state with more stringent
fiduciary duty standards or weaker derivative suit demand requirements on
shareholders. To the extent reincorporation requires a shareholder vote,
managers lose the ability to exit unilaterally from the state law fiduciary
duty protections.2 28 Managers may also choose to initiate the process to
opt-out of state law antitakeover devices. 229 State law fiduciary duties also
often place great importance on the status quo. Given the business
judgment rule, managers enjoy great leeway in the amount of private
benefits they may appropriate from the firm. Courts often lack the
expertise to assess directly the value of particular managerial decisions.
Once a particular management team chooses to appropriate a particular
level of private benefits, however, courts then have a benchmark for the
level of shareholder value possible in the firm. To the extent the managers
choose to increase drastically the amount they appropriate from the firm
resulting in a large drop in corporate profits, courts and shareholders may
use this as a signal that managerial opportunism has increased.2 30 Other
factors, of course, may cause a drop in corporate profits; nevertheless, the
signal may be particularly strong when a new control block shareholder
immune to subsequent takeover assumes control over the firm.
Third, managers may choose to have the firm take on a higher level of
debt financing. A greater amount of debt forces the firm to pay out its free
cash flow to the debtholders. 23 1 To the extent managers seek to avoid
financial distress, managers will then have an incentive to engage in
projects that generate cash flow instead of projects more geared to their
228. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1460 (1992) (noting that while shareholders
have to power to approve a corporate reincorporation only the board of directors may initiate a
reincorporation).
229. In Delaware, for example, a decision to opt out of section 203's moratorium period as a
categorical matter requires an amendment to either the company's charter or the by-laws, through a Vote
of the shareholders. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(b)(3) (1998). The board could propose such a
charter or by-law amendment at an annual or special shareholder meeting.
230. Russia has provided examples of corporations where large drops in the amount of corporate
profits may indicate opportunism. See Bernard Black, Reinier Kraakman, & Anna Tarassova, Russian
Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731 (2000)
(describing how the Russian corporation "Noyabrskneftegaz earned $600 million in 1996, before
[Boris] Berezovski acquired control of Sibneft [Noyabrskneftegaz's parent company], and $0 in 1997.
Most of the missing $600 million showed up as Sibneft profit, even though under the company law,
transactions between parent and subsidiary require approval by the subsidiary's minority shareholders,
which was never obtained.").
231. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers,
76 AM. ECON. REV., PAPERS & PRoc. 323, 324 (May 1986); Rene M. Stulz, Managerial Discretion
and Optimal Financing Policies, 26 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (1990).
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own personal preferences. Managers, as well, will be forced to pay out this
cash flow to the debtholders rather than re-invest the cash into a valuereducing project that increases the managers' own welfare.
Fourth, managers may install long-term executive compensation
packages that rely on options and other means of aligning the incentives of
managers and their shareholders. Managers with option-based
compensation, for example, possess a reduced incentive to appropriate
private benefits of control to the extent their options suffer a reduction in
232
value as a result.
Fifth, managers may enter into long-term contracts with particular
customers and suppliers that penalize the firm for failing to meet certain
targets. For example, a contract with a customer may require the delivery
of a set amount of products at a fixed quality level. Failure to meet the
terms of the contract may result in a large penalty payment that reduces the
amount of value available for managers to appropriate or places the firm at
risk of financial distress. Such a contract may therefore force managers to
operate the firm at the minimum level of efficiency necessary to ensure that
the customer's contract terms are met. Managers seeking to appropriate
value from the firm through a reduction in work effort, for example, may
find a decreased ability to do so given a long-term supply contract with
large penalty terms. Managers that seek to appropriate value through the
diversion of production to their own benefit, as well, may face a reduced
233
ability to make such diversion.
And finally, Acme management itself may develop a long-term
reputation that acts as a commitment device. A manager, for example, may
enjoy a reputation as a low appropriator of private benefits. Because of this
reputation, the manager is able to negotiate for a higher compensation
package, making the reputation valuable to the manager. 234 Rather than
risk the reputation, the manager may therefore limit the amount
appropriated to levels consistent with that reputation.
Significantly, not all commitment devices are created equal. While
some are easily negated by management's successors, others have a
significantly longer shelf life. Firms that rely on the reputation of
incumbent managers, for example, often face an entirely new slate of
232. For a discussion of the usefulness of executive compensation as a means of controlling
managerial'agency problems see Robert Dean Ellis, Equity Derivatives, Executive Compensation, and
Agency Costs, 35 HOus. L. REv. 399 (1998).
233. On a related note, a robust competitive product market also reduces the ability of managers to
appropriate private benefits. See Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 564.
234. See Alchain, supra note 5 (discussing the incentive effect of the labor market for managers).
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managers after a change of control, and thus any reputation-based
commitments made by the erstwhile management would be virtually
irrelevant once an acquisition has occurred. Other commitment devices,
however, such as long-term contracts, financial leverage, and restrictive
debt covenants are likely to remain potent long after a control shift. As
well, the state of incorporation may also remain the same. We would
predict, therefore, that the favored forms of commitment devices are those
that are also durable, robust to changes in management. With a long-lived
limitation on their expected private benefits, outside investors may not
expect to gain as much from appropriating private benefits and instead seek
only to gain pro rata with other shareholders.
Of course, if we are correct in arguing that managers have significant
abilities to commit to a ceiling on their private benefits, we must also
address the affiliated question of why firms would ever want to leave
managers any flexibility to commit in the first place. Put another way, one
might legitimately wonder why the incorporators and promoters of the firm
wouldn't simply pre-commit its subsequent managers to some maximum
level of private benefits at the time of the initial corporate charter. 235 To
the extent private benefits of control result in value transferred from
shareholders to managers, the argument goes, shareholders that initially
invest in the firm will reduce their willingness to pay for the firm's shares.
The incorporators of the firm may increase the amount they receive from
the initial sale of securities to the public through the adoption of limits on
such private benefits.
While we believe this argument to be a strong one in some instances,
as noted above 236 its usefulness is limited by the costs of setting up such ex
ante schemes. Indeed, for the incorporationist argument to work, it must be
the case that the incorporators can anticipate with significant accuracy all
the ways in which managers can appropriate value, and formulate effective
means of tying their hands from doing so. Such ex ante approaches to
governance, however, rarely come at a low cost, particularly in the early
stages of forming a corporation, where the vicissitudes of the firm's
business environment have yet to run their course. Instead, within such an
environment, incorporators may wish to give their managers flexibility to
determine how to monitor for managerial diversion of private benefits of
control. To the extent that specifying fully state-contingent corporate
charters is prohibitively costly, then, giving managers the flexibility to

235.
236.

See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 1, at 305-07.
See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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determine the mix of optimal monitoring and incentive devices to control
managerial opportunism may work to increase shareholder welfare.
Consequently, it may be more prudent and less costly for
incorporators to let the market for corporate control induce managers to
make their own decisions about how to select value-maximizing corporate
governance devices. Once given such an incentive, managers are able to
use their own expertise and informational advantage to select the most
efficient forms of corporate governance devices, without requiring the
founders of the firm to expend considerable resources on anticipating them.
When the acquisitions market is a relatively effective means of deterrence
(and we have argued that allowing favoritism may make it even more so),
such a strategy can make a great deal of sense.
3. Relative Bargaining Power
Another important assumption of our model concerns the bargaining
power of incumbent management relative to the outside investor. Recall
that in the numerical example above, we assumed that M and B split any
gains from bargaining in equal portions. While this seems a sensible
assumption in the abstract, it implicitly presupposes that the parties are
similarly situated, sophisticated, and patient. Because there are plausibly
bargaining settings in the real world that differ from these preconditions, it
is important to consider how our conclusions might change if one player
had significantly more bargaining power than the other.
Perhaps the best vehicle for addressing this question is to consider the
two "extreme" cases in which either B or M possesses all the bargaining
power. Consider first the case where the outside investor B has the power
to make a "take it or leave it" offer, extracting the full value of the surplus
from M. Such a situation is not terribly implausible, given that many block
shareholders are large, well-capitalized arbitrageurs and institutions,
capable of having great influence on corporate management. In such a
situation, as it turns out, our central thesis not only persists, but it is
actually strengthened by having a strong bargainer as a block shareholder.
To understand the intuition behind this result, recall that when
bargaining is permitted the principal purpose that B has for building an
initial toehold is to become a "credible" threat of a takeover: That is, B
wishes to build a sufficient ownership block so that B's prospective net
benefits of completing a takeover of Acme are positive (even if just barely
so). At this point, B would be able to claim a share of the difference
between B's prospective takeover payoff and the incumbent manager's
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payoff in the absence of a takeover. When the block shareholder possesses
all the bargaining power, the payoff it can expect from becoming a credible
negotiator grows even larger than in our baseline case of equal bargaining
power. Indeed, now B enjoys more than simply a "share" of the bargaining
surplus, but instead can claim all of it. As such, B will be willing (if
necessary) to build even a larger toehold when B knows it can expect all
the fruits of the bargain.
For these very same reasons, then, player M has even stronger reasons
to fear B's entry, and will even more strongly favor deterrence over
accommodation. Indeed, if M were to accommodate B, it would now
necessitate a bribe that robs M of all private benefits of control, leaving M
with nothing. As such, M is substantially more motivated to deter B from
entering in those situations where B has most or all of the bargaining
power. Accordingly, M will choose an even sharper constraint on the
237
ability to appropriate value.
Now consider the opposite case, in which M has sufficient bargaining
power to capture the entire surplus from forming a coalition. In this case,
the incumbent manager is much less fearful of a block shareholder who
forms a toehold. Indeed, when M possesses all the bargaining power, all
gains from negotiating go directly to M; player B receives nothing more
than the expected takeover payoff. Consequently, B has very little
incentive to form a credible toehold in the first place, given that it cannot
extract any additional rents from player M. Thus, when M has all the
bargaining power, the players will behave just as if bargaining were
prohibited, with M committing to appropriate at most 3.67% of firm
value, 238 and B deciding against forming a toehold.
From this discussion, it should be clear that the benefits of allowing
favoritism are most pronounced when the incumbent manager's bargaining
power is not "too large" compared with the block shareholder. For only in
those situations will management have a clear incentive to deter the
formation of a toehold block of shares' Such was the case when either B
had all the bargaining power or when M and B have equal bargaining
powers. When, in contrast, managers have much or all of the bargaining
power, permitting favoritism does not have a clear advantage over
prohibition. Nevertheless, as noted above, even in this situation, permitting
237. Indeed, when B has all the bargaining power, the unique equilibrium of the model entails M
deciding to constrain itself even further, committing to appropriate no more than 1.70% of the firm's
value (compared to 2.12% in the equal bargaining power case).
238. See supra text accompanying notes 190-91 (noting that 3.67% represents the benchmark
level of managerial expropriation of private benefits when shareholder favoritism is prohibited).
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favoritism may simply bring about the same equilibrium outcome as does
prohibition. Although B may choose not to form a toehold and negotiate a
coalition with M, B may still undertake an outright takeover to displace M
when private benefits are sufficiently high. As such, even though our
bargaining power assumption is important, a weak form of our argument
still holds regardless of the parties' relative bargaining power.
4. Thick Acquisition Markets
Fourth, our analysis simplified strategic considerations by assuming
that there was but a single outside investor (that is, B) capable of mounting
a hostile acquisition of the company. In the real world, where capital
markets are well developed and arbitrageurs are numerous, this assumption
appears to be somewhat limited. One might justifiably wonder, then, how
we might generalize our example to allow for two, three, or an arbitrary
number of "N" potential block shareholders, each of whom was capable of
purchasing up to a control block in the company.
As it turns out, our model is capable of such a generalization, albeit at
the price of added complexity. Without going too far into the details,
however, generalizing our example to allow for multiple block
shareholders actually strengthens our central thesis rather than undercutting
it. The intuition here is simple: When multiple block shareholders await in
the wings, incumbent managers who might otherwise prefer to form a
coalition must now worry about having to make multiple bribes in order to
retain control. 239 Particularly since their initial toehold purchases can be
relatively small, each block shareholder now poses the credible threat of
completing a takeover. Thus, since we have demonstrated that incumbent
management has an incentive to choose deterrence over accommodation
with only one outside investor in the picture, this incentive almost certainly
becomes stronger when multiple block shareholders stand at the ready.
Indeed, because each of the investors is similarly situated, choosing a level
of X private benefits sufficient to deter one of them would have a similar
effect on all investors. Thus, we are relatively confident that our central
arguments would have as much or more force in a more realistic setting
where the takeover market harbors numerous potential acquirers.

239. Having multiple parties willing to purchase a significant block is quite possible in the capital
markets. Michael Bradley, Anand Desai, and E. Han Kim found that 46% of tender offer contests
during early 1980s involved a multiple bidder situation. See Michael Bradley, Anand Desai & E. Han
Kim, Synergistic Gainsfrom CorporateAcquisitions and Their Division Between the Stockholders of
Target and Acquiring Firms, 21 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 29 (1988).
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5. Initial Ownership Structure
Finally, our analysis above has presumed throughout that the firm's
shareholdings begin from a dispersed position, where no existing
shareholder owns an appreciable stake. This assumption was deliberate,
particularly given that managerial agency problems are perceived to be
most pronounced in such situations. At the same time, however, our
argument was based on the premise that allowing patronage would cause
managers to act in ways that deter opportunistic block shareholders from
emerging. When a block shareholder already exists, however, such
deterrence arguments are significantly less coherent.
Consequently, we acknowledge that our theoretical argument is
substantially weaker for firms who already have significant block
shareholding in place.
For here, allowing favoritism may induce
incumbent block shareholders simply to extract side payments, providing
little incentive for managers to take deterrent action. To be sure,
preexisting block shareholders may serve other valuable purposes, such as
monitoring the firm's managers, which we have downplayed in the above
analysis. 240 To the extent that this monitoring effect is pronounced, there
may be an independent justification for favoritism that emanates for
reasons outside those offered above.
IV. REFORM POSSIBILITIES
With the conclusions of the previous subsection in hand, we turn in
this Part to a more policy-oriented discussion of the regulatory reform
possibilities suggested by these conclusions. To be sure, one must always
exercise a prudent dose of caution in interpreting results from theoretical
models such as that presented above. But at the same time, the intuitions
that such models expose may deserve serious consideration by legislatures,
courts, and other policymakers. It is these very intuitions (and their
implications) that we pursue below.
One of the more important insights from the previous section is that
the very form of opportunism that regulators fear in the context of
shareholder favoritism can, ironically, serve as a beneficial restraint on
managerial self-dealing at the ex ante stage. As such, efficiency-minded
regulators would be well advised to keep this potential benefit in mind,
focusing less on whether "opportunism" has motivated some instance of
favoritism, but rather on whether the requisite preconditions exist for
240.

Indeed, this is precisely the argument offered in Ayres & Cramton, supra note 148.
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favoritism to have the efficiency-enhancing ex ante effects we have
suggested. Such conditions include the following:
a. Whether the block shareholder extracting favoritism is relatively
new (rather than a preexisting block shareholder);
b. Whether there are numerous potential purchasers of blocks;
c. Whether incumbent management's bargaining power against the
block shareholder is not "too large";
d. Whether management has credible devices at its disposal by which
it might constrain its own ability to appropriate value; and
e. Whether purchasing a block of shares requires the payment of a
premium over fair market value.
Indeed, considerations such as these could (and, we believe, should)
come into play when courts evaluate the particular forms of shareholder
patronage outlined in Part II. Section A discusses various reforms
regulators may wish to consider within the present regulatory framework.
Section B raises several additional concerns regulators may wish to
consider. Section C then sketches a new market-based approach to
regulating selective payments to shareholders.
A. REFORMS TO THE REGULATORY SYSTEM

It is perhaps no overstatement to characterize much of the existing
corporate governance landscape as focusing centrally on preventing
opportunism. Indeed, it is widely recognized that corporate law focuses on
the agency problem between managers and dispersed public shareholders
(and, in some cases, other constituencies). The regulatory prohibitions
against many forms of selective payments, therefore, draw much of their
legitimacy from the putative dangers implicit in managerial
opportunism. 24 1 To the extent, however, that the intuitions exposed above
are valid, regulators would be well advised to apply their scrutiny only after
accounting for the efficiency-promoting effects on opportunism. Such
considerations may play a role in a number of existing doctrines governing
shareholder favoritism, and we therefore revisit some of them below.

241.

See supra Part 11.
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1. Selective Payments Reconsidered
As noted in Part II, conventional wisdom reflects significant
skepticism about shareholder patronage, viewing it as a manifestation of
managerial opportunism. Regulators have responded to this perceived risk
by systematically prohibiting such selective patronage, starting-quite
logically-with those types of favoritism that are easiest to verify (such as
outright non-pro rata distributions of cash and property). Over time, such
legal prohibitions have expanded piecemeal to proscribe successively less
verifiable categories of patronage, in a sort of regulatory back-and-forth
game with managers, who in turn respond by shifting242their activities toward
more indirect and opaque mechanisms of patronage.
As we have already suggested, this regulatory dance may impose
significant inefficiencies, since indirect forms of patronage are likely to be
progressively more costly to implement and confer less value on recipients
(resulting in a dead weight loss from an efficiency perspective). The
potential inefficiency becomes even more severe, however, if shareholder
favoritism has a welfare-enhancing effect on corporations. Most obviously,
our arguments suggest that regulators should think twice before
categorically banning a form of patronage simply because of perceived
opportunism. While such payments may indeed have an opportunistic
intent, we have argued that the very ability to make such payments can
impose an even stronger ex ante deterrent effect on managers. Permitting
such payments becomes attractive precisely because it will induce
managers to choose the path of deterrence, thereby bypassing the necessity
to make such transfers (at least under the conditions specified above).
More subtly, however, once regulators understand that even
opportunistic payments can enhance corporate welfare, it follows that the
efficacy of favoritism is maximized when the medium for conferring
patronage is as direct as possible. Viewed in this light, distributions
consisting of outright transfers of cash or property are, ironically, the best
vehicles of deterrence, in that they avoid the inefficiencies involved in
indirect forms of patronage.2 43 For example, direct payments provide a
clear and verifiable form of rent transfer upon which outside potential
block shareholders may rely. The uncertainty in the value of "in kind"
transfers, in contrast (such as selective information disclosure), affords
managers the ability to conceal the amount of transfer without the outside
242. For a taxonomy of different methods by which managers may favor particular shareholders,
see supra Part 1H.
243. See supra Part 11.
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investor necessarily attributing the drop to the manager's actions. Outside
investors, as a result, will treat such in kind patronage with enhanced
skepticism, thereby diluting the deterrent effect we have spotlighted.
Regulators may therefore wish to relax prohibitions against selective
cash distributions to favored shareholders (allowing such payments without
regard to motivation). Doing so will result in a shift from opportunistic "in
kind" transfers toward more direct cash favoritism, reducing the dead
weight loss inefficiency from favoritism. Regulators can also assist the
incentives of outside investors to form blocks along at least two additional
dimensions. First, regulators may help the division of a private benefit
surplus between managers and a toehold block through devices (such as
enforcement of patronage contracts) designed to increase the credibility of
both parties. In some situations, for instance, a firm may be sufficiently
cash constrained that managers can only credibly promise to transfer funds
over time to the toehold block. To ensure that the toehold block continues
to support the managers into the future, managers may wish to stagger
payments across time. Regulators, then, may be in a position to provide
centralized mechanisms for enabling managers to commit to such longterm contracts. For example, regulators might help to encourage or suggest
standard form agreements, standing ready to monitor and enforce such
agreements.
Likewise, block shareholders also benefit from being able to commit
credibly to support management into the future (in for example proxy
contests) and abstaining from acquiring additional shares to obtain control.
Regulators may enhance the credibility of such promises as well, providing
legal liability for block shareholders who breach such a promise. Once
again, the benefits of such credibility emanate from an ex ante perspective,
where the ability of a block shareholder to extract patronage imposes
increased pressure on managers to manage companies efficiently.
In some ways, these regulatory changes would not necessitate a
complete overhaul of the existing system. Under current law in most
states, for instance, shareholders already enjoy limited ability to enter into
voting trusts and vote pooling agreements with one another. 24 At the same
time, however, various limitations exist on the use of such devices to bind a
shareholder to support management, thereby rendering them less reliable
than they might otherwise be. For example, even though Delaware law
244. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 218 (1998) (voting trusts and other voting arrangements).
Through standstill agreements, moreover, shareholders may already agree to abstain from further
purchases of a corporations stock in return for consideration. See supra note 10.
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permits any shareholder to sign over an irrevocable proxy as consideration
for some other contractual agreement, it limits enforcement only to those
that are "coupled with an interest sufficient in law to support an irrevocable
power."2 45 Given the open-ended nature of this condition, it is entirely
possible for a court to conclude that the entrenching effect of an
opportunistic agreement between incumbent management and a block
246
shareholder is not of the type of envisioned by the statute.
Second, regulators may assist the pool of potential outside investors
by encouraging informational disclosure on existing relationships between
managers and preexisting block shareholders. 247 Consider an outside
investor making the decision whether to assemble a toehold block of shares
to extract rents from managers. Part of the uncertainty facing the outside
investor is whether other blocks of shares are present in the market and
their relationship with management. The presence of a competing block
already in a coalition with management, for example, may raise the cost of
a takeover for the new outside investor even after forming a toehold. The
higher cost of a takeover, in turn, reduces the negotiating strength of the
outside investor with management, reducing the expected amount of rent
extraction. The added uncertainty imposes risk-bearing costs on the
outside investor and may thereby deter formation of toehold blocks.
Through mandating disclosure (through, for example, a publicity
requirement frequently seen with voting trusts 248), regulators may reduce
the risk facing outside investors contemplating the formation of a block of
shares.
As noted above, regulators should be mindful of the relative
bargaining strengths of managers and outside toehold blocks in determining
whether to allow selective payments. Recall that our principal argument is
at its strongest when incumbent management did not wield "too much"
bargaining power against the block shareholder. As such, a permissive
legal posture toward favoritism is likely to have the greatest effect in
precisely these situations.

245.

246.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(e).

For a general discussion on the validity of voting trusts and vote pooling arrangements see
5 FLETCHER, supra note 52, § 2064. For a discussion of cases relating to voting trusts and vote pooling
arrangements, see CLARK, supra note 1,at 772-81.
247. Already block shareholders with more than 5% beneficial ownership of a corporation's class
of equity stock must make a number of disclosures pursuant to the Williams Act. See supra note 78 and
accompanying text.
248. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 218 (requiring a copy of a voting trust agreement to be filed
with the Secretary of State and subject to inspection by other shareholders).
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At the same time, however, the relative bargaining strengths between
managers and outside investors are often context-specific, and thus the task
of developing a general rule is difficult. Nevertheless, regulators may still
be able to identify some canonical situations where incumbent management
is unlikely to dominate negotiations with block shareholders, and enforce
patronage agreements in those contexts. Although we cannot offer a
complete catalogue of such instances, they are likely to include situations
in which (i) incumbent management stands to incur a large reputational loss
should a hostile acquisition occur; or (ii) the outside investor has a
2 49
reputation for effectively extracting rents from management.
Alternatively, regulators might be able to modify directly the
bargaining range itself, by perhaps conditioning their approval of patronage
on whether the bribe received by the block shareholder exceeds a specified
minimum amount. Managers with superior bargaining power that wish to
payoff a particular toehold shareholder are then unable to do so with only a
de minimis bribe but must exceed at least the regulatory minimum.
Shareholders may then have an incentive to construct a block of shares
even where managers otherwise hold most of the bargaining power.
2. Fiduciary Duties
State corporate law imposes significant mandatory restrictions on the
ability of managers to appropriate private benefits in the form of fiduciary
duties, and particularly the fiduciary duty of loyalty. Under the duty of
loyalty, courts require that managers not profit at the expense of corporate
welfare. 250 The duty of loyalty, therefore, provides a mechanism that may
complement the takeover market to help control managerial opportunism.
For example, takeovers are most likely during a decline in share price,
which in turn may deter managers from engaging in a series of small
actions that extract value-actions that eventually have a large impact on
share price. But for extremely large value diversions, takeovers may
provide inadequate deterrence, since the risk of displacement would pale in
comparison to the significant gains that managers might glean from a onetime act of disloyalty. The duty of loyalty, on the other hand, is well suited

249.
Ironically, therefore, rather than condemn the so-called greenmail "artists" of the 1980s, we
should be celebrating their actions. See Fred R. Bleakley, Outrage Over Disney Buyout, N.Y. TIMES,

June 13, 1984, at D1.
250. In what has become perhaps the most celebrated statement of this duty, Judge Benjamin
Cardozo famously wrote that the duty of loyalty required "[n]ot honesty alone, but the punctilio of an

honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior." Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546
(N.Y. 1928). For more on the duty of loyalty see supra note 57.
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to regulate one-time acts of self-dealing. Litigants who can prove such
breaches of the duty, then, will enjoy a much more secure avenue for
redress.
Likewise, fiduciary duties can also play a complementary role in
ensuring that managers, entering into a coalition with a toehold
shareholder, are unable to increase substantially the amount of firm value
they appropriate for themselves past the benchmark level where side
payments are prohibited. 25 1 Too high levels of expropriation, for example,
may simply induce the outside block shareholder to takeover the firm
outright.2 52 Managers, as a result, will tend to choose deterrence over
accommodation even when shareholder favoritism is allowed. Imposing
fiduciary duties that focus on egregious levels of private benefit
expropriation on the part of managers (excluding selective payments to
outside shareholders) serves as a safety net to ensure that managers will not
increase their ability to extract private benefits through a coalition with a
toehold shareholder.
At the same time, the potential complementary role of fiduciary duties
does not come cost-free. The presence of fiduciary duties, for example,
exposes a firm's managers to the possibility of costly and sometimes
frivolous derivative suits, 253 pursued simply to extract a settlement.
Because of the expense inherent in such lawsuits, corporations may
routinely settle derivative suits rather than expend resources in defense, no
matter how legitimate the claim. 254 Adding to this incentive to settle,
director and officer (or "D&O") liability insurance policies often will pay
for settlements but not for judgments at trial. 5 The value of fiduciary
duties, moreover, may vary depending on the specific firm. In firms where
managers have many opportunities to engage in significant episodes of rent
extraction, fiduciary duties are likely to be much more valuable than in
firms where such opportunities are more limited. Firms, for example, that

251. See supra text accompanying notes 208-15.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 208-15.
253. See Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 55 (1991). For evidence of nonmeritorious securities litigation, see Janet Cooper Alexander,
Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497
(1991); James Bohn & Stephen Choi, Fraud in the New-Issues Market: Empirical Evidence on
Securities Class Actions, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 903 (1996).
254. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats
to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1996); Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519
(1997); David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance
Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985).
255. See Alexander, supra note 253, at 550-51.
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operate in highly competitive markets may operate on such thin margins
that managers cannot extract many rents without inviting bankruptcy.
Moreover, not every form of fiduciary duty is entirely complementary
with our underlying thesis. In particular, it is important to note that state
corporate law universally imposes fiduciary duties on dominant
25 6
shareholders, including (perhaps) those who purchase a significant block
seeking to extract rents from managers. Even though we have highlighted
the potential benefits of such activities, courts with an eye toward fiduciary
principles may treat a toehold block in coalition with management as
equivalent to a controlling shareholder. The application of fiduciary duties
to toehold blocks in coalition with management, then, can impair the ability
of such shareholders to extract private benefits from management. Outside
investors therefore will have a reduced incentive to form a block in the first
place, thereby retarding the disciplining threat that shareholder patronage
represents. Hence, while fiduciary duties are quite possibly a complement
of our thesis, their application does not uniformly cohere with the
arguments presented above. 257 Regulators should not rely too comfortably
on the ability of enhanced fiduciary duties to substitute for (or augment)
takeover markets effectively.
3. Antitakeover Devices and Statutes
Obviously critical to our analysis of shareholder favoritism is the
background possibility of a hostile takeover. Thus, if managers can
implement antitakeover devices that reduce or completely cut off the
possibility of a takeover, then two unappetizing consequences result. First,
and most directly, managers become more entrenched, enjoying a greater
256. For Delaware cases imposing a duty of loyalty on controlling shareholders, see Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701, 709-10 (Del. 1982); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 719 (Del. 1971); Sterling v.
Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 109-10 (Del. 1952). See also supra note 57 (discussing the
fiduciary duty of loyalty).
For an examination of the fiduciary duty owed by controlling shareholders to minority
shareholders, see John C. Carter, The Fiduciary Rights of Shareholders,29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 823,
831-36 (1988). See also Eric Seiler, Daniel M. Taitz, & Ellen A. Hamick, Issues Relating to
Controlling Shareholders,in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, DOING DEALS: UNDERSTANDING THE NUTs

AND BOLTS OF TRANSACTIONAL PRACTICE 455 (1996) (noting the uncertainty of court-based fiduciary
duty doctrine as applied to controlling shareholders).
257. We would therefore allow managers to freely make payments to outside shareholders (and
allow such shareholders to accept such payments) without regard to fiduciary duty. On the other hand,
imposing a fiduciary duty on other actions that managers may take (e.g., executive compensation and
self-dealing transactions directly involving the managers) will then help limit the amount of increased
private benefit expropriation that is possible through a coalition between managers and outside
shareholders.
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ability to appropriate private benefits without fear of a takeover.
Consequently, in the presence of such measures, only those nontakeover
methods of deterrence are likely to be effective. Fiduciary duties, for
example, remain as one possible limit to excess opportunism even when
antitakeover devices reduce the threat of a takeover. In addition, it may be
to use the proxy system to vote out a firm's
possible for outside investors
258
directors.
of
board
current
Second, antitakeover provisions reduce the threat of an outside
investor forming a toehold block to extract rents from management. This
disincentive can be bad news for other shareholders, since-as we argued
above-the formation of a toehold can give the outside investor sufficient
credibility to extract patronage from managers, an ability that ultimately
deters agency costs. Antitakeover devices that reduce the threat of a
takeover, then, also diminish the block shareholder's bargaining credibility,
thereby deterring the formation of the toehold in the first place.
Consider, for example, antitakeover devices that impose a minimum
amount of shares that a potential acquirer must own prior to obtaining
control. Delaware, for example, employs a so-called control share
acquisition statute. Contained within section 203 of Delaware's General
Corporation Law, the control share acquisition statute prohibits persons
acquiring 15% or more of a corporation's voting stock from undertaking a
business combination without prior board approval for a three-year
period.2 59 Persons who cannot obtain board approval must either wait for
the moratorium period to pass, or be willing to purchase at least 85% of the
corporation's outstanding voting stock (excluding shares held by directors
260
or officers of the corporation as well as certain employee-owned stock).
Requiring an outside investor who seeks control to purchase a
supermajority of shares makes takeovers considerably more difficult.
Particularly where the cost of assembling a block is increasing with block
size, outside investors may face prohibitively large costs putting together
the larger required control block. In the context of the paper's framework,
the prospective harm to managers occurs through the amount of rent a
toehold shareholder is able to extract. Increasing the cost of a takeover

258. Firms, nevertheless, may install classified boards to deter the use of even proxy contests to
change control.
259. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(1) (1998).
260. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(2). Other methods of avoiding board approval are
possible. An acquirer, for example, may seek the approval of a supermajority of disinterested
shareholders. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(3).
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reduces the ability of the toehold at the time they bargain with managers to
26 1
extract rents, thereby reducing the deterrent effect on managers.
Despite the negative impact of antitakeover devices for our central
thesis, some variation on Delaware's antitakeover statute may in fact have
some salubrious effects. Recall that managers forming a coalition with a
toehold block must compensate the shareholder for the reduced value of the
262
shareholder's stake that the manager's appropriations will bring about.
The larger the toehold, then, the more overall anticipated loss to
shareholders that managers must internalize when paying off the block
shareholder.
Notwithstanding this observation, recall also that the outside investor
has an incentive to form the minimal possible toehold that still makes the
takeover threat a credible one. Indeed, forming a larger toehold would buy
the shareholder little in the way of bargaining credibility, and would come
at significant cost. Indeed, for each dollar the outside investor expends to
form a larger toehold, only a fraction of the resulting bargaining surplus
can be recouped.
Regulators may be able to exploit these competing incentives by
adopting a permissive view toward shareholder favoritism, but limited
solely to those toehold blocks that meet a certain minimum level of
ownership. Such a minimum share ownership requirement may work to
push outside investors to form larger toeholds than they otherwise would,
and under certain circumstances this might benefit all shareholders in a
corporation. Indeed, now incumbent management will realize that it will
have to make an even larger payment to buy off a block shareholder, and
might have an enhanced incentive to reduce private benefits before such a
shareholder emerges.
On the other hand, conditioning enforceability of patronage on
minimum share ownership can also have counterproductive effects. For
instance, setting the minimum too high can cause some outside investors to
choose simply to forego assembling a toehold altogether (due to the
261. On the other hand, where the outside investor may seek to appropriate its own private
benefits after a takeover, forcing the outside investor to conduct an acquisition with a larger control
block may benefit all shareholders. Once the outside investor owns a larger control block, it will
internalize more of the cost from private benefit appropriation, thereby deterring such appropriation.
262. Formally in the model, because the toehold shareholder owns a significant block, they benefit
more from a takeover. The greater the private benefit level, the more the toehold block shareholder
benefits from the takeover. Managers seeking to enter a coalition with the toehold block shareholder
must then compensate the toehold block shareholder for its foregone takeover benefits when entering
into the coalition. See supra notes 208-15 and accompanying text.
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expense), notwithstanding the commitment by management to exercise
restraint. Regulators must therefore take care in setting the minimum level
of share ownership such that an outside investor will in fact seek to expand
their block. Unlike under Delaware's present control share acquisition
statute,2 63 regulators should also remove the ability of a corporation's board
to waive application of the statute. Given such ability, managers will
simply waive the minimum share ownership requirement to avoid the threat
of larger toeholds.
B. OTHER REFORM CONSIDERATIONS
In designing policy to take into account the ex ante incentive effects of
shareholder patronage, regulators may also wish to consider a few other
considerations that affect this Article's analysis. This Section discusses
two of them: (1) the possibility that managers may negotiate with a toehold
block prior to committing to a maximum level of private benefits; and (2)
the impact of manager-owned blocks.
1. Timing of the Managers' Commitment
This Article's analysis assumes that shareholders are initially
dispersed and hold insignificant stakes. In such situations, of course, it is
unlikely that managers will render patronage toward any prospective block
shareholder before the purchase of a significant block. For example,
managers may find it difficult to identify which existing shareholders have
the liquidity to form a block of significant size. Even where identification
is possible, managers may view the threat of an outside shareholder to form
a block as not credible. Any outside shareholder may represent that it plans
to assemble a block of shares to extract rents from managers, even though
other outside options for such capital would in actuality be more attractive.
Managers may therefore prefer to wait for a toehold to actually form in the
market before commencing negotiations. Thus, in situations where firms
truly begin with a relatively dispersed shareholder base, our assumption
was probably well founded. 26
In several real-world situations, however, managers may be able to
negotiate with a prospective toehold block shareholder prior to committing

263. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(1) (allowing the board of directors to approve a business
combination with a shareholder that does not meet the minimum share ownership requirements of the
statute).
264. But see supra note 30 (citing evidence that many companies outside the United States and the
United Kingdom have significant block owners).
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to a fixed level of corporate governance. For example, firms with a pool of
preexisting block shareholders may already have an obvious bargaining
partner for management from the very beginning. Concentrated ownership
may be particularly common for firms on the eve of a public offering,
where a pool of preexisting blocks (e.g., founders, initial investors, and
venture capitalists) enjoys close relations with managers. Second, and
more generally, even within dispersed-ownership firms, managers may
have the ability to identify particular outside investors with the credible
capability of forming a block in advance. Some investors, for example,
may have a reputation for forming blocks to extract rents from managers.
This reputation may make the threat on the part of the outside investor to
265
form a toehold credible to managers.
If managers negotiate with a potential or preexisting block shareholder
prior to making a commitment to a maximum level of private benefits, our
central argument loses some of its force. Indeed, by locking up any outside
threats before making any commitment about future expropriations,
managers can exploit small-scale shareholders considerably. Returning to
the Acme hypothetical, if Acme's managers are able to negotiate with an
actual or potential block shareholder prior to committing to a maximum
level of private benefits, they may buy the shareholder's quiescence, and
then make no commitment at all, implicitly promising to loot the entire
worth of the company. 266 Such a deal must make managers better off than
the alternatives, since the managers can always refuse to bargain and then
commit to a ceiling of X , thereby deterring any entry by a block
shareholder. Managers therefore are more willing to make opportunistic
bribes in a manner that reduces overall corporate value when bargaining
precedes commitment.
Efficiency-minded regulators, then, would be wise to consider
whether an instant situation affords management the ability to lock up
preexisting or potential block shareholder prior to committing to a fixed
level of private benefits. Regulators, for example, may apply greater
scrutiny to agreements between managers and shareholders just prior to
when a firm opts into a regime that permits favoritism. 267 As well,
regulators may choose not to enforce any agreements between managers
265. See, e.g., Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (1964) (greenmail recipient had reputation for
extracting rents from management).
266. In our model, this corresponds to X = 1. Of course, fiduciary duties among other
mechanisms act as external limits (not covered explicitly in our model) that also limit the ability of
managers to expropriate private benefits of control.
267. See infra Part IV.C. (setting forth the argument that firms should have the ability to opt out of
prohibitions against shareholder favoritism).
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and an outside investor negotiated prior to when an outside investor forms
a toehold block. Or finally, regulators may wish to remain conscious of
how competitive the takeover market is in each case: Where there are
numerous possible block shareholders, reaching ex ante agreements with
some of them may be of only little solace to management, who may rather
simply choose the path of deterrence.
2. Manager-Owned Blocks
One possible response managers may have to the threat of outside
investors forming a toehold block is to form their own block of shares. To
be sure, this strategy is not always possible: In large publicly held
corporations, for instance, managers may lack the financial resources to
assemble a significant block, or would be forced to compromise the
diversification of their portfolios in order to do so. Nevertheless, the
possibility exists that managers in at least some firms may form a defensive
block of shares.
Managers that hold defensive blocks of shares will increase the cost to
outside investors seeking to form a block in at least two ways. First, the
very presence of the managerial block raises the number of shares an
outside investor might need to acquire in order to obtain "effective" control
over the firm, as it can no longer count on as much support from
unaffiliated shareholders. The larger the block an outside investor must
form, the more expensive a takeover becomes. 268 Second, managers who
buy their own blocks are likely to purchase from existing shareholders who
value their shares the least, because of different expectations as to firm
value, varying tax rates, and so forth.26 9 Subsequent outside investors,
therefore, may be left having to purchase shares from higher valuing
shareholders, which increases the marginal cost of forming a block.
Despite the impact that a manager-owned block may have on the costs
faced by potential acquirers, managerial block ownership is probably not a
large cause for concern. Indeed, unlike fiduciaries who own no shares in a
firm, managers that own a significant block will at least partially bear the
cost of the appropriation of private benefits. 270 The net effect of a
manager-owned block is therefore inconclusive.

268. See supra Part II.C. I (discussing the rationales behind this Article's assumption of an
upward sloping supply curve for shares).
269. See supra Part 1I.C.l.
270. For example, managers that own 25% of the outstanding common stock will suffer a loss of
twenty-five cents for every dollar they expropriate as private benefits.
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This fundamental indeterminacy appears to be borne out in empirical
data as well. Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny have
previously made the observation that the risk of a takeover alone can result
in similar conflicting impacts from a management-owned block. 27 1 On the
one hand, the more shares management holds, the more expensive a
takeover for an outside investor, leading to greater management
entrenchment. On the other hand, the more shares in the hands of
managers, the more managers internalize the cost of their appropriation of
private benefits. For levels of board share ownership under 5%, they find
that overall firm value appears to increase in the size of the managerial
stake. 272 Between 5% and 25%, board share ownership negatively
correlates with firm value. 273 Above 25% of absolute share ownership,
274
increased board ownership again increases firm value.
The ability to engage in opportunistic bribes raises the cost to
managers from appropriating private benefits. Accumulating shares in a
management-controlled block therefore will provide managers with a
correspondingly higher benefit than where managers are faced solely with
the risk of a takeover. All other things being equal, we conjecture that
managers will accumulate larger blocks under a system where opportunistic
bribes are allowed to outside shareholders. 275 But at the same time, such
accumulations should not necessarily raise the ire of regulators.
C. MARKET-BASED REFORMS

The reform suggestions thus far assume that regulators are able to
assess correctly the costs and benefits of different methods of controlling
managerial opportunism. Although perhaps defensible in some situations,
it may be too much to presume as a general matter that regulators have
sufficient knowledge to diagnose correctly the needs of every corporation.
And even when they have such knowledge, regulators may also simply
make mistakes. In the presence of such imperfections, firms may find

271. See Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Management Ownership and Market
Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, 20 J. FIN. EcON. 293 (1988).
272. See id. at 311 (using the Tobin's Q measure of firm value).
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. From an overall efficiency standpoint, of course, this may not be so swell. Indeed, greater
ownership concentration in the hands of management, while providing a partial solution to agency cost
problems, also causes managers to hold a larger amount of undiversified risk than they would otherwise
be inclined to hold. This enhanced risk is a true inefficiency, but perhaps one that is necessary in a
second best world.
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themselves locked into legal
unresponsive to their needs.

protections

that

are

systematically

To make matters worse, however, even where regulators possess
adequate information and expertise, they are subject to influence on the
part of the very parties they seek to regulate. Regulators that seek a job
after they finish government service, for example, often find employment
in the very industry they regulated.2 76 Regulators seeking an industry job
may avoid imposing regulations that impose too high costs on their future
employers. Other regulators may expand the breadth and complexity of
regulations to justify increasing the size and scope of their regulatory
277
agency.
In state corporate law, many have cited the above problems to argue
that competition among the states provides a strong check on the ability of
regulators to deviate from regulatory provisions that maximize share
value.2 78 While we do not wish to enter this debate ourselves,2 79 it may at
the very least make sense for regulators to consider allowing firms to optout of state corporate law prohibitions dealing specifically with selective
payments to block shareholders.
The rationale for permitting firms to opt out of corporate governance
rules is, in our estimation, relatively persuasive, at least insofar as these
provisions deal predominantly with manager-shareholder relations.
Entrepreneurs of firms, for example, at the time they initially sell securities
to the public will have strong incentives to put in place both contractual as
280
well as legal investor protection devices that investors find worthwhile.
276. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political
Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
ECON. 3 (1971).
277. See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
36-42 (1971).
278. For a discussion of the race-to-the-top argument, see Daniel Fischel, The "Race to the
Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware'sCorporationLaw, 76 Nw. U. L.
REV. 913, 919-20 (1982). See also Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, ShareholderProtection, and the
Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 258 (1977) (making the argument that state
corporate law competition results in a race to the top). For a discussion of the race-to-the-bottom
hypothesis, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation:The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1992). See also William L. Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974) (contending that
state corporate law competition results in a race to the bottom).
279. One of us, nevertheless, has written on the topic. See Stephen J.Choi & Andrew T. Guzman,
Choice and Federal Intervention in Corporate Law, 87 VA. L. REV. 961 (2001); Stephen J. Choi
& Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities
Regulation, 71 S.CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998).
280. See supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
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To the extent rational and informed, investors then will increase their
willingness to pay for the firm's shares, putting more money into the
pocket of the entrepreneurs in control of the firm when it goes public.
Whether the practice of shareholder favoritism substantially benefits a
particular firm, moreover, is often specific to that firm. For companies that
start at the time of their IPO with significant block shareholders already
present, the ability to make side payments could conceivably result in an
increased overall level of private benefit appropriation.28 1 Such firms,
therefore, may choose to keep prohibitions against selective payments in
place. Other firms conducting an IPO, in contrast, may not have any large
block shareholders aside from the share ownership of corporate insiders. In
these situations, the ability to play favorites with shareholders may have the
salubrious effects we have suggested. Similarly, the inefficiency cost of
different forms of selective payments may also vary by firm. A firm, for
example, may benefit greatly from the ability to employ a particular
shareholder who has some particular expertise; banning selective payments
to shareholders then may impose a disproportionately large cost on the
firm. Consequently, giving individual firms the ability to determine their
own selective payment policy may substantially increase overall corporate
welfare.
While we are cautiously optimistic about the benefits of allowing optouts, we are also mindful of some of the potential pitfalls of such a regime.
Most notably, entrepreneurs at the time of a firm's IPO may fail to select a
patronage policy that maximizes overall corporate welfare due to
constraints on information and expertise. Robert Dairies and Michael
Klausner, for example, argue in a study of antitakeover provisions present
in corporate charter terms that firms often do not implement charter
provisions that maximize firm value.2 82 The increase in firm value from an
optimal selective payment policy, for example, may not exceed the cost to
entrepreneurs of taking the time and resources to determine and implement
such a policy. Regulators may be able to take some steps to mitigate such
information and contracting costs, such as providing a "menu" of optional
methods of selective payments that a firm may choose in its charter to
permit. Regulators may also provide a checklist of the range of possible

281. See supra Part IV.B.2. Recall, however, from our analysis there that even when management
chooses to accommodate block shareholders, there may be strong reasons against appropriating too
much value, since so doing would make a takeover extremely cheap, thereby allowing the block
shareholder to force management out of the bargain entirely through an outright takeover.
282. See Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value?
Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 83 (2001).
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wealth transfers allowable under each form of payment. Such mechanisms
are often an effective, low cost means of disclosing the possibilities for
effecting a selective payment policy within a firm. Having been made
aware of the possibilities, investors may have an easier time evaluating and
valuing the chosen policy of any particular firm.
Second, a liberal opt-out policy may fall prey to abusive practices,
particularly if it allows opting out at any time. Once a firm is public and its
shares are dispersed, for example, managers may then attempt to change its
283
patronage regime in a self-serving way-a so-called "mid-stream" shift.
One solution to the problem of mid-stream shifts is to allow firms to optout only at the time they initially sell securities to the public. While a
standard objection to this solution is that it creates organizational
inflexibility down the road, there are particularly strong reasons to prefer
ex ante opt-outs in the context of shareholder favoritism. Once a firm
decides to allow opportunistic payments, the benefit to shareholders comes
from the ever-present threat imposed on managers that an outside investor
will appear to extract rents from the managers. Allowing managers to
prohibit selective payments at a later point in time, in turn, reduces the
incentive of an outside investor ex ante to form a toehold, thereby reducing
the threat on managers.
Third, firms considering whether to opt-out of various regulatory
prohibitions against selective payments to shareholders may fail to take
into account the interests of other stakeholders at the firm. When managers
appropriate private benefits, for example, they may harm third parties.
Customers, for example, may suffer a reduction in product quality if
managers appropriate resources away from production, research, or quality
control in order to line their own pockets. Nevertheless, many such
stakeholders are themselves connected to the corporation through some
contract form of relationship. As such, these parties may be in a position to
demand better terms in their contractual dealings with the
company,
284
thereby causing the firm to internalize the cost of opportunism.

283. See supra note 28.
284. Even where not connected through contract, moreover, third parties (such as surrounding
communities) often receive little deference under state corporate and federal securities laws. For
example, Meritt Fox has made the argument that labor has a strong interest in the accuracy of securities
market prices. See Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should
Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498, 2562-69 (1997). The SEC, nevertheless, has not made the
protection of labor a factor in its decisionmaking. See Stephen J. Choi, Promoting Issuer Choice in
Securities Regulation, 2 VA. J. INT'L L. 613, 628 n.56 (2001). Indeed, determining the precise impact

on third parties often is extremely costly. Without a precise estimate on the impact to third parties,
simply mentioning third parties as an additional interest which firms must take into account may
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Thus, while allowing some form of opt-out when it comes to
shareholder favoritism is not without costs, such costs do not appear to be
prohibitive. Moreover, providing an opt-out option does not force
legislatures to engage in the complicated exercise of attempting to specify
the precise preconditions under which shareholder favoritism would
desirable or undesirable for each firm. To a large extent, firms making
their opting decision before going public can be trusted ex ante to specify
policies governing the manager-shareholder relationship that are reasonably
responsive to their own idiosyncrasies.
V. CONCLUSION
Received wisdom within corporate law maintains that "favoritism"
toward block shareholders has dangerous implications for overall corporate
welfare. On first blush, the concerns raised by conventional wisdom have
obvious merit: shareholder patronage frequently has the intent and the
effect of co-opting the very individuals who are the most viable takeover
threats toward incumbent management, causing them to fall short of their
enormous potential as credible monitors of corporate welfare. When such
individuals become the puppets of management, other shareholders and
stakeholders stand to lose.
In this Article, we have questioned the overall persuasiveness of this
received wisdom on at least two fronts. On a pragmatic level, we have
argued that the regulatory apparatus used to scrutinize shareholder
patronage has been more effective at relocating than eliminating the
phenomenon. Because regulation is most able to deter the most patent and
verifiable forms of favoritism, managers seeking to play favorites can (and
do) find more indirect and more costly means for accomplishing the task,
all to the detriment of the corporation as a whole.
On a more fundamental level, however, we have argued that even if
eliminating patronage were practically feasible, the underlying arguments
for doing so categorically seem far from compelling. Indeed, we have
demonstrated how the ability to make bribes can, ironically, make
managers worse off and all shareholders better off than in a world of
provide managers with a convenient pretext to engage in opportunism. The decision to take into
account the interest of third parties, moreover, is one that affects not only this Article's proposal, but all
corporate regulatory provisions that deal with managerial opportunism.
Similar arguments have been made against so-called shareholder constituency statutes. For a
description of shareholder constituency statutes, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting
Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971 (1992); William J. Carney, Does Defining
Constituencies Matter?, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 385 (1990).
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effective prohibition. Indeed, when legal rules permit favoritism, managers
are forced to choose between (i) sharing their private spoils with an
opportunistic block shareholder attempting to extract a bribe, and (ii)
reducing the amount of value they appropriate, deterring block ownership
2 85
and enjoying it alone. As we have demonstrated, in many situations
managers will prefer the deterrence option, a choice that redounds to the
benefit of shareholders.
These conclusions place the extant legal prohibitions against many
forms of selective payments to shareholders in a somewhat different (and
more critical) light. At the very least, our analysis suggests a slightly
different role for regulators than they have heretofore played. Rather than
seeking to determine when an instance of favoritism is motivated by
opportunism, courts and legislatures would more productively spend their
time analyzing whether the preconditions exist for the beneficial effects we
identify to take hold. On one end of the spectrum, managers of widely held
firms operating under a potential threat from numerous rent-seeking outside
investors will have strong incentives to make use of their own expertise to
limit the amount of private benefits available to extract. On the other
extreme, companies with preexisting block shareholders or those operating
in dysfunctional or small takeover markets are less amenable to the
permissive regime we have suggested. But be that as it may, the very
heterogeneity of business characteristics renders questionable the "onesize-fits-all" form of regulation that has historically attached to managers
who play favorites with shareholders. A first step in moving away from
that existing regime would be to allow companies a limited ability to opt
out of the regulatory status quo. In the pages above, we have suggested a
number of modest ways to introduce this and other regulatory reforms.
Although our arguments have been limited to the manager-shareholder
relationship and the market for corporate control, the fundamental point
that having to share rents with others can act as a strong form of deterrence
against opportunism is probably more general still. While not developed
here, there are a number of other applications of this insight to corporate
law, particularly insofar as other corporate stakeholders' claims are
concerned. For example, our arguments might be redirected not to the
takeover market, but rather to the corporate proxy system, in which B
represents a dissident shareholder who attempts to convince a block of
other shareholders to side with B and against management. In this case, the

285. See supra text accompanying notes 208-16 (enumerating the conditions under which
patronage can be value-enhancing for other shareholders).
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supply curve from our analysis would represent the marginal cost of
assembling political support for the dissident's alternate slate. Just as in the
case of a block shareholder, management may wish to "buy off' dissidents
who appear to pose a credible threat of displacing management.
Other applications of our theory might even transcend the shareholdermanager relationship. For instance, while creditors usually enjoy a
relatively fixed return on their investment, the default risk that the firm
presents can inject greater uncertainty into this claim. (A similar point
applies to other fixed claimants, including labor, suppliers, and customers).
Such fixed claimants may, at some expense, investigate the firm to
determine the current risk of insolvency. Managers of companies near
default may then attempt to favor a particular pivotal creditor of the firm
(that has uncovered the firm's impending insolvency), allowing the
manager to stay in control while fending off or delaying bankruptcy.
Arguably fearing the opportunistic dangers for other creditors that this
to
incentive creates, federal law vests bankruptcy trustees with the power 286
void preferences given to a creditor close to the filing of bankruptcy.
Our analysis presents a potential cost of such prohibitions. Indeed, if the
terms of the agreement with the pivotal creditor force management to
surrender a substantial value of its private benefits (from delaying
bankruptcy), permitting such favoritism may give management an incentive
to take actions that avoid financial distress altogether. Not only does such
restraint help debt holders, but maintaining a strong equity cushion may
also be in the interests of overall corporate welfare. While such extensions
are interesting, we leave them for future endeavors.

286.
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(2001) (providing a summary of voidable preference doctrine inside the United States). See also Vein
Countryman, The Concept of Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REV. 713 (1985)
(tracing the history of prohibitions against preferential transfers near bankruptcy).
Under Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee in bankruptcy may void transfers made to
a shareholder within 90 days of the filing of a bankruptcy petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A)
(2000). The trustee may void preferences given to insiders up to a year prior to the filing of a petition
for bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B). Although a variety of exceptions exists, including the
contribution on the part of a creditor of "new value" in return for the preference, none of the exceptions
apply to preferences given on the part of managers to delay opportunistically the filing of a bankruptcy
petition. See II U.S.C. § 547(c)(1)(A) (setting forth the new value exception).

